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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the evolution of antecedents, dimensions and initial screening 
models which discriminate between new product success and failure. It advances on 
previous empirical new product success/failure comparative studies by developing a 
discrete simulation procedure in which participating new product managers supply 
judgements retrospectively on new product strategies and orientations for two distinct 
time periods in the new product program: (1) the initial screening stage and (2) a 
period approximately 1 year after market entry. Unique linear regression functions 
are derived for each event and offer different, but complimentary, temporally 
appropriate sets of determining factors. Model predictive accuracy ascends over time 
and conditional process moderators alter success factors at both time periods. Whilst 
the work validates and synthesises much from the new product development 
literature, is exposes probable measurement timing error when single retrospective 
models assess success dimension rank at the initial screen. 
Six of seven hypotheses are accepted and demonstrate that: 
1. Many antecedents of success and measures of objective attainment are perceived 
by NPD (new product development) managers to differ significantly over time. 
2. Reactive strategy, NPD multigenerational history and a superior product are the 
most important dimensions of success through one year post launch. 
3. Current linear screening models constructed using retrospective methods produce 
average prescriptive dimensions which exhibit measurement timing error when 
used at the initial screen. 
4. Success dimensions evolve from somewhat deterministic to more stochastic over 
time with model forecasting accuracy rising as launch approaches based on better 
data availability. 
5. Product market PiLC (the life expectancy of an introduction before modification 
is necessary calculated in years and months) and its order of entry and level of 
innovation alter aggregate success model accuracy and dimension rank. 
6. Proper initial dimensional alignment and intra-process realignment based on 
changing environments is critical to a successful project through one year post 
launch. 
The work cautions practitioners not to wait for better models to be developed but 
immediately: (1) benchmark reasons for their current product market success, failure 
and kill historical "batting average"; (2) enhance and/or replace 
contributing/offending processes and systems based on these history lessons; (3) 
choose or reject aggregate or conditional success/failure models based on team 
forecasting ability; (4) concentrate on the selected model's time specific dimensions 
of success and (5) provide/reserve adequate resources to adapt strategically over time 
to both internal and external antecedent changes in the NPD environment. 
Finally, it recommends new research into temporal, conditional and strategic trade- 
offs in internal and external antecedents/dimensions of success. Best results should 
come from using both linear and curvilinear methods to validate more complex yet 
statistically elegant NPD simulations. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Background 
New product development (NPD) is defined as the overall process of strategy, 
organisation, concept generation, product and marketing plan creation and evaluation, 
and commercialisation of a new product (Crawford 1994). Booz Allen and Hamilton 
(1982) suggest that the process carries great risk, with Cooper revealing that 46% of 
the resources American firms devote to new products are spent on failures or 
cancellations (Cooper 1985a). Given early documented failure rates of 36.2% 
(Crawford 1979) and recent anecdotal estimates as high as 80-90% (Semon 1996), an 
improved understanding of the process is desirable. 
Failure rates can be reduced by more proficiently conducting up-front pre- 
development NPD activities (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b). Benefit measurement 
screening models such as NewProd (1979b, 1981,1985,1992), if used at the initial 
screen (see Figure 1-1), should help (Cooper 1985a). But despite field scholarship, 
up-front processes remain ineffective (Cooper and de Brentani 1984) and account for 
only 7.1% of NPD process expenditures (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988). 
Regrettably, new product success rates have not improved significantly in the last 
twenty years (Wind and Mahajan 1988). 
1.1.1 The problem with current screening models 
Ideally, screening models should: (1) be armtentative commitment in a sequential 
process; (2) have a reasonable balance of rejection and acceptance errors; (3) use 
uncertain information allowing for an absence of financial data; (4) allow multiple 
objectives and evaluation criteria and (5) be realistic and easy to use. However, this 
prototype does not exit (Cooper 1985a). 
The most important efforts to deliver this ideal emanate from the NewProd Project 
f 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981) and the Stanford Innovation Project (Maidique and Zirger VO, VV 
1984; Zirger and Maidique 1990). Their linear screening models exhibit some 
differences in methodology, construction, dimension selection and dimension order. 
But they have notable common dimensions of success to recommend them, to 
practitioners. Unfortunately, despite their claims of 73%-84% and 88% accuracy 
respectively, NPD up-front activities still go under-funded, weakly performed 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b) and models under-utilised (Cooper and de Brentani 
1984; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988). The simplest explanation for avoidance of 
9 
early NPD activities is that it is more direct and quicker to allow an experienced 
manager to predict the actual NPD outcome straightaway (Insinga 1986). This is 
credible in an age when the three year interval between the development of a new 
technology and its obsolescence, as in the 150MHz Pentium Pro chip, has shrunk to 
three months (PC Week 1995). A more complex explanation involves the 
inappropriateness of using time invariant deterministic linear optimisation models 
requiring early, expensive, speculative information to solve what is really a long-term 
, 
ý'ý stochastic problem. 
Figure 1-1: Strategic Approach to New 
Booz Allen & Hamilton 1982 
Appraise PLC 
Appraise Corporate Culture 
Appraise Internal Capabilities 
Assess NPD experience 
Ii Analyze Y==j 
Ii Corporate Ii Scan External Environment Objectives 
Identify Corporate Growth 
Role for New Products Ii Corporate Strategy 
roduct Planning: 
Develop New Product 
Strategy 






Deterministic designs are inappropriate where time is a critical factor (Bums and 
Austin 1985). At the initial screen, the only certain project level dimension which 
will remain unchanged over the life of the process is past NPD product market 
history. All else is probabilistic and subject to changing environments ranging from 
stable to volatile (Kotler 1994). Single use deterministic optimisation models such as 
NewProd and Stanford, whilst acceptable for average prescriptive guidance, are 
unsuited for dynamic probabilistic environments where both the data available 
(Albala 1975; Cooper 1985a) and the criteria for success (Hultink and Robben 1995; 
Ronkainen 1985) are time variant. With NewProd recommending dynamic 
environment avoidance (Cooper 1979b, 1981), this may be seen by today's 
practitioner as a severe model limitation. 
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Evaluating new products is really a system not an act with the evaluation system 
evolving as the product evolves (Crawford 1986). NewProd and Stanford are not 
evolving evaluation systems since they do not "gradually develop, especially from a 
simple to a more complex formst. Rather, both are "monomorphic" and "do not 
change form during development"2. This static character prevents them from properly 
representing the internal and external antecedent change which occurs naturally 
(Albala 1975). 
Practitioners in today's dynamic environments may understand implicitly, the 
incongruity of using the same model in different environments (Albala 1975) and for 
changing sets of go/no-go/continue criteria (Hart 1993; Hultink and Robben 1995; 
Ronkainen 1985). Their under-utilisation may be the manifestation of what has been 
noted by scholars, that models: (1) fail to account for internal and external efforts; (2) 
lack interdisciplinary perspective; (3) are inflexible; (4) fail to reduce development 
time; (5) perform poorly under dynamic market conditions; (6) lack sufficient 
accuracy (Wind and Mahajan 1988); (7) have suspect construct validity and temporal 
stability (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and (8) suffer from survivor bias 
(Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Mitchell 1991). 
1.1.2 One solution 
Deterministic models optimising one linear objective function are appropriate only if 
variables remain constant over time (Burns and Austin 1985). NewProd and Stanford 
are typical of such models. They offer a single static prescription to solve multiple, 
dynamic problems. A multiple model (Albala 1975) system (Crawford 1986) 
employing discrete simulation is one possible solution. This technique would be 
quite conservative in its use of seminal methods for individual model construction. 
Yet it would still be consistent with proposals for new 3`d generation fluid, fuzzy, 
focused and flexible model characteristics (Cooper 1994b). 
Multiple mini models make more sense than one big test (Crawford 1986) and better 
represent the go_-v? o go. 'continue NPD decision. As the building blocks of a 
simulation, smaller, time sensitive conditional models would move' the decision and . 
project along faster. Those meeting fuzzy initial screening conditions would be given 
a conditional go to speed up the process subject to tasks being completed and 
environmental antecedents being favourable at specified times in the future (Cooper 
1994b). Each would still represent tentative commitments in a sequential process 
I The concise Oxford Dictionary (1990). 
2 Ibid. 
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(Cooper 1985a). But unlike NewProd or Stanford, their temporal, conditional nature 
would optimise early versus late information requirements since they would be 
constructed from temporally appropriate dimensions. As such they would be more 
realistic, easier to use and have a lower expected cost of information. Because each 
would evolve over time with the product, they would accept the initial screen for what 
Crawford suggests it is - an estimate of what will be possible later in a changing 
environment with the advantage then of information yet to surface (Crawford 1986). 
Furthermore, a system of models would provide the option to change the plan and 
simulate a new result along the way whilst allowing multiple performance criteria 
(Ronkainen 1985) thought important to proper dimensional assessment (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1987a; Hart 1993; Hultink and Robben 1995). 
A continuous simulation solution replicating internal and external system dynamics at 
infinite points in time would permit the most robust response to static model 
criticisms. However, before a system requiring sets of differential equations could be 
deemed appropriate, a simpler discrete simulation using traditional model 
construction methods should demonstrate significant change over time. This 
conservative procedure would extend seminal methods incrementally. Yet it would 
measure dynamic change over time as requested (Wind and Mahajan 1988). 
Successful demonstration of a discrete simulation technique capturing model and 
dimensional variation over time is important to field advancement because it would: 
1. support Albala's (1975) contention that single deterministic models used early, 
lead to eventual contradiction. This would give impetus to empirical tests of more 
complex NPD CPM/PERT network paradigms (Grossman and Gupta 1974; Hart 
and Baker 1994; Lilien and Kotler 1983; Urban and Hauser 1980; Wasson 1978). 
2. deliver on requests to demonstrate dimensional temporal stability and improved 
I construct validity (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) by minimising problems 
associated with perceived measurement timing error (Cooper 1992; Crawford 
1979) and survivor bias (Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Mitchell 1991). 
3. make models more relative (Lilien 1975) by integrating and relating requested 
heterogeneous inter-disciplinary antecedents (Wind and Mahajan 1988) with more 
homogeneous established factors of success. 
4. support Cooper's (1994b) proposal for 3rd generation "fuzzy gate" schemes by 
demonstrating model situational and conditional differences vis-a-vis product life 
cycle (PLC), order of entry and level of innovation. 
5. shed light on deterministic versus stochastic NPD model development issues by 
investigating the importance to success of past product market NPD history versus 
future strategic activity. 
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Better understanding, requested synthesis (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and 
accelerated product development, key to a new product's success (Cooper 1995), may 
JG~ result. Higher model utilisation and rising success rates might also. 
1.2 Objectives 
This research responds to scholarly criticism and practitioner under-utilisation of 
current initial screening models. It attempts to demonstrate that better models are 
possible in consideration of temporal, strategic and conditional process phenomena. 
A more refined understanding of NPD models and dynamic processes is sought by 
examining perceived antecedent, factor and linear regression model differences over 
time. Important new knowledge should result from accomplishing the following 
research objectives: 
1. use well accepted, conservative seminal methods to simulate the beginning and 
end of the NPD process by benchmarking perceived variables, factors and linear 
regression success models at the initial screen and one year post launch. 
2. evaluate seminal model temporal and construct validity at these extreme points, 
concurrent with the reduction of perceived measurement timing error and survivor 
bias. 
3. determine the relationship of heterogeneous inter-disciplinary antecedents on 
previously demonstrated homogeneous dimensions of success. 
4. appraise the moderating influence of product life cycle and order of entry/level of 
innovation on aggregate models. 
5. investigate deterministic influences of past product market NPD history as it 
relates to the stochastic influences of reactive strategic alignment. 
Accomplishing these objectives should enrich academic understanding of NPD model 
and process dynamics, whilst providing a more realistic foundation for NPD decision 
making under changing conditions. 
1.3 Research rationale 
Early assessment of the dimensions of success and outcome prediction based on 
dimension achievement is axiomatic to accomplishing NPD objectives (Booz, Allen 
and Hamilton 1982). Despite calls for better understanding (Cooper 1975; Crawford 
1977; Hatch 1957, Hopkins and Bailey. -1971; 
Mahajan and Wind 1992; Montoya- 
Weiss and Calantone 1994; NICB 1964; Wind and Mahajan 1988) the NPD process 
remains speculative (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 1990) and the initial screen the 
most poorly performed NPD activity (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986). Research into 
initial screening model improvement and better early process understanding is both 
important and timely. 
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Though models exemplified by NewProd (Cooper 1979b, 1981) and Stanford 
(Maidique and Zirger 1984, Zirger and Maidique 1990) are reasonably accurate, they 
recommend sweeping, prescriptive, temporally insensitive success factors. Validity 
and reliability challenges by scholars (Mahajan and Wind 1992; Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994) parallel practitioner requests for improvement in model accuracy, 
length of implementation time and the ability to capture market complexity (Wind 
and Mahajan 1988; Mahajan and Wind 1992). Established findings lack inter- 
disciplinary data integration (Wind and Mahajan 1988), field research efforts are 
disjointed and success factor relative importance inconclusive (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994). 
Clearly, no model meets all requirements (Calantone, Vickery and Droge 1995; 
Cooper 1985a, 1994b; O'Connor 1994) - and this work does not pretend to do so. 
However, this work is important because: 
1. simulation may better represent the NPD process than the current static approach. 
Empirical justification of the technique as a valid representation of NPD dynamic 
phenomena should be pursued. 
2. the temporal stability of established success dimensions has been challenged. 
Finding established dimensions of success as more appropriate to early or later 
activities would validate and synthesise their temporal order and importance in the 
process. 
3. the consequences of requested heterogeneous inter-disciplinary data integration on 
established homogeneous models needs to be studied. 
4. the effects of conditional phenomena such as PLC and order of entry on initial 
screening model validity and accuracy needs investigation. Better understanding 
could lead to probabilistic "fuzzy" cycle shortening procedures. 
5. the balance between deterministic consequence of past product market NPD 
history and the probabilistic effects of strategic reactive alignment has not been 
examined. Exploratory research to determine the effect of feedback, learning and 
realignment on NPD success is appropriate. 
1.3.1 Discrete simulation methods 
Current models exemplified by NewProd and Stanford fail to adequately account for 
post screening dynamics and market complexities (Mahajan and Wind 1992). Their 
limited acceptance (de Brentäni 1983,1986) may be due to their simple, deterministic 
approach. They are static, only maximise simple linear predictive functions and yield 
inflexible "what's best" solutions for probabilistic "what if" environments. Though 
still valuable, these methods need to be extended to meet today's dynamic 
requirements. 
14 
Using seminal methods to construct a simulation at two discrete points in time is 
conservative, extends field methods incrementally, captures perceived internal and 
external process change over time and makes sense. The approach delivers empirical 
support to long recommended NPD CPM/PERT network paradigms (Grossman and 
Gupta 1974; Hart and Baker 1994; Lilien and Kotler 1983; Urban and Hauser 1980; 
Wasson 1978) practised in the field today as 2' generation stage-gate (Cooper 1990a; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1991) systems. Demonstrating a simple discrete simulation 
solution using traditional linear regression methods would establish baseline 
beginning and ending NPD process norms. It is through benchmarking and analyses 
of these that process improvement emanates (Griffin 1993) and by which 
concurrent/parallel processing efforts to reduce "slack3" (Meredith 1992) and NPD 
cycle time (Cooper 1994b, 1995) should be measured. 
1.3.2 Temporal validation 
The validity and reliability of NPD models has been challenged (Mahajan and Wind 
1992). This has been followed by calls for established antecedents and dimensions of 
success to be tested for temporal stability (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and 
difference as a function of changing performance measurement criteria (Hart 1993; 
Hultink and Robben 1995). Because it is at the initial screen that most projects are 
killed (Cooper 1981; McGuire 1973), differences in the quality, availability and cost 
of early versus late information is critical. If information differs significantly over 
time, then models constructed from that information should also differ (Hultink and 
Robben 1995) along with the model's expected value to the team. 
Uncertainty and mistakes at the initial screen stem from the fact that little reliable 
information is available regarding the proposed product's market, costs and 
investment required (Cooper and de Brentani 1984; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 
1990). NewProd claims to capture early antecedents of success using long term 
retrospective cross-sectional techniques. However, measurement of early perception 
many years after launch is problematic since it can be affected by memory loss, 
subjective interpretation by operational function, survivour/post hoc bias towards 
early successful products and failure to account for "kill" characteristics and/or early 
failures (Cooper 1992; Crawford 1979; Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; 
Mitchell 1991). 
..., r 
3 the delay in activities off the critical path (Meredith 1992). 
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Static methods as used by NewProd only produce one prescriptive model based on 
average dimensions measured imprecisely after launch. Even worse, these then are 
not recommended for use in dynamic markets (Cooper 1979b, 1981). Rather than one 
static model, multiple time specific models are more realistic because they could use 
information apropos to dynamic environments, circumstances (Albala 1975; 
Crawford 1986), development criteria (Ronkainen 1985) and long versus short term 
performance criteria (Hultink and Robben 1995). Components of success can vary 
dramatically by time (Hultink and Robben 1995) and based on different performance 
criteria such as "financial" versus "market impact" (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a). 
Work which does not recognise temporal change in the way one measures new 
product success may produce dimensions of limited value (Hultink and Robben 
1995). This work attempts to correct for measurement timing error caused by 
imprecise performance benchmark dates and survivour bias inherent in seminal 
models. The result should be a refinement of the sweeping, average dimensions they 
endorse. 
1.3.3 Inter-disciplinary evaluation 
Re-examination of the NewProd and Stanford homogeneous findings, in light of 
heterogeneous integrated antecedents from adjunct fields, satisfies requests for better 
inter-disciplinary perspective (Wind and Mahajan 1988). NewProd validations suffer 
from limited size, different country contexts and changing data sets (Cooper 1992). 
Stanford (Zirger and Maidique 1990) has received no published external validation. 
The four most frequently utilised factors, proficiency of technological activities, 
proficiency of market-related activities, product advantage and protocol, not 
surprisingly, are typically identified as the primary discriminators between success 
and failure (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). This work validates these as they 
relate to others thought under-represented (the environment, financial/business 
factors, strategy, speed to market and company resources) and to some which have 
not had statistics reported consistently (market competitiveness and market potential; 
Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). Though models' containing these "extra 
dimensions" may not be'the most' parsimonious or internally consistent, they may 
relate better to other branches of the literature, actual management practices and 
practitioner beliefs (Lilien'1975). Furthermore, this work hopes to broaden the" 
discussion beyond the important, but now repetitive conclusion, that successful firms 
must develop a "superior product" based on "technical knowledge and skills" and 
"market it aggressively" to "target customer wants and needs" (Montoya-Weiss and 
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Calantone 1994). This should encourage NPD research by scholars in adjunct fields 
and higher model use by practitioners. 
1.3.4 Conditions moderating success dimensions 
Cooper (1979b, 1980b, 1981) and Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1993) generally relegate 
external conditions to a moderating status without investigating their ultimate impact. 
However, because all new products are not the same (Hultink and Robben 1995; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1991) or even measured using the same criteria (Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1987a; Hart 1993; Hultink and Robben 1995; Maidique and Zirger 
1985), there may be no simple set of success/failure factors that govern NPD 
outcome. Rather, sets of conditions (Rubenstein, Chakrabarti, O'Keefe, Soulder and 
Young 1976) such as PLC, order of entry and innovativeness may moderate (Cooper 
1979b, 1981; Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991,1993) final outcome. Seminal NPD 
model development work diminishing the importance of the product life cycle 
(Buzzell 1966, Catry and Chevalier 1974; Cox 1967; Doyle 1976; Kotler 1994; Luck 
1972; Michael 1977; Polli and Cook 1969, Rink and Swan 1979; Staudt et al. 1976; 
Tellis and Crawford 1981), order of entry (Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton 1982; Hopkins and Bailey 1971; Lambkin 1988; Lilien and Yoon 1990; 
Robinson and Fornell 1985; Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan 1992; Urban, Carter, 
Gaskin and Mucha 1986) and the level of product innovativeness (Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton 1982; Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991) is illogical. Furthermore, if PLC, 
order of entry and level of innovativeness are important concepts to practitioners, 
their absence from initial screening models may contribute to under-utilisation (Lilien 
1975). A more precise operationalisation of select moderating conditions of success, 
in conjunction with normal NPD timing constraints, is needed to determine their true 
potential in conditional "fuzzy gate" cycle shortening schemes for new 3'd generation 
processes (Cooper 1994b). 
1.3.5 History versus, strategy 
Strategic planning based on historical experience (Boston Consulting Group 1972; 
Bo on', Allen and Hamilton 1982) and environmental alignment/realignment is 
important to success (Abell and Hammond 1979; Ansoff 1965; Ansoff and Stewart 
1967; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Calantone and di Benedetto 1988; Hopkins 
and Bailey 1971; Lambkin and Day 1989; Mahajan and Wind 1992; Maidique and 
Zirger, 1984; Porter. 1980,1985; Thorelli and Burnett 1981; Wind and Mahajan 1988). 
The process is a fundamentally dynamic one, proceeding as a form of learning :z 
(Mintzberg 1994; Slater and Narver 1995). Current models fail to measure the impact 
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of the team's ability to react strategically over time based on newly learned 
information and application of resources. 
Multiple model simulation featuring dimensional evolutionary feedback would allow 
initial strategy based on history to be compared with new intra-process learning based 
on reality. Demonstrating a real time intra-process strategic alignment system 
incorporating the history=learning=alignment=realignment relationship would 
allow the analyses of the worth of deterministic versus stochastic methods. 
1.4 Hypotheses 
Hypotheses in the alternate form have been developed and tested subsequently. They 
are designed to explore the differences between perceived antecedents and 
dimensions of success at both the initial screen (T) and one year post launch (T). 
The first set of hypotheses, Hla through Hld, pertain to the differences managers 
perceive over time in: (1) individual antecedent variables (Hla); (2) normalised 
factors constructed from these variables (H, b); (3) factors significant to success (Hlc) 
and (4) the predictive accuracy of the linear models constructed (Hld). In all cases, 
accepting the null form of the hypotheses indicates no statistically significant 
difference is perceived over time in variables, normalised factors, significant factors 
and/or accuracy. The alternate form of each follows: 
1.4.1 Hypothesis Hl a: Antecedent evolution 
Many variables relating to a new product's success are dynamic and perceived to 
evolve over the life of the NPD process. 
1.4.2 Hypothesis Hlb: Normalised factor evolution 
The factors constructed from screening variables are dynamic with respect to their 
construction, percent of variance, order and magnitude. They evolve over time 
from the initial screen to the end of the first year of market entry. 
1.4.3 Hypothesis Hlc: Linear regression model evolution 
Factors significant to a new product's successful introduction are dynamic. As 
more information becomes known to the team over time, these significant factors 
evolve from an inadequate, incomplete, uncertain condition at the initial screen, to 
a more adequate, more complete, more certain condition at the end of the first year 
of market entry. They change in their order and magnitude. 
1.4.4 Hypothesis Hid: Forecasting accuracy evolution 
As the factors contributing to a new product's success evolve, the resulting new 
product screening model's predictive proficiency evolves also. 
The second set of hypotheses examin&he differences in model construction at each 
time period as the aggregate model and success dimensions are affected by product 
life cycle (H), order of entry/innovation level (H)and strategic reactive capability 
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(H4). Accepting the null form of H2 and H3 would indicate no difference is observed 
in success dimensions by PiLC and order/innovation. Accepting the null form of H4 
indicates that there is no difference in success/failure outcome by virtue of ability to 
adjust strategically. The alternate form of each follows: 
1.4.5 Hypothesis H?: PiLC conditions 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction vary 
as a function of the length of the product's introductory life cycle (PiLC) - the life 
expectancy of the product before modification is necessary. 
1.4.6 Hypothesis H3: Order/innovation conditions 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction vary 
as a function of its order of entry and relative level of innovativeness. 
1.4.7 Hypothesis H4: Strategy as dynamic link 
Firms which develop precise initial strategies but react f exibly to deal with 
deficiencies in early assumptions of internal and external environments, are more 
successful than those that do not. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Current initial screening models exemplified by NewProd and Stanford are adequate 
for describing an unchanging, average new product development process and 
predicting an idea's ultimate success. However, because they are born of single, long 
term retrospective methods they fail to describe adequately, true initial screening 
dimensions and the dynamic NPD post screening strategic activity leading to short 
term success or failure. Because of their inability to reflect these phenomena, 
NewProd actually recommends avoiding projects targeted at dynamic markets 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981). Inability to recommend and guide participation in dynamic 
opportunities is a severe limitation as shorter PLCs become more common. This 
dates current models as primitive and may be a reason for their limited appeal. 
This Thesis assesses dynamic intra-process phenomena by measuring the perceived 
temporal stability of antecedents, dimensions and models over time when: (1) 
heterogeneous but important interdisciplinary variables are integrated with established 
data sets; (2) precise beginning and ending variable recollection dates are used in lieu 
of imprecise long-term averages; (3) models are constrained by the moderating 
influences of product life cycle, order of entry and level of innovation and (4) team 
learning and strategic reaction align internal and external environments over time. 
This assessment is important because if variables, dimensions and models are 
perceived to change over time and by moderating condition, then applying 
deterministic model dimensions in stochastic environments is inappropriate. If 
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significant evolutionary, conditional and strategic influence is demonstrated, 
managers would be more confident in their use of resulting dynamic initial screening 
and post screening models alternatives. 
1.6 Chapter outline 
Chapter two presents a review of the scholarly literature relevant to the development 
of each hypothesis. Justification is made for old and new variables and dimensions to 
be examined. The grounds for choosing selected seminal works, as the basis of 
comparison to this work, is presented also. Chapter three employs Churchill's (1991) 
six step sequence as a foundation for the research design and describes the procedures 
used to examine all hypotheses. Survey logistics and statistical procedures to test the 
null hypotheses are described in detail. Chapter four describes the findings from 
testing Hla through H, d and their relationship to seminal work. The same is true for 
Chapter five, with explanations of the findings for H2, H3 and H4. Finally, Chapter six 
summarises all findings and draws conclusions germane to scholars and practitioners. 
It suggests weaknesses of this work, whilst making recommendations for correction. 
Finally, it envisions a combination of linear and curvilinear methods, used within a 
PERT framework, to advance field knowledge of the dynamic NPD process. 
I 
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Chapter Two - Literature review and hypotheses 
development 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter two reviews the NPD literature drawing attention to success/failure factors 
governing the NPD process. Works resulting in linear success/failure forecasting 
models are featured. These are the best basis of comparison to this work because they 
are comprehensive, incorporate much of earlier findings and forecast success based 
on the application of recommended third and fourth level methods of dimensionality 
and interpretation (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). Seven hypotheses were 
developed based on gaps apparent in that linear forecasting branch of the literature. 
In addition to validating previous work, they posit the evolutionary (hypotheses Hla 
through H, d), conditional (hypotheses H2, H3) and strategic nature (hypotheses H) of 
established and new to the field variables, dimensions and linear models. 
2.2 Factors associated with NPD success 
There is considerable qualitative and quantitative research on conducive 
environments and factors driving new product performance. Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton (1982) suggest that the companies utilising specific "best practices" are 
most likely to succeed in developing new products. These best practices have multi- 
disciplinary, multi-functional roots (Cooper 1976) requiring an eclectic analysis and 
articulation. 
Montoya-Weiss and Calantone (1994) recently attempted to bring syntheses to the 
field by applying meta-analysis techniques (see Wolf 1986; APPENDIX B) to works 
which: (1) studied a dependent variable measuring the performance of a new product 
project or programme and (2) identified one or more explanatory factors as 
determinants of new product performance (see Table 2-1). Cardinal to this effort 
were the works of Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987b), Maidique and Zirger (1984), 
Rothwell, Freeman, Jervis, Robertson and Townsend (1974) and Utterback, Allen, 
Hollomon and Sirbu (1976). Eighteen drivers of performance classified as strategic, 
development process, marketing environment and organisational were found to 
dominate the literature., These came from the fields of marketing, organisational' 
behaviour, engineering and operations management... 
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Table 2-1: Multi-disciplinary literature associated with new product performance4 
Reference Scope Success/ Function 
Failure 
1. Balachandra, R. Critical signs for making go/no go decisions in new product Project Success R&D, 
ement 2(2): 92-100 (1948). al of Product Innovation Mana t J d l Failure Mgmt. g opmen . ourn eve 
2. Brockhoff, Klaus and Chakrabarti, Alok K. R&D/Marketing linkage and Programme Success Mkt. 
innovation strategy: some West German experience. IEEE Transactions on Failure R&D 
Engineering Management EM-35(3): 167-174 (1988). 
3. Bronnenberg, JJ. A. M. and van Engelen, M. L. A Dutch test with the NewProd Project Success Varied 
model. R&D Management 18(4): 321-332 (1988). Failure 
4. Calantone, Roger J. and Cooper, Robert G. A discriminant model for identifying Project Failure 
scenarios of industrial new product failure Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science 7(3): 163-183 (1979). 
5. Calantone, Roger J. and di Benedetto, C. Anthony. An integrative model of the Project Success Mgmt. 
new product development process: an empirical validation. Journal of Product Failure 
Innovation Management 5(3): 201-215 (1988). 
6. Calantone, Roger J. and di Benedetto, C. Anthony. Canonical correlation analysis Project Success 
of unobserved relationships in the new product process. R&D Management 20(1): 3- Failure 
23 (1990). 
11. Cooper, Robert G. Why new industrial products fail. Industrial Marketing Project Failure 
Management 4(6): 315-326 (1975). 
12. Cooper, Robert G. Identifying new product success: Project NewProd. Project Success Varied 
Industrial Marketing Management 8(2): 124-135 (1979). Failure 
13. Cooper, Robert G. The dimensions of industrial new product success and Project Success Varied 
failure. Journal of Marketing 43(3): 93-103 (1979). Failure 
14. Cooper, Robert G. How to identify potential new product winners. Research Project Success Varied 
Management 23: 10-19 (1980). Failure 
15. Cooper, Robert G. Project NewProd: factors in new product success. European Project Success Varied 
Journal of Marketing 14(5/6): 277-291 (1980). Failure 
16. Cooper, Robert G. New product success in industrial firms. Industrial Project Success Varied 
Marketing Management 11(3): 215-223 (1982). Failure 
17. Cooper, Robert G. New product strategies: what distinguishes the top Project Success Mgmt. 
performers? Journal of Product Innovation Management 2(3): 151-164 (1985). 
18. Cooper, Robert G. How new product strategies impact on performance. Journal Project Success Mgmt. 
of Product Innovation Management 1(1): 5-18 (1984). 
19. Cooper, Robert G. Predevelopment activities determine new product success. Project Success Mgmt. 
Industrial Marketing Management 17(3): 237-247 (1988). Failure 
20. Cooper, Robert G. New products: what distinguishes the winners? Research & Project Success Mgmt. 
Technology Management 33(6): 27-31 (1990). Failure 
21. Cooper, Robert G. and Kleinschmidt, Elko J. An investigation into the new Project Success Varied 
product process: steps, deficiencies and impact. Journal of Product Innovation Failure 
Management 3(2): 71-85 (1986). 
22. Cooper, Robert G. and Kleinschmidt, Elko J. New products: what separates Project Success Mgmt. 
winners from losers. Journal of Product Innovation Management 4(3): 169-184 Failure 
(1987). 
23. Cooper, Robert G. and Kleinschmidt, Elko J. Success factors in product Project Success Mgmt. 
innovation. Industrial Marketing Management 16(3); 215-223 (1987). Failure 
24. Cooper, Robert G. and de Brentani, Ulrike. New industrial financial services: Project Success Mgmt. 
what distinguishes the winners. Journal of Product Innovation Management Failure 
8(1): 75-90 (1991). 
26. De Brentani, Ulrike and Droge, Cornelia. Determinants of the new product Project Success Mgmt. 
screening decision. A structural model analysis. International Journal of Research Failure 
in Marketing 5(2): 91-106 (1988). 
27. Dillon, William R., Calantone, Roger and Worthing, Parker. The new product Project Success Mgmt. 
problem: an approach for investigating product failures. Management Science Failure 
25(12): 1184-1196 (1979). 
29. Dwyer, Larry and Mellor, Robert. Organisational environment, new product Project Success R&D, 
process activities and project outcomes. Journal of Product Innovation - Failure Mkt. 
Management 8(1): 39-48 (1991). 
30. Dwyer, Larry and Mellor, Robert. New product process activities and project Project Success Mgmt. 
outcomes. R&D Management 21(1): 31-42 (1991). Failure 
31. Edgett, Scott, Shipley, David and Forbes, Giles. Japanese and British companies Programme Success 
compared: contributing factors to success and failure in NPD. Journal of Product 5 yrs. Failure 
Innovation Management 9(1): 3-10 (1992). 
32. Edgett, Scott, Shipley, David and Forbes, Giles. Japanese and British Programme Success 
Companies Compared: Contributing Factors to Success and Failure in NPD. In: 5 yrs. Failure 
4 Montoya-Weise and Calantone (1994). 
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1990 PDMA Proceedings (1990). 
34. Germunden, H. G., Heydebreck, P. and Herden, R. Technological inter- Programme Success 
weavement: a means of achieving innovation success. R&D Management 
Failure 
22(4): 359-3766 (1992). 
35. Gerstenfeld, Arthur. A study of successful projects, unsuccessful projects and Project Success R&D 
projects in process in West Germany. IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Failure 
Management EM-23(3): 116-123 (1976). 
38. Hise, Richard T., O'Neal, Larry, Parasuraman, A. and McNeal, James U. Project Success Mkt. 
Marketing/R&D interaction in new product development implications for new Failure 
product success rates. Journal of Product Innovation Management 7(3): 142-144 
(1990). 
39. Hopkins, David S. New-Product winners and losers. Research Management Programme Success 
24(3): 12-17 (1981). Failure 
41. Johne, Frederick A. How experienced product innovators organise. Journal of Project & Success Varied 
Product Innovation Management 4(4): 210-223 (1984). Programme Failure 
43. Kleinschmidt. E. J. and Cooper, R. G. The impact of product innovativeness on Project Success Mgmt. 
ement 8(4): 240-251 (1991). vation Mana tI f l P d J Failure g ro uc nno per ormance. ourna of 
45. Larson, Erik W. and Gobeli, David H. Organising for product development Project Success Varied 
projects. Journal of Product Innovation Management 5(4): 180-190 (1988). 
46. Lilien, G. L. and Yoon, Eunsang. Determinants of new industrial product Project Success Mgmt. 
performance: a strategic re-examination of the empirical literature. IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management EM- 36(1): 3-10 (1989). 
47. Maidique, Modesto A. and Zirger, Billie Jo. A study of success and failure in Project Success Varied 
product innovation: the case of the US electronics industry. IEEE Transactions on Failure 
Engineering Management EM-31(4): 192-203 (1984). 
48. Pinto, Jeffrey K. and Slevin, Dennis P. Critical factors in successful project Project Success Students 
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The eighteen significant dimensions were categorised as follows: 
- Strategic factors - product advantage, technological synergy, company resources, 
strategy and marketing synergy. 
- Development process factors - proficiency of technical activities, proficiency of 
marketing activities, protocol, top management support/skill, proficiency of pre- 
development activities, speed to market, financial/business analysis and costs. 
- Marketing environment factors - market potential, market competitiveness and 
environment. 
- Organisational factors - internal/external relations and organisational conditions. 
The literature's most studied factors were: (1) proficiency of technological activities 
(included in 69.2% of all research analysed); (2) proficiency of market related 
activities (61.5%); (3) product advantage (61.5%) and (4) protocol (46.2%). The least 
studied were : (1) the environment; (2) financial/business analysis; (3) costs; (4) 
strategy; (5) speed to market and (6) company resources. Though they were not able 
to define the order of factor importance due to diverse designs, methods and 
publication bias, they argue that it is not surprising the top four factors studied are 
typically identified as the primary determinants of success. This suggests field effort 
has been somewhat self-fulfilling. 
To properly isolate the diverse factors affecting new product success, combinations of 
multi-disciplinary, multi-functional inputs must be considered (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1986; Wind and Mahajan 1988). The gap formed by the narrow 
homogeneous focus and factor under-study provides the opportunity for validating the 
most studied factors, whilst simultaneously examining the integration effects of the 
less studied factors. This should broaden the discussion beyond the indisputable, but 
now somewhat redundant conclusion, that successful firms must market a superior 
product aggressively to target customer wants and needs (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994). 
2.3 Maturation of the literature and linear forecasting methodology 
The eclectic nature of the literature suggests that success/failure can be explained 
and/or predicted by antecedent variables from numerous disciplines. Unfortunately, 
most of the work remains exploratory (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b), lacks an 
organised synthesis and has not evolved in an orderly fashion. However, some 
maturation of focus and method in'management and marketing is apparent, 'as 
exemplified by the field's most notable NPD initial screening forecasting models - 
'; 'ý iý . 
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NewProd (Cooper 1979b, 1981) and Stanford (Maidique and Zirger 1984; Zirger and 
Maidique 1990). 
The NewProd Project is the most comprehensive work to date (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994) and is the best basis of comparison for the current work's accuracy 
and validity. It has been replicated (see Table 2-3) and refined over time (Cooper 
1985a, 1992) but it is actually founded in elementary benefit measurement forecasting 
Figure 2-1: Maturation of significant NPD product, strategy and process literature & methodology 
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models. In their simplest form these models integrate benefit data from well- 
informed respondents (Cooper 1985a; see Figure 2-1, panel A). Their earliest NPD 
manifestations were subjective checklists and scoring models (see Figure 2-1, panel 
B). Their latest manifestations are exemplified by the NewProd linear regression 
model and Stanford discriminant analysis model (see Figure 2-1, panel F). 
2.3.1 Checklists 
Checklists (see Figure 2-1, panel B) and scoring models range from simple to 
complex. They attempt to separate winners from losers but exhibit significant 
problems (Simon and Freimar 1970), especially in interpretation and application. 
Though, in their simplest form they are attractive and convincing, there are hazards in 
determining what is an acceptable pattern of success. Their qualitative nature makes 
it possible, unconsciously or deliberately, to favour some projects over others 
(Augood 1973). In their most complex form they become unwieldy as they are 
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superimposed over budgeting restrictions, resource allocations, project variations and 
scheduling problems. Representative of the work in this area are Augood (1973), 
Bradbury, Gallagher and Suckling (1973), Dean (1968), Helin and Souder (1974), 
McGuire (1973) and O'Meara 1961. 
2.3.2 Patterns of failure or success 
Both failure and success patterns have been studied, typically on the assumption that 
they were models to avoid or emulate. Their main weakness is that they are unilateral 
and do not compare success against failure. 
2.3.2.1 Failure patterns 
Representative of research into patterns of failure (see Figure 2-1, panel C) are 
Cochran and Thompson (1964), Cooper (1975), Davidson (1976), Hopkins (1980), 
Hopkins and Bailey (1971), Konopa (1968) and Lazo (1965). Hopkins and Bailey 
(1971) are typical and find a definite pattern to new industrial product failure based 
on inadequate market analysis, product technical problems, lack of effective 
marketing effort, higher than expected costs, competitive strength or reaction, poor 
timing and technical/production problems. Many of these reasons for failure were 
validated later by Hopkins (1980). He found poor marketing research, technical 
problems in design or production, improper timing of market introduction and failure 
to support the introduction with ample selling effort related to failure. Similarly, 
Cooper (1975) found a low level of sales was the most important general reason for 
failure. The specific causes of low sales levels included firmly entrenched 
competitors, overestimating the number of potential users, high price, technical 
difficulties with the product and misdirected marketing efforts. Finally, both Cochran 
and Thompson (1964) and Lazo (1965) found similarly, that the overwhelming causes 
of failure were marketing, not technical problems. These were exemplified by 
inadequate market analysis, product deficiencies, higher costs than anticipated, poor 
timing, competition, insufficient market effort, inadequate sales force and weakness 
in distribution. 
2.3.2.2 Success patterns 
Representative of success pattern case method research are Cooper (1976), Globe, 
Levy and Schwartz (1973), Marquis (1969), Myers and Marquis (1969) and Roberts 
and Burke (1974). This genre sought to infer future patterns of success from past 
patterns of success: Globe, Levy and Schwartz (1973) are typical finding early 
recognition of need and adequate funding important to the successful innovation 
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process. External factors such as economic, political and social factors were least 
important with formal market analysis far down the list. 
Cooper (1976) looked at the success process for three model products at Dupont, 
Northern Electric and Pratt and Whitney. He linked success to a stage-wise process 
of sequential, multi-disciplinary, multi-functional yet integrated activities supported 
by technical and market research. Incremental commitment was key, with relatively 
minor expenditures on initial stages compared to major financial investment required 
of later stages. Each GO stage meant to "go only to the next stage" with constant re- 
evaluation providing timely bail-outs. This laid the groundwork for current stage- 
gate processes (Cooper 1990a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1991). 
Another good example of success case methodology is the work of Myers and 
Marquis (1969). They suggested that optimising technology push and market pull 
factors was important. Success, they argued, was based on the process of potential 
demand recognition and technical feasibility leading to idea formulation, problem 
solving, information gathering and solution utilisation. 
2.3.3 Success/failure typologies and clusters 
These designs focus on the project, the process or the strategy typology or cluster and 
are more statistically sophisticated than simple unilateral comparison (see Figure 2-1, 
panel D). They measure dimensionality. Representative works include Calantone 
and Cooper (1979,1981), Calantone and Di Benedetto (1990) and Cooper (1983, 
1984a, 1984b, 1985b). All flow from Hopkins and Baileys' (1971) and Cooper's 
(1975) determination that a definite pattern of project failure does exist and that 
marketing-related functions are the key to understanding patterns. 
Calantone and Cooper (1977) indicated that most new product failures can be 
manifest by a limited number of scenarios. They devised, for the first time, a 
conceptual framework and failure classification scheme using discriminant analysis, 
ANOVA°and Duncan's Multiple Range Test. They concluded that marketing-related 
functions were a root cause of failure and that the same mistakes are made over and 
over again (Calantone and Cooper 1979). Six failure scenarios included "the better 
mousetrap no one wanted", "the me-too product meeting a competitive brick wall", 
"the competitive one upsmanship"; "the environmentally ignorant", "the technical 
dog" and "the price crunch". Seven variables emerged as important determinants 
discriminating between types of product failure. These were a lack of R&D, 
marketing research, selling and promotion resources, poor preliminary market 
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assessment, poor in-house prototype testing, market newness to the firm and product 
newness to the market. 
Subsequently, Calantone and Cooper (1981) developed new product success/failure 
scenario based on factor analysis and cluster analysis techniques. There, the largest 
single scenario representing 15.38% of the sample, was "old but simple money saver" 
with the most successful scenario being the "synergistic, close to home, product". 
Other significant scenario included "the better mousetrap with no marketing", 
"innovative mousetrap, not better", "close to home, me too", "innovative high tech", 
"me-too product with no technical/product synergy", "synergistic product that was 
new to the firm" and "innovative superior product with no synergy". 
With respect to process and programme strategy typologies, Cooper is most 
representative (1983,1984a, 1984b, 1985b). In the first of these works Cooper 
determined that the concept of an "average NPD process" is misleading. In fact each 
process has its own distinct set of activities and emphases, is not sequential and has 
activities which overlap or are undertaken in parallel. Seven clusters representing 
types of new product development processes were uncovered. The most successful 
was the "balanced complete" and the least successful of all was the "design 
dominated process". The remaining processes isolated were the "market oriented 
process", the "front-end dominated process", the "minimum process", the "launch 
with prototype process" and the "prototype dominated process". 
In the second and third work Cooper looked at the firm's total programme strategy, 
not its individual project strategy. The elements of the overall programme strategy 
were reduced to nineteen factors and then to five clusters types. Similar to the 
process findings, the best overall programme strategy was "balanced and focused". 
Others included "technology driven", "technology deficient" and "low budget, 
conservative". "High budget, diverse" tied with "technology deficient" for the worst 
performing programme strategy. 
2.3.4 Simple discrimination and dimensional comparison - no forecasting 
models 
The premise underlying these works was that only through a direct comparison of 
successes and failures could the variables that discriminate between them be 
identified (see Figure 2-1, panel E). Works which attempted to discriminate in this 
way include Gerstenfeld (1976), Kulvik (1977), Maidique and Zirger (1984), 
Rothwell (1974,1976), Rothwell et. al. (1974) and Rubenstein et. al (1976). 
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Particularly representative of this design were SAPPHO (Rothwell 1972), Utterback, 
Allen, Hollomon and Sirbu (1976) and Cooper (1979a). 
Using a comparative analysis of forty-three paired innovations, SAPPHO was the first 
to identify, in this way, measures which differentiate success from failure. Each pair 
were market competitors, with one a commercial success and the other a commercial 
failure. Prior to Rothwell's analysis of one hundred and twenty-two variables, 
unilateral studies of either success or failure dominated the literature. Rothwell 
determined that successful innovators have a better understanding of users' needs, 
they pay more attention to marketing and publicity, use greater sales and customer 
educational efforts, make better use of outside technology, foster better internal and 
external communications, use senior management as product champions and are more 
efficient. SAPPHO laid the methodological groundwork for future forecasting works. 
Similarly, Utterback, Allen, Hollomon and Sirbu (1976) found the most striking 
difference between successes and failures was the degree to which successes had no 
initial difficulty in marketing. Other competitive and market related factors were 
found significant including having a great or moderate advantage over competing 
approaches or products. Important also were projects demonstrating a recognised 
need before a solution was found, a product intended for a particular situation or user 
specification, a project initiated by the firm's top management and situations where 
project planning was more highly structured. 
Cooper's NewProd Project (1979a) was paramount in the maturation of field focus 
and method. This work founded the conceptual framework for the NewProd 
discriminant analysis (1979b) and linear regression forecasting (1981) models. These 
are the most important predictive/prescriptive work in the field to date and they laid 
the groundwork for more complex forecasting models and methods. The 
variables/activities found significant to success included: 
- proficiently executing the launch., 
- having a new product that more clearly meets customers' needs than do 
competitors products. 
- having a higher quality new product than competitors in terms of tighter 
specifications, greater durability and reliability. 
- undertaking a good prototype test of the product with the customer. 
- having the sales force and/or distribution effort well targeted. 
- undertaking aproficient test market or trial sell. 
- proficiently starting up full-scale production. 
- knowing customers' price sensitivities. 
- executing product development well. 
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- understanding buyer behaviour and the customers purchase 
decision. 
- having a product that permits the customer to reduce 
his costs. 
- having a good company product fit in terms of sales 
force and/or distribution. 
- having a good company-product fit in terms of marketing research skills and 
needs. 
- doing a good job on idea screening. 
- understanding customers' needs, wants and specifications 
for the product. 
2.3.5 Complex discrimination and interpretation - linear forecasting models 
Complex discrimination and interpretation using linear forecasting techniques 
represent the most accomplished work today (see Figure 2-1, panel F). The original 
NewProd model (1979b) and the latest version of the Stanford model (Zirger and 
Maidique 1990) used discriminant analysis, a third level measure of dimensionality'. 
They are considered here, along with fourth level works using linear regression 
(Cooper 1981,1985a, 1992; Cooper and de Brentani 1984), because they illustrate the 
field's most important parsimonious screening models which yield reasonably 
accurate success/failure forecasts. 
2.3.5.1 Project NewProd 
The first phase of Project NewProd (Cooper 1979a, see Figure 2-1, panel E) provided 
the conceptual framework (see Figure 2-2) for Cooper's success/failure initial 
screening forecasting models (Cooper 1979b, 1981). It does the same for this work as 
well. Developed to identify relevant variables from the myriad available for 
investigation, new product success or failure is determined, ultimately, by the 
interaction of the commercial entity (see Figure 2-2, panel #6) with the marketplace 
(#1). The commercial entity is the result of the new product process, a stage-wise 
series of activities (#4) and information acquisition functions (#5). The NPD 
environment into which the product is launched is uncontrollable at the project level. 
The NPD process is controllable at the project level. 
Beginning with a seventy-seven variable data set developed from this framework, 
Cooper demonstrated parallel discriminant analysis (Cooper 1979b) and linear 
regression (Cooper 1981) forecasting functions which described the dimensions of 
success-The monomorphic NewProd models were reasonably accurate, were based 
on eleven and eight deterministic dimensions respectively and forecast success/failure 
accurately in approximately 84% of the cases. In both, the most important of these 
dimensions was product uniqueness/superiority. In the earlier study, market 
knowledge/marketing proficiency and technological resource compatibility were 
5 There are four ascending levels: (1) descriptive; (2) tests of difference/similarity; (3) dimensionality and (4) interpretation of parameters (Montoya- 
Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
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second and third (see Table 2-2). Market dynamism detracted from success as did 
relative price of the product, marketing competitiveness and newness to the firm. 
Table 2-2: NewProd discriminant analysis dimensions 
Cooper, Robert G., The Dimensions of Industrial New product Success and Failure, Journal of Marketing Vol. 43 (Summer 1979b), 
93-103.77 variables reduced to 18 factors with Eigenvalue >1 explaining 71.3% of variance. 84.1%% correct. Success = 89.2%, 
Failure = 78.5%. Wilk's Lambda =. 51, F=15.95 at. 001 with 11df 
Factor Name/Factor # Standardised 
Function 
Coefficient 
Wilk's Lambda Flo Enter 
or Remove 
Product Uniqueness/Superiority F4 . 527 . 859 31.66 
Market Knowledge and Marketing Proficiency F2 . 465 . 730 33.95 
Technological resource compatibility F1 . 325 . 680 14.13 
Market Dynamism (Frequency of New Product Introductions) F14 -. 264 . 644 10.65 
Market need, growth and size F8 . 271 . 610 10.49 
Relative price of product F15 -. 252 . 576 10.62 
Marketing and managerial synergy F6 . 193 . 557 6.49 
Marketing competitiveness (and customer satisfaction) F5 -. 186 . 540 5.88 
Newness to the firm F3 -. 170 . 517 3.24 
Strength of marketing communications and launch effort F9 . 137 . 517 3.24 
Source of idea/investment magnitude F18 . 114 . 510 2.27 
Figure 2.2: lve iProd's oomeptual fi an i ork 
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Though it received only limited validation (see Table 2-3), this work and its follow- 
up using multiple linear regression (see Table 2-4) remain the most important work in 
initial screen modelling to date. 
Table 2-3: NewProd validation and predictive proficiency6 
1. ORIGINAL STUDY USING CROSS SPLIT-HALF Cooper, Robert G., An empirically derived new product project 
METHOD WITH 195 cases and 84.1% reliability selection model, IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management EM-28: 54-61 (August 1981)) Cases used to 
generate = same to test 
2. NORTH AMERICAN STUDY 179 new cases 73% Cooper, Robert G., Project NewProd: Factors in New Product 
reliability. Success, European Journal of Marketing, 1980b 14,5/6 
Cooper, Robert G., New Products: What Distinguishes the 
Winners, Technology Management, November-December 1990, 
P27-31 
Cooper, R. G. and E. J., Kleinschmidt, New Products: The Key 
Factors in Success, Chicago, IL: American Marketing Assoc., 
1990 
Cooper, Robert G and Elko J Kleinschmidt, What Separates 
Winners from Losers?, Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, Vol. 4 Issue 3 Sept. 1987 pp. 169-184 
3. DUTCH TEST 19 cases (all new) with 84% reliability Bronnenberg, J. J. A. M. and L. A. van Engelen, A Dutch test 
with the NewProd-Model, R&D Management, 18(4): 321-332 
1988 
4. DANISH TEST 26 cases Modified NewProd to create DanProd (all new cases) 
5. PROCTOR & GAMBLE 60 cases with 80% reliability Cooper, Robert G., Selecting Winning New Product Projects: 
Using the NewProd System, Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 1985; 2: 34-44 
Cooper's linear regression application produced slightly different results. This was 
probably due to change in statistical technique' and using a distilled, forty-eight 
variable sub-set. Again he found that product quality, superiority and uniqueness 
together, are the single most important dimension of NPD success. This time 
however, overall project/company resource compatibility and market need, growth 
and size followed (see Table 2-4). The remaining variables were consistent with the 
earlier work. 
Table 2-4: NewProd linear regression dimensions 
Cooper, Robert G. An empirically derived new product project selection model. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 
EM-28: 54-61 (1981) and Cooper, Robert G., Selecting Winning New Product Project: Using the NewProd System. Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, 1985; 2: 34-44, Linear regression using 48 variables R=. 648074, Rz. 420, Adj. R2=. 395, F =16.83 
with 8df Standard error = 2.73 
Key factors or dimensions Reg. Coef F Variables loading on factor 
value 
Product superiority, quality and uniqueness 1.744 68.7 highly innovative, new to mkt. 
product has unique features for user 
product is superior to competing products 
product reduces customers' costs 
product does unique task for user 
product is higher quality than competitors 
Overall project/co resource compatibility 1.138 30 adequate financial resources 
compatible R&D resources 
compatible engineering skills 
necessary marketing research skills 
needed managerial skills 
compatible production resources 
compatible sales force/distribution resources 
adequate advertising/promo skills 
Market need, growth and size . 801 12.5 high need level by customers for product type 
large market ($ volume) 
6 from Cooper. Robert G. The NewProd System: The Industry Experience. Journal of Product Innovation Management 9: 113-127 (June 1992). 71 Third level measures of dimensionality weh as discriminant analysis are not as refined as fourth level regression analysis (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and may cause alight differences in results. 
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high growth market 
Economic advantage of product to end user . 722 10.2 product reduces customers' costs 
product is priced lower than competing products 
Newness to the firm -. 354 2.9 new customers to firm 
new product class to firm 
new customer need to firm 
new production process to firm 
new product technology to firm 
new sales force/distribution to firm 
new advertising/promotion to firm 
new competition to firm 
Technological resource compatibility . 342 2.5 compatible 
R&D resources & skills for project 
compatible engineering skills & resources 
Market competitiveness -. 301 2.0 highly competitive market 
intense price competition in market 
many competitors 
many new product introduced into market 
changing user needs 
Product customness/specialisation -. 225 .9 a market-derived new product 
idea 
a custom product 
a mass market for product 
Constant . 328 
Following these two landmark studies, Cooper and de Brentani (1984; see Table 2-5) 
studied managerial accept/reject criteria. Generally consistent with NewProd, new 
factors perceived important to managers at the initial screen included financial 
potential, product life, domestic focus and types of strategy (market maintenance and 
diversification strategy). Comparison to Cooper's earlier work suggests that 
differences exist between perceived causes of success/failure and criteria perceived 
important to the managers' accept/reject decision. This is the first indication that a 
"reality check" (Calantone, Di Benedetto and Haggblom 1995) problem might exist 
in the forecasting branch of the literature. 
Table 2-5: Linear regression results of accept/reject criteria 
Cooper, Robert G. and Ulrike de Brentani, Criteria for Screening New Industrial Products, Industrial Marketing management, 
1984 (13) 149-156. Adjusted R' = . 564, F= 54.3, sig. at . 0001 
Key actors or dimensions Reg. Coef F value Significance oF 
Financial Potential 1.390 158.2 . 0001 
Corporate Synergy 1.285 134.2 . 0001 
Technological and Production Synergy . 932 69.9 . 0001 
Product Differential Advantage . 881 62.7 . 0001 
Product Life . 576 26.7 . 0001 
Market Maintenance Strategy . 425 14.6 . 0002 
Size of Market . 384 12 . 0006 
Diversification Strategy . 270 5.8 . 0161 
Domestic Market . 223 4.1 . 0450 
Cooper and de Brentani's study of the financial services industry (1991) found 
dimensions consistent with those in previous industrial screening works, but in 
radically different order. This may indicate that model differences exist based on 
whether the product is a manufactured item or a service. Because the work did not 
utilise a forecasting methodology, it is not used as a basis of comparison here. 
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2.3.5.2 Stanford Innovation Project 
The original Stanford Innovation Project (Maidique and Zirger 1984) had three parts: 
(1) collection of unstructured data for variable set determination8; 
(2) comparison of 
success/failure innovation pairs for fifty-nine innovations and (3) an in-depth case 
study of a twenty firm sub-set. The following circumstances were found to lead to 
new product success: 
- The developing organisation through 
in-depth understanding of the customers and 
the marketplace, introduces a product with a high performance-to-cost ratio. 
- The developing organisation is proficient in marketing and commits a significant 
amount of its resources to selling and promoting the product. 
- The product provides a high contribution margin to the 
firm. 
- The R&D process is well planned and executed. 
- The create, make and market functions are well interfaced and co-ordinated. 
- The product is introduced into the market early. 
- The markets and technologies of the new product benefit significantly 
from the 
existing strengths of the developing business unit. 
- There is a high level of management support for the product 
from the 
development stage through its launch to the marketplace. 
No forecasting model was developed until the follow-up six years later (Zirger and 
Maidique 1990). Using discriminant analysis for dimension determination and 
forecasting (see Table 2-6), the high-tech biased, deterministic model found 
excellence of the R&D organisation to be the most important dimension of success. 
Superior technical performance and product value followed. Whilst superior product 
was not a distinct significant factor, its key constructs were found in other 
dimensions. Like NewProd, a weak competitive environment was important to 
success. 
Table 2-6: Stanford Innovation Project discriminant analysis 
Zirger, B. J. and Maidique, M. A. A Model of New Product Development: An Empirical Test Management Science 7: 867-883 
(1990). Wilk's Lambda =. 51, Eigenvalue =. 978, Canonical Correlation =. 7 
Key factors or dimensions (factor name) Structure Coefficients Constructs 
Excellent R&D Organisation . 80, Product had superior quality and reliability 
Product was developed by a highly competent engineering 
organisation 
Product development process was well planned 
Product was strongly supported by project management 
Co-ordination between engineers and manufacturing was 
good 
A clearly identified individual was an activist in promoting 
the product's development throughout the product 
development and the introduction cycle. 
Product was a good match with the customer's needs 
Superior Technical Performance . 
64 Co-ordination between marketing and engineering was 
good 
Product had superi or technical performance 
Product Value . 48 Product was priced lower than competitive alternatives 
Product provided superior benefit to cost 
Product concept developed form frequent interactions 
between the product development team, introduction team 
8 despite the NewProd and SAPPHO studies. the authors thought the literature variable pool was lacking by industry. 
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and the customers 
Synergy with Existing Competencies . 38 Product benefited from its closeness to the company's 
existing products 
Product benefited from its closeness to the company's 
existing markets 
Product benefited from its closeness to the company's 
technologies 
Management support . 35 Product was strongly supported by general management 
Competent Marketing & Manufacturing . 28 Co-ordination between marketing and manufacturing was 
good 
Product was manufactured by a highly competitive 
manufacturing organisation 
Product was introduced by a highly competent sales and 
marketing organisation 
Weak Competitive Environment . 28 Product was first to the market 
Product was developed for a market with few strong 
competitors 
Large & growing market . 27 Product was developed for a large market 
Product was developed for a rapidly growing market 
2.4 Conceptual framework 
New conceptual frameworks for screening/forecasting models must be grounded in 
Cooper's six variable groups (see Figure 2-2). This work is. However, this work's 
framework better addresses the problems of accounting for product evolution 
following the initial screen (Cooper 1992) and the parallel effects of an evolving 
marketing strategy (Crawford 1986). Key to the modification (see Figure 2-3) is the 
change in the expected value of the go/no-go decision at the initial screen as it 
evolves through infinite permutations vis-ä-vis the learn/continue/react decision 
though one year post launch. The outcome possibilities are a function of: (1) initial 
probabilities of success; (2) expected values of success with no strategic response; (3) 
revised probabilities of success based on learned antecedent states of nature and (4) 
revised expected values of success based on type and magnitude of learned strategic 
response. 
The post screening expected value calculation would actually involve infinite 
continuous calculations based on compounding internal and external environmental 
forces (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1990) over time. Since deterministic frameworks 
are inappropriate when time is a critical factor (Bums and Austin 1985), deterministic 
models used in changing (Albala 1975; Abell and Hammond 1979; Buzzell and Gale 
1987; Crawford 1984,1986; Kotler 1994; Lambkin and Day 1989; Lilien and Yoon 
1990; Porter 1980,1985,1991; Utterback, Allen, Hollomon and Sirbu 1976) 
stochastic environments are also. Such frameworks produce models laden with 
measurement timing error which reduces the temporal validity of initial and intra- 
process dimensional prescription. The environmental changes in turn produce 
changes in the conditional expected value (Tull and Hawkins 1993) of the 
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is highly relevant today as many facets of business activity accelerate (Bayus 1994). 
Static frameworks can describe this dynamic conceptually, but they fail as a platform 
for its operationalisation, measurement and implementation. To measure the 
correction necessary to maintain infinite possible states of equilibrium, this 
framework links variable groups more directly to strategy. It does this by casting the 
type and magnitude of appropriate strategic reaction in the role of equilibrium (Kotler 
1994) alignment mechanism. It does not abandon NewProd's application of early 
information in the creation of an early success forecast probability distribution and 
prescriptive strategy. However, success is not determined from initial strategy alone 
but from the interaction of the market environment with the evolving new product 
strategy (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b; Crawford 1986). Accordingly, this 
framework acknowledges posterior probabilistic distributions in the form of post 
screen changing states of nature. 
Clearly, adopting a framework embracing infinite expected values of imperfect 
information (EVII) seems more prudent today, than accepting one which leads to 
dynamic environment avoidance (Cooper 1979b, 1980b, 1981). Furthermore, it is 
harmonious with Cooper's proposals concerning new 3rd generation models featuring 
the 4F's9 (Cooper 1994b). These characteristics are desirable because they should 
bring products to market faster and improve utilisation of scarce resources. Thus, this 
work's conceptual framework supports assessment of the entire portfolio's value as a 
function of the highest project/portfolio expected payoff for each state of nature. This 
permits a potential solution to "pipeline chum", the problem of too often changing 
development priorities and "pipeline balance", the ability to successfully develop new 
product platforms whilst extending existing product lines. 
2.5 Hypotheses development 
Most past efforts have been dedicated to identifying variables and proposing 
explanatory models rather than to testing models and hypotheses (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1987b). This work tests seven hypotheses based on the conceptual 
model described above, in consideration of gaps in previous NPD forecasting 
research. 
9 (1) Fluid and adaptable with overlapping stages for greater speed; (2) Fuzzy gates where conditions are not absolute but can assume varying states that are conditional and situational; (3) Focused priorltsation to allow better resource management of the entire portfolio and (4) Flexible to allow each project a unique route through the process network. 
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Hypotheses Hla through Hld are related in their assumption that: (1) previously 
validated and new multi-disciplinary variables require replication for synthesis 
in 
field knowledge (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Wind and Mahajan 1988) and 
(2) process and environmental variable groups related to NPD outcome evolve over 
the life of the process (Albala 1975; Abell and Hammond 1979; Buzzell and Gale 
1987; Crawford 1984,1986; Kotler 1994; Lambkin and Day 1989; Lilien and Yoon 
1990; Porter 1980,1985,1991; Utterback, Allen, Hollomon and Sirbu 1976). 
Increasingly more elegant statistical tests are used to measure and analyse NPD 
managers' perception of variable states, first at the NPD process beginning (To, the 
initial screen) and then at the end (T1, one year post launch). The procedures test the 
evolution of variables (Hla), normalised factors (Hlb), model dimensions (Hlc) and 
model predictive accuracy (H, d) at two extreme points in the NPD process whilst 
techniques advance from simple ANOVA/t-tests, to factor analysis and linear 
regression. 
Hypotheses H2 and H3 explore how the dual linear regression functions and 
dimensions established in the procedures in Hlc above, change conditionally by P; LC 
and order/innovation. Finally, H4 examines the NPD value of strategic planning as 
both an initial contributor and a learned reactive linking mechanism to dimensional 
alignment. 
2.5.1 Hypothesis Hla 
Many variables relating to a new product's success are dynamic and perceived to 
evolve over the life of the NPD process. 
This hypothesis tests the null form that there is no change in the perceived 
significance and/or magnitude of variables important to entry success over the life of 
the NPD process. It is important because "best practices" require replication, better 
statistical rigour and more comprehensive reporting, especially under conditions 
assessing their temporal stability (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). Evolution of 
managers' perception of NPD variable change over the life of the process has not 
been verified. Understanding this change is fundamental to uncovering reasons for 
practitioner under-utilisation of models. This is especially important in today's 
dynamic situations recommended for avoidance (Cooper 1980b) yet still considered 
important for field advancement (Mahajan and Wind 1992). 
2.5.1.1 Core antecedent variables from NPD forecasting literature 
In choosing variables for replication,, this hypothesis acknowledges pioneering efforts 
(see Figure 2-1, A-E). However, only NewProd (Cooper 1979b, '1981), SAPPHO 
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(Rothwell et al 1974) and Stanford (Maidique and Zirger 1984, Zirger and Maidique 
1990) are comprehensive enough in reporting information and supporting statistics 
(Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). NewProd's original data set of seventy-seven 
process and environmental variables (Cooper 1979b) were comprehensive. These 
were reduced first to forty-eight (Cooper 1981,1985a) and then to thirty (Cooper 
1992). They capture homogeneous success/failure forecasting variation best (see 
variables labelled COOPER 1992 in APPENDIX A). For validation and synthesis, 
this work adopts Cooper's core, supplemented from other seminal works as needed. 
2.5.1.2 Supporting variables from other NPD forecasting literature 
Additional multi-disciplinary, multi-functional antecedents need testing (Cooper 
1976; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Wind 
and Mahajan 1988). Where conceptual gaps in Cooper's core existed, variables were 
borrowed from Cooper and de Brentani (1984) and Zirger and Maidique (1990). 
These forecasting works were closest in method and findings to NewProd and form 
the best basis of comparison for judging this work's validity and contribution. 
Cooper and de Brentani (1984) found financial potential, product life and types of 
strategy important to manager's accept/reject decision (see table 2-5). These new 
variables uncovered, along with mutually inclusive dimensions reordered, suggests 
reality check/utilisation problems between scholarly findings and practitioner go-no- 
go criteria. All three variable concepts were operationalised for better precision and 
added to this work's core (see Cooper and de Brentani 1984 in APPENDIX A). 
Zirger and Maidique (1990) used a high technology sampling frame to study variables 
similar to NewProd (see table 2-6). In'slightly different order due to 
R&D/organisational variable operationalisation, their findings tap dimensions similar 
to NewProd and support using the "Cooper 30". However, unlike Cooper, early entry 
was found related to success (Maidique and Zirger 1984). It was operationalised and 
added to the variable core data set (see Zirger and Maidique 1990 in APPENDIX A). 
2.5.1.3 New variables 
New variables culled from theory important to adjunct fields are noted by an "*" in 
Figure 2-3. Also, one primary citation to justify their use is displayed in the postal 
survey instrument in APPENDIX A., Areas integrated with the core include: (1) New 
product development history/experience; (2) Market entry barriers and competitive 
retaliation; (3) PLC; (4) Market entry timing; (5) Project innovation levels and (6) 
Strategic action/reaction. Models not acknowledging these areas, despite being 
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(Rothwell et al 1974) and Stanford (Maidique and Zirger 1984, Zirger and Maidique 
1990) are comprehensive enough in reporting information and supporting statistics 
(Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). NewProd's original data set of seventy-seven 
process and environmental variables (Cooper 1979b) were comprehensive. These 
were reduced first to forty-eight (Cooper 1981,1985a) and then to thirty 
(Cooper 
1992). They capture homogeneous success/failure forecasting variation best (see 
variables labelled COOPER 1992 in APPENDIX A). For validation and synthesis, 
this work adopts Cooper's core, supplemented from other seminal works as needed. 
2.5.1.2 Supporting variables from other NPD forecasting literature 
Additional multi-disciplinary, multi-functional antecedents need testing (Cooper 
1976; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Wind 
and Mahajan 1988). Where conceptual gaps in Cooper's core existed, variables were 
borrowed from Cooper and de Brentani (1984) and Zirger and Maidique (1990). 
These forecasting works were closest in method and findings to NewProd and form 
the best basis of comparison for judging this work's validity and contribution. 
Cooper and de Brentani (1984) found financial potential, product life and types of 
strategy important to manager's accept/reject decision (see table 2-5). These new 
variables uncovered, along with mutually inclusive dimensions reordered, suggests 
reality check/utilisation problems between scholarly findings and practitioner go-no- 
go criteria. All three variable concepts were operationalised for better precision and 
added to this work's core (see Cooper and de Brentani 1984 in APPENDIX A). 
Zirger and Maidique (1990) used a high technology sampling frame to study variables 
similar to NewProd (see table 2-6). In slightly different order due to 
R&D/organisational variable operationalisation, their findings tap dimensions similar 
to NewProd and support using the "Cooper 30". However, unlike Cooper, early entry 
was found related to success (Maidique and Zirger 1984). It was operationalised and 
added to the variable core data set (see Zirger and Maidique 1990 in APPENDIX A). 
2.5.1.3 New variables 
New variables culled from theory important to adjunct fields are noted by an "*" in 
Figure 2-3. Also, one primary citation to justify their use is displayed in the postal 
survey instrument in APPENDIX A. Areas integrated with the core include: (1) New 
product development history/experience; (2) Market entry barriers and competitive 
retaliation; (3) PLC; (4) Market entry timing; (5) Project innovation levels and (6) 
Strategic action/reaction. Models not acknowledging these areas, despite being 
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parsimonious and accurate, may be thought deficient (Lilien 1975) or "black box" 
(Mahajan and Wind 1992) by practitioners, thus leading to under-utilisation. Their 
validation would indicate future use in new product success/failure forecasting is 
warranted. 
2.5.1.3.1 Product market history 
The addition of product market historical experience is reasonable because: 
- firms should exploit past experience (Abell and Hammond 1979; Boston 
Consulting Group 1972; Buzzell and Gale 1987; Cooper and de Brentani 1984; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b; Crawford 1980,1994; Lambkin 1988; Lilien 
and Yoon 1990; Peters and Waterman 1982; Schmalensee 1982). This leads to 
competitive advantage (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982). 
benchmarking (Griffin 1993) historic norms to create information tracking 
systems (Crawford 1994; Kotler 1994) is necessary for "focusing" on the 
expected value (Tull and Hawkins 1993) of the go/no-go/continue decision vis-ä- 
vis the expected value of the entire portfolio (Cooper 1994). 
- product market entry success is related to previous generation replacement history 
e. g. success of PC word processors proceeds from replacement history of electro- 
mechanical = manual typewriter product market history (Saunders and Jobber 
1994). 
- past product market history, possibly the industrial, multigenerational equivalent 
of natural selection (Darwin 1859), needs testing. Individual products are 
offsprings of "family" platforms enhanced over time. Successive platforms are 
the applied result of underlying core capabilities (Meyer and Utterback 1993). In 
well-managed firms, such core capabilities tend to be of much longer duration and 
broader scope than single product families or individual products. Unobservable 
in seminal, single product market generation work, project "natures1° may be a 
"family inheritance" relating to synergy. Embodying all past product market 
efforts and analogous to genetic family history, the nature of past project 
experience may affect initially, every "next" project's success. As with early 
childhood experience, these early, uncontrollable influences may last until 
modified by controllable "nurturing"" processes over time. 
- variation may be the result of "dominant or recessive" product market 
characteristics unseen in single generation studies. Analogous to Mendel's12 
"hereditary units" (genes), project family ancestors and their ability to learn and 
teach from experience, may be the key to why projects fail despite seemingly 
"doing all the right things". 
Though success, failure and kill ratios and characteristics have been included on rare 
occasions (Cooper 1984b, 1985b; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1990a), very little has 
been done to establish the nature and extent of the link between this indirect measure 
of success and other dimensions (Hart 1993). Seminal omission of this certain 
10 A human analogy is one's early "nature- affecting being e. g. family wealth, appearance, place of birth, body build, intelligence level and religion. are uncontrollable in the child. To some degree they affect early and later decision making. I1 Sooner or later one's own 'nurturing" choices modify what nature has delivered on her own. 12 Gregor Johann Mendel. 
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deterministic dimension13 from initial screening model development seems an 
oversight. 
2.5.1.3.2 Competition and barriers to entry 
Competition is intensifying in many industries (Griffin 1993; Hayes, Wheelwright 
and Clark 1988; Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). Though the nature of the 
competitive situation has been found to be only weakly related to success, (Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1993), "the environment" needs further study (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994 ). Some suggest that environmental dimensions have less impact on 
success than process dimensions (Cooper 1979b, 1980b, 1981, Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1993) and that new products can be successful under a variety of 
market conditions (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a). However, re-examination is 
important in today's increasingly competitive global environment because: 
- past undercounting of market environment characteristics may result from 
products facing highly negative markets being killed early in their development 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987a). Long-term retrospectives exhibit survivour 
bias and may not capture these phenomena. 
- being "environmentally ignorant" is a significant failure scenario (Calantone and 
Cooper 1979). 
- competition for resources can cause failure (Calantone and Cooper 1979; Cooper 
1975; Darwin 1859; Lambkin and Day 1989; Link 1987; Wind and Mahajan 
1988) with some recommending dynamic (Cooper 1980b) and competitive 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981; Zirger and Maidique 1990) environments be avoided. 
- competitive actions are related to strategic planning (Abell and Hammond 1979; 
Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Bain 1956; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Buzzell 
and Gale 1987; Nijssen, Arbouw and Commandeur 1995; Rogers 1983; Doyle, 
Saunders and Wong 1992; Wasson 1978), recognised as important by NPD 
managers (Maidique and Zirger 1984) and important in practitioners' definitions 
of success (Hart 1993). 
Whilst new products aimed at markets with aggressive competitors seem to succeed 
or fail in spite of the situation (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993), the importance and 
type of the threat causing unique strategic responses goes unmeasured. Direct 
assessment of the threat of competition and important barriers to entry such as 
"incumbent cost advantages", "product differentiation", "brand identity", "cu stomer 
switching costs", "capital requirements", "access to distribution channels", "absolute 
cost advantages" and "government policy" (Porter 1985) is warranted. 
13 ff honestly assessed, past history has almost 0% chance of measurement error. i. e. it is a deterministic dimension. A deterministic mathematical 
model is expressed as Y=Bp + B1X1. Given any value for X the value of Y can be determined with precision. A stochastic model contains one or more random components that lead to errors in efforts to predict and is written as Y=Bp + B1X1 +e (cpsilon/error) (Webster 1992). 
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2.5.1.3.3 Product Life Cycle (PLC) 
PLC "surrogates variables" 14 have been found inferior to process variables for success 
prediction (Cooper 1979a) with length of PLC found only moderately important to 
project accept/reject decisions (Cooper and de Brentani 1984). However, PLC should 
be added to this work's core variable data set because: 
- the citations suggesting its strategic importance are impressive 
(Ansoff and ., 
Stewart 1967; Buzzell 1966; Catry and Chevalier 1974; Day 1981; Dodge and 
Rink 1978; Doyle 1976; Gordon, Calantone and di Benedetto 1991; Kotler 1994; 
Luck 1972; Levitt 1965,1966; Michael 1977; Rink and Swan 1979; Tellis and 
Crawford 1981; Thorelli and Burnett 1981; Utterback and Abernathy 1975; and 
Wasson 1978). 
- it is thought to have a moderating impact on the NPD process 
(Cooper 1979b, 
1981,1984) with previously validated dimensions deserving more attention as 
moderators (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
- with most NPD processes designed for long PLCs (Wind and Mahajan 1988), 
managers complain tools do not match their short cycle needs (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1991). PLC has the potential to meet forecasting needs 
(Balachandran and Jain 1972; Cooke and Edmondson 1973; Kovac and Dague 
1972; Parsons 1975) as an enabler (Day 1981). This might allow short-cuts and 
the improved accuracy requested (Wind and Mahajan 1988) in 3`d generation 
situational/conditional schemes (Cooper 1994b). 
- construct validity problems (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) caused by 
surrogate error emanate, possibly, from using only surrogate variables (Cooper 
1979a) to measure PLC. This needs correction using better operational 
definitions of PLC. 
Prominence in the literature, under-examination of NPD-related moderating 
characteristics and surrogate measurement error compel replication using a better 
operationalisation of the PLC concept as a process enabler (Day 1981). 
2.5.1.3.4 Market entry timing 
Entry timing is related to level of project innovativeness (Crawford 1994), with both 
concepts in need of re-examination based on mixed findings. 
- some find market entry timing is important to success (Ansoff and Stewart 1967; 
Lambkin 1988; Lilien and Yoon 1990; Robinson and Fornell 1985; Robinson, 
Fornell and Sullivan 1992). Pioneers develop sustainable competitive advantages 
(Lambkin 1988; Robinson 1988; Robinson and Fornell 1985; Robinson, Fornell 
and Sullivan 1992) with market share penalties paid by later entrants (Urban et al 
1986). However, 
- first-in advantages are 
based on the assumption of accumulated experience, 
marketplace positioning and stable preference patterns (Bain 1956). These are not 
as certain in today's short cycled markets where rapid diffusion reduces learning- 
based advantages (Liberman and Montgomery 1988). 
14 product homogeneity, intensity of competition, level of price competition, number of competitor. 
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- some indicate that final market share does not depend on order of entry at all 
(Fershtman, Mahajan and Muller 1990) or may be explained as much by other 
factors (Lilien and Yoon 1990; Miller, Gartner and Wilson 1989; Kerin et at. 
1992) including scale of entry (Biggadike 1979). 
- the best success/failure forecasting projects show mixed results. Cooper 
(1979b) 
and Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1993) did not find entry order a determinant of 
success in contrast to Maidique and Zirger's observation (1984). 
Clarification of the relationship of entry order to success in initial screening models 
remains undecided, provocative and worth re-examination. 
2.5.1.3.5 Market entry innovativeness 
Findings covering the impact of innovativeness (see APPENDIX B) on performance 
are scattered and inconclusive: 
- Myers and Marquis (1969) showed the great majority of five-hundred and sixty- 
seven successful incremental innovations were market derived (about 75% market 
pull) and only 21% were technology push. They did not produce a forecasting 
model however. 
- Globe, Levy and Schwartz (1973) determined that radical innovations were 
dominated by internal and technical factors. 
- early works have not found innovativeness a strong factor of success (Chakrabarti, 
O'Keefe and Soulder 1976; Kulvik 1977; Rothwell 1972,1974). 
- NewProd considered innovativeness a moderating variable only (Cooper 1979a, 
1979b, 1980a, 1980b) emphasising that innovative products are not all that 
different from "me too" products. 
- Cooper and de Brentani (1991) found highly innovative services marginally more 
successful, with Maidique and Zirger (1984,1990) finding product innovativeness 
not to be a success dimension. 
However, these findings need re-examination in light of the fact that: 
- all previous linear NPD work failed to identify the curvilinear phenomena 
inherent in innovativeness (Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991). 
- Cooper recently found highly innovative products achieved an admirable track 
record (Cooper 1994a). 
- innovation is an area lacking empirical confidence with only 31.9% of the 
research reporting the type of innovation studied. Thus, typically reported factors 
of success are called into question, with managerial guidelines by type of 
innovation needed (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
In these increasingly dynamic times it is highly appropriate to re-examine success 
more precisely as a function of "new-to-the-world products", "new-product lines", 
"additions to existing product lines", improvements/revisions to existing products", 
"repositionings" and "cost reductions" (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982). 
2.5.1.3 6 Strategic action/reaction 
Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1982) argue that success favours those that implement 
company specific approaches driven by corporate objectives and strategies. Whilst 
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this concept is not new, the link between objective attainment, type and magnitude of 
initial strategy based on early information and reactive strategy based on new learning 
has not been demonstrated. It should be since: 
- new product strategy and execution result from the new product process activities 
moving the product from idea to launch in an environment of resources, 
experience and skills in marketing, production and technology (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1987b). Strategy leads to performance (Buzzell and Gale 1987), as 
firms plan, anticipate and assemble resources and skills (Abell and Hammond 
1979) to take advantage of the projected situation. 
- traditional strategic approaches such as PIMS (Buzzell and Gale 1987)15 usually 
deal with existing products and are of little help in NPD work (Cooper 1984a, 
1984b). 
- strategic typologies are linked to performance (Cooper 1984a, 1984b, 1985b) with 
new product outcomes determined, not from initial strategy alone, but from the 
interaction of the market environment with the new product strategy (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1987b). 
- the NPD strategic process (Cooper 1985a, 1985b) exhibits this interaction into the 
post launch period (Cooper 1992; Crawford 1986). Benchmarking strategic 
changes between the initial screen and one year post launch would allow 
observation of the strategic alignment process (Abell and Hammond 1979; Kotler 
1994; Porter 1991). 
- new product strategies link the NPD process to company objectives, which, in 
turn, loop back to provide guidelines for the next project's screening criteria 
(Booz Allen and Hamilton 1982). This conceptual "connective dynamic" needs 
better operationalisation, definition and clarification. 
Beginning NPD strategy at the initial screening using historical experience and early 
information may be quite inappropriate in the later stages of the process. After 
downstream information becomes more certain, adjustments in strategic emphases 
and implementation are conceivable: Thus, assessing initial screen strategic profile 
and its evolutionary adjustment vis-ä-vis "newness/innovativeness problems ", 
"barriers to entry problems", "resource problems", "project/newness problems", "final 
product problems" and "market problems" is apropos. 
2.5.1.4 Core supporting and new antecedents may evolve 
Information available early may evolve to a richer level during the later stages of the 
process (Albala 1975; Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Crawford 1984,1986; 
Lambkin 1988; Ronkainen 1985). Successful innovation is facilitated by monitoring 
environmental evolution (Mintzberg 1983) and handling major changes related to 
technology and the marketplace as they occur (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988, 
1995; Cooper 1980a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 1988). Understanding the 
15 AIMS (profit impact of market strategy) strategic dimensions consist of strategy in the areas of product/service policies, pricing policies, marketing programs, Investment strategy, work force productivity, vertical integration and R&D. 
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significance and magnitude of simple and compounding variable evolution, within 
and between categories (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1990), is fundamental to 
empirical demonstration of "must meet, should meet" stage and gate criteria and 
activities (Cooper 1990a). This evolution16 has not been demonstrated, but would 
support those recommending its assessment (Abell and Hammond 1979; Buzzell and 
Gale 1987; Kotler 1994; and Porter 1980,1985,1991). And it may uncover 
conditional phenomena (Cooper 1994b) necessary to relative models (Lilien 1975) 
which are required for futuristic scenario analysis (Wind and Mahajan 1988). 
2.5.2 Hypothesis Hlb 
The factors constructed from screening variables are dynamic with respect to their 
construction, percent of variance, order and magnitude. They evolve over time 
from the initial screen to the end of the first year of market entry. 
Hypothesis Hlb is a logical extension of H, a above. It tests the null form that there is 
no difference between early and late normalised factorial environments. It flows 
methodologically from Schocker, Gensch and Simon's (1969) admonition to 
eliminate variable overlapping effects by reducing them to more manageable subsets 
of independent dimensions. 
Factor analysis is well established in NPD research (Calantone and Cooper 1979; 
Cooper 1979b, 1981 1985a; Cooper and de Brentani 1984,1991; Zirger and Maidique 
1990). Investigations over the last three decades have generated awareness of the 
normalised environmental factors that facilitate or undermine new product success. 
Unfortunately, no work has observed normalised factor environmental change from 
the beginning to the end of the NPD process. 
H, b posits that there is a difference between beginning and ending factor analysis 
results. Validation is important because demonstrating a significant change in factor 
solutions would suggest multiple normalised environments are at work in the NPD 
process. This would support those suggesting that internal and external 
environmental changes occur (Abell and Hammond 1979; Buzzell and Gale 1987; 
Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988,1995; Cooper 1980a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1987b, 1988; Kotler 1994; Porter 1980,1985,1991) thus affecting the expected value 
of success. 
2.5.3 Hypothesis Hic 
Factors significant to a new product's successful introduction are dynamic. As 
more information becomes known to the team over time these significant factors 
16 also for normalised factors (Hlb), linear regression success dimensions (H1c), accuracy improvement (Hld) and strategic reaction (114). 
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evolve from an inadequate, incomplete, uncertain condition at the initial screen to 
a more adequate, more complete, more certain condition at the end of the first year 
of market entry. They change in their order and magnitude. 
A logical extension of Hla and Hlb above, this hypothesis tests the null form that 
there is no linear difference between beginning and ending dimensions perceived 
significant to success. It replicates Cooper's seminal methodology, integrates new 
heterogeneous dimensions and then re-examines factor selection and magnitude as 
they change over time. The aim is to understand internal temporal construct validity 
problems possible in static works. 
2.5.3.1 Re-examination and validation of previous work 
The link between project outcome, performing up-front activities (Cooper 1988, 
1994b; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986,1987b, 1994) and initial screening forecast 
reliability (Cooper 1979b, 1981,1992; Zirger and Maidique 1990) has been 
established. However, for the field to evolve beyond the exploratory stage, 
replication is required (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). NewProd has received 
limited validation (see Table 2-3) and Stanford none. Therefore, re-construction and 
validation of the initial screening function and dimensions, using core and expanded 
data sets, is important. 
2.5.3.2 NPD model evolution 
Testing Hlc also responds to queries as to whether or not "best practices" are time 
invariant (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). Though dimensional evolution has 
been acknowledged to be a methodological problem (Cooper 1992; Crawford 1979), 
neither NewProd (see Table 2-2 and Table 2-4) nor Stanford (see Table 2-6) results 
have been tested for temporal stability. 
Some NPD evolution is recognised currently. For example: (1) conceptual changes 
are thought to represent continuous improvement in the quality of the data over time 
(Albala 1975); (2) product innovation techniques are thought to evolve over time into 
process innovation techniques (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Calantone, Di 
Benedetto and Meloche 1988; de Bresson and Townsend 1981; Utterback 1981) and 
(3) project success is related to evolving technical and marketing skills and resources, 
either on hand or acquired over time (Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988,1990,1993; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 1988). Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that 
if the quality of data, innovation techniques, skills and resources needed change over 
time, then early dimensions of success may differ from later dimensions of success. 
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Importantly, if "best models" were demonstrated to differ over time, the GO/NO-GO 
and GO/CONTINUE decision would then be conditional". "Fuzzy" decision making 
is thought desirable (Cooper 1994b). Thus, accepting Hlc would ultimately lead to 
more flexible models displaying unique critical paths (Lilien and Kotler 1983; Urban 
and Hauser 1980)18 to success. 
2.5.3.3 Seminal measurement timing error 
A serious threat to the validity of the NewProd model comes from its long, imprecise 
retrospective measurement period. To establish dimensional construct validity, early 
NewProd work used factor analysis. Later both factor analysis and Chronbach alphas 
were used. However, factor analysis and Chronbach alphas are not panacea 
substitutes for establishing construct validity (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Figure 2-4: Performance measurement error resulting from evolution of internal and external variable changes 
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Measurement timing error occurs when measurements are made at an inappropriate 
time to properly reflect the characteristic being studied (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
Cooper constructed the NewProd model from long retrospectives (see Figure 2-4)19. 
17 Conditional probability is the likelihood that event "A" will occur given that, or on the condition that, event "B" has already occurred. P(AIB) 
P(A and B) I P(B) (Webster 1992). The project might GO or CONTINUE given that significant early requirements have been achieved and those 
required later have a high conditional probability for later accomplishment based on evolving internal and external conditions. 18 see CPM in APPENDIX B. Similar to PERT, CPM refers to the critical path method of project management used for timely application of 
resources. The technique is similar, but possibly more useful to practitioners, than anecdotally determined stage-gates (Cooper 1990a). See also, 
Grossman, Don and Sri N. Gupta, Dynamic Time-Staged Model for R&D Portfolio Planning-A Real World Case, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management Vol. EM-21, No 4, November 1974. 
19 NewProd'a evolutionary problem is founded also, in the inconsistent manner of asking for the success/failure performance judgement e. g. the 
measurement of dimensional evolution varies from case to case depending on the point in time when the respondent decides independently. to 
measures success/failure. This can be misleading (Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992). In Calantone and Cooper (1979) the unit of analysis was 
a product new to the firm and a failure within the last 5 years. Unfortunately, in Cooper 1979a, 1979b and 1981, the term "recent" was used but not defined. The elapsed time benchmark date (from screening or from launch) was missing also This work improves upon this using one year from 
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Asking company personnel to recall sets of new products over a five year period 
relies heavily on memory, is subjective in interpretation and may vary between 
operational functions. The results can be biased towards earlier products because 
there has been a longer time to achieve some degree of success (Crawford 1979). 
Clearly, the longer the retrospective the more serious such survivor bias (Kerin, 
Varadarajan and Peterson 1992, Mitchell 1991). Thus, because the product and 
marketing strategy evolve together (Crawford 1986) causal antecedents can be 
divorced from the ultimate success/failure result by strategic action/reaction (Cooper 
1992). Further, since most performance measures vary with the timeframe specified, 
the failure to define precise performance measurement benchmark dates in seminal 
literature may limit the value of this type of result (Hultink and Robben 1995). 
In testing Hlc measurement timing error and survivor bias are reduced by using a 
three year time frame (versus five years) and a one year performance benchmark date. 
Construct validity and temporal assessment (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) 
should improve proportionately. 
2.5.4 Hypothesis Hld 
As the factors contributing to a new product's success evolve, the resulting new 
product screening model's predictive proficiency evolves also. 
Hld is a logical extension of Hla, H, b and Hlc. It tests the null form that there is no 
accuracy difference between the two linear functions created in H, c above. 
Validation is important because it would support the evolution of environments 
theorised above and respond to requests for better forecasting accuracy (Mahajan and 
Wind 1992). 
Screening accuracy is critical yet based on speculative (Cooper and de Brentani 1984; 
Albala 1975, Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 1990; Souder 1978) information. Up- 
front activities are poorly performed overall (Cooper 1988) with richer data emerging 
as the process evolves (Albala 1975). Practitioner under-utilisation may be due to 
manager disapproval of immature, uncertain forecasts based on expensive speculative 
information leading to low expected value from early model use20. If predictive 
proficiency is shown to rise over time, a multiple model (Albala 1975; Lilien 1975) 
simulation becomes an even more attractive NPD paradigm. These would be 
probabilistic rather than deterministic and would be more useful than current models 
launch as the performance measurement date. For Comparison, Cooper's -recent project" is assumed to be 5 years denoted in previous and later (Cooper and de Brentani 1991b; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993) works. 20 EVIL   EVPI-ECE. Expected Value of Imperfect Information a Expected Value of Perfect Information minus Expected Coat oo Errors (Tull and Hawkins 1993). The more speculative the model's information (increasing the coat of error based on speculative "a priori" information), the lower its expected value to the practitioner. The lower the value of the model to the practitioner the less it will be used. 
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in dealing with risk due to internal and external change. As such, they would allow 
complex diagnostic analyses using multiple performance criteria based on various 
types of strategic equilibrium adjustment. 
2.5.5 Hypothesis H 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction vary 
as a function of the length of the product's introductory life cycle. 
The operational definition of PiLC is "the life expectancy of an introduction before 
modification is necessary". It is calculated in years and months and is in harmony 
with Day's argument that a product life cycle begins when a substantial change in 
technology, customer function or customer group occurs that is outside the scope of 
all or most of the current suppliers (Day 1981). Yet it avoids the empirically vague 
issue of beginning and end of PLC stages. Using I1C in a conditioning/moderating 
role, H2 tests the null form that there is no difference between short, medium and long 
product market dimensions of success. 
Some have suggested that there may not be one set of NPD activities/processes 
common to all teams, conditions and situations (Calantone, Vickery and Droge 1995; 
Cooper 1985a, 1994b; O'Connor 1994). Accordingly, with short cycles (Griffin 
1993; Qualls, Olshavsky and Michaels 1981) lessening management's ability to react 
quickly, thus forcing use of approximations (Ansoff and Stewart 1967), H2 attempts 
to demonstrate how PiLC approximation alters dimensions under such conditions. 
Validation is important because, though PLC is recommended for determining 
strategy, few have examined how strategies actually change in response to product 
life cycle changes (Thorelli and Burnett 1981). 
2.5.5.1 PLC in the general literature 
Supporters of PLC's suggest the concept is fundamental to determining strategy 
(Hoffer 1975). They advise that it leads to better planning (Levitt 1965,1966), is the 
simple and intuitive centrepiece of the marketing and planning literature (Thorelli and 
Burnett 1981) and though lacking empirical support, it is advocated by academics 
(Buzzell 1966, Catry and Chevalier 1974; Cox 1967; Doyle 1976; Kotler 1994; Luck 
1972; Michael 1977; Polli and Cook 1969, Rink and Swan 1979; Staudt et al. 1976; 
Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Wasson 1978) as a framework for product 
management (Tellis and Crawford 1981). 
Others disagree based on disappointing application (Thietart and Vivas 1984), 
propensity for self-fulfilling, premature product death (Dhalla and Yuspeh 1976) and 
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lack of evidence concerning competitive processes accompanying market evolution 
(Lambkin and Day 1989). None-the-less, its true value as an enabling condition, a 
moderating variable, or a consequence of strategic decisions (Day 1981) has not been 
explored fully (Harrell and Taylor 1981). 
2.5.5.2 PLC in the screening literature 
Direct PLC impact assessment is conspicuously rare in the screening/forecasting 
literature. When acknowledged, support has been weak. NewProd (Cooper 1979a) 
found a gap between the venture outcome and product life-cycle surrogates. With 
none significantly related to success or failure, he argued for de-emphasising its 
strategic or predictive value. However, he did find it to moderate conditions of 
success (Cooper 1979b, 1981). Contrarily, Cooper and de Brentani (1984) later found 
length of PLC significant to managers' accept/reject decisions, but it ranked only fifth 
out of nine criteria (see Table 2-5). This may illustrate another "reality check" 
incongruity between modelers and practitioners (Calantone, Di Benedetto and 
Haggblom 1995). 
2.5.5.3 Current short PLC imperative 
Product life-cycles and/or symptoms are getting shorter (Bayus 1994; Booz Allen and 
Hamilton 1982; Griffin 1993; Guveritz, S. 1982; Qualls, Olshavsky and Michaels 
1981; Rosenthal 1991). The evolution of the original twenty-five year typewriter 
PLC to the five year first-generation microprocessor-controlled model is an example 
(Saunders and Jobber 1994). Even more severe, computer hardware PLCs are 
estimated at six to eighteen months (Seymour 1995) with significant advances in 
graphics components estimated at ninety to one-hundred twenty days (Boudette 
1993). 
Decreasing product development cycle time is an important issue to US corporations 
(Griffin 1993) with many companies trying to shorten their time from ideation to 
launch (Ali, Krapfel and LaBahn 1995; Griffin 1993; Millson, Raj and Wilemon 
1992). Currently, there is a veritable deluge of articles in the Journal of Product 
Innovation Management concerning shorter PLCs, cycle reduction time and issues 
ancillary (Bayus 1994; Carmel 1995; Cooper 1994b; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994; 
Nijssen, Arbouw and Commandeur 1995; Murmann 1994; Saunders and Jobber 1994; 
Rauscher and Smith 1995). However, most NPD processes are modelled on long 
PLCs. Flexible procedures allowing short-cuts need development (Wind and 
Mahajan 1988). 
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"The environment" requires further study (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Validation of short, medium and long PiLC success dimensions is meaningful since 
little is understood of shrinking PLC effect on dimension variance. Further, all 
current models lack desirable third generation conditional/situational characteristics 
(Cooper 1994b) which could shorten cycle time based on PiLC conditions. Reducing 
requirements (Wind and Mahajan 1988) by limiting dimension consideration to only 
those appropriate to product market length would support early estimation of PLC 
(Levitt 1965,1966), validate PLC as a moderator (Cooper 1979b, 1981; Day 1981) 
and be useful to NPD critical path modelling (Lilien and Kotler 1983; Urban and 
Hauser 1980). 
2.5.6 Hypothesis H3 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction vary 
as a function of its order of entry/related level of innovativeness. 
Since the general and NPD literature is mixed on the effects of speed to market and its 
contribution to success/failure under researched (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 
1994), re-examination is important. Inconsistent findings may be due to inadequate 
operationalisations of the concept, methodological inconsistencies and statistical 
inappropriateness. It is clear that no standardised set of NPD activities are perfect for 
all conditions (Calantone, Vickery and Droge 1995; Cooper 1994b; O'Connor 1994). 
Therefore, using order/innovation to moderate the aggregate factors is appropriate and 
useful to measure success through the 1" year after launch. 
H2 does not attempt to decide whether entry should be early, late, or somewhere in 
between. Rather, it investigates whether "high-tech" pioneers exhibit different 
success factors than "lower-tech" followers. With free and timely choice of 
order/innovation not always possible, a need exists to differentiate between early and 
late strategies (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
2.5.6.1 Order/innovation in the general literature 
The concept of ordered advantage is quite mature (Bain 1956; Stigler 1969), with 
Ansoff and Stewart (1967) suggesting technological strategy success comes from 
either: (1) being first to market based on technical leadership and risk taking; (2) 
following the leader stressing an ability to react quickly as the market starts its growth 
phase; (3) applying applications engineering to modify products in mature markets or 
(4) being "me-too", but stressing superior manufacturing efficiency and cost control. 
,.. ý. 
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Some find early entry important to success (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Hopkins 
and Bailey 1971; Lilien and Yoon 1990; Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan 1992). 
Pioneers have higher market shares (Robinson and Fornell 1985) for both start-up and 
adolescent businesses (Lambkin 1988), with a significant penalty paid by later 
entrants (Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 1986). These penalties, especially in high 
growth, short PLC and high price erosion environments, have caused profit declines 
from 17% to 35% over a five year period (Nijssen, Arbouw and Commandeur 1995). 
Some find otherwise (Fershtman, Mahajan and Muller 1990; Miller, Gartner and 
Wilson 1989) suggesting successful entry may actually be more a condition of 
marketing positioning and advertising Merin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Urban 
et al. 1986), delayed entry to improve the product and/or marketing effort (Lilien and 
Yoon 1990) or a function of industry related variables (semiconductor industry - 
Flaherty 1983; Spital 1983; high technology - Maidique and Zirger 1984; cigarettes - 
Whitten 1979; pharmaceuticals - Bond and Lean 1977). At best the general literature 
is mixed. 
2.5.6.2 Order/innovation in the screening literature 
Speed to market is one of the least studied factors of success (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994). The existing evidence is mixed due probably to differences in 
variable selection, conceptual/operational definitions and/or inappropriate statistical 
methods. 
The effects of innovation as it relates to order is also troublesome. Utterback (1974) 
examined factors affecting successful innovation. Later Abernathy and Utterback 
(1978) examined how response to innovative ideas changes as teams mature. 
Innovativeness is identified as important to new entries (Davidson 1976; Marquis 
1969; Rothwell 1976) and to competitive advantage (Maidique and Zirger 1984) with 
Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1982) determining that ten percent of "new to market " 
products represent sixty percent of successes. This is inconsistent with those failing 
to find that being first to market is a significant determinant21 (Cooper 1979b; Zirger 
and Maidique 1990). Complicating matters, Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) 
recanted previous findings on innovation because of the inappropriateness of linear 
methods. Then, ironically, they used linear techniques again (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1993) to find order moderately significant to success. Such 
21 this may be due to the methodological problem of averaging dimensions over long periods of time and failure to benchmark performance 
measurement dates consistently. Importantly, the survivor bias (see Figure 2-4) resulting would eliminate the significance of those who failed because of late entry. 
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inconsistencies support re-examination. The problem is still unresolved and 
provocative. 
2.5.6.3 Complications with past findings 
Changing new product development environments, methodological problems of past 
work and failure to identify, account and report innovation type requires re-evaluation 
of success discriminants as a function of innovation type (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994). Environments are now characterised by new knowledge being 
applied faster, more new introductions, time between innovations decreasing, more 
variations available and failure to consistently remove products from the market 
(Bayus 1994; Saunders and Jobber 1994). Avoiding such environments (Cooper 
1979b, 1980b) to attain a learning advantage is impractical today. Given that rapid 
diffusion rates reduce learning-based advantages (Liberman and Montgomery 1988), 
re-evaluation of order/innovation is more appropriate than ever. 
Problematic also is the suggestion that order effects may vary between incumbents 
and newcomers (Mitchell 1991). Survivor bias (Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 
1992) from five year retrospectives (see Figure 2-4) may exclude early failure. This 
casts some suspicion on the mixed order/innovation findings. This work's use of a 
cross-section of small, large, new and incumbent teams, benchmarked precisely at one 
year post launch, minimises survivor bias. The results from testing H3 will represent 
pioneering failed case phenomena possibly missing in the NewProd and Stanford 
models. 
2.5.7 Hypothesis H4 
Firms which develop precise initial strategies but react flexibly to deal with 
deficiencies in early assumptions of internal and external environments, are more 
successful than those that do not. 
Suggesting that firms should plan and react accordingly is not original. Poor planning 
has been known to be a reason for failure for some time (Crawford 1977 ). However, 
few firms plan well (Abell and Hammond 1979) and no one has measured the direct 
effect of strategy's initial and later intra-process links to success. H4 tests the null 
form that there is no difference in entry success based on the team's ability to plan 
and implement initial NPD strategy and then react appropriately over time. 
2.5.7.1 Strategy in the general literature 
Strategy at its simplest is static. It provides a blueprint for the pursuit of 
organisational objectives appropriate for sustained success (Thompson and Strickland 
1987). This success is based on analysing: (1) customer segmentation and its 
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requirements; (2) competitors and their strategies; (3) environmental trends; (4) 
market evolution of supply and demand and (5) company strengths and weaknesses 
(Abell and Hammond 1979). These factors must be reviewed in the context of size 
and historical experience vis-ä-vis costs. 
Strategy is also dynamic, with strategic windows for successful entry occurring when 
a market's key success requirements and specific firm competencies fit best (Abell 
1978). Though the PIMS studies linked strategy to performance (Buzzell and Gale 
1987), the phenomena of strategy guiding the fit between objectives, resources and 
opportunities over time (Porter 1991) has not been demonstrated. This learned 
reactive dynamic defined as alignment (Abell 1978; Kotler 1994) remains 
unexamined in an NPD context. 
2.5. Z2 Strategy in the screening literature 
Company specific new product programmes are a function of a well-defined new 
product strategy (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982). These link the NPD process to 
company objectives, provide focus for idea/concept generation and guide the 
establishment of screening criteria. 
Modern NPD strategy has been studied (Cooper 1984a, 1984b, 1985b; Cooper and de 
Brentani 1984; Rothwell et al. 1974; Souder 1987,1988) with Cooper finding 
programme strategy related to performance. This relationship was based on the types 
of new products developed, markets chosen, technologies employed and the nature, 
orientation and commitment of the process (Cooper 1984a, 1984b, 1985b). However, 
it is understudied in an NPD context (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) with no 
one accounting directly for the effects of less informed, early, strategic planning, 
evolving into more informed, later strategic reaction. Equilibrium maintenance and 
its link to success needs clarification. 
2.5.7.3 Strategy - the unmeasured NPD "dynamic link" 
PIMS linked strategy to performance but has been criticised as overly simplistic 
formulae attempting to solve complex management problems (Lubatkin and Pitts 
1985). Because PIMS treats NPD strategies peripherally, it is not adequate to address 
new product development programmes (Cooper 1984a, 1984b) or individual project 
strategy. Survivor bias reduces PIMS to analysing only late phenomena, as the 
effects of early exit from the market goes unexamined. And PIMS does not forecast 
which new products will succeed based on specific strategic variation. As such, it is 
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inadequate for describing normative initial or reactive NPD success accomplishment. 
Better understanding of the temporal nature of NPD strategy is needed. 
This work posits that the team's NPD strategy has both an initial and reactive role in 
assessing, reacting to and controlling process and environmental group equilibrium. 
This initial and ending "strategic state of nature" and its link to success, needs 
examination because: 
- though strategic policies and decisions involving significant resource 
commitments are not easily reversible, they must be calibrated to fit the situation 
(Buzzell and Gale 1987). As situations change, strategic fit must change to 
optimise success. 
- process and environmental strategy evolution is important. New posterior 
conditional information acquisition requires strategic adjustment (Kotler 1994). 
The type and magnitudinal impact of changing relationships between initial and 
ending strategic NPD requirements has not been established. 
- well-defined strategy links the process to company objectives, establishing 
guidelines for screening criteria in return (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; see 
Figure 2-5). However, this successful post launch strategic feedback process has 
never been demonstrated and requires delineation for its incorporation into initial 
screening model criteria. 
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team learning - re-evaluation of screening objectives 
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4.1 1 
Whilst correctly advising attention to controllable variables, NewProd and Stanford 
cannot empirically demonstrate the evolving calibration of strategy to dynamic 
situations. Recommended for avoidance (Cooper 1980b), dynamic situations 
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requiring control are precisely where adaptive strategy is most critical and wanting. 
By failing to deliver dynamic advice, seminal models are strategically lacking. 
Accordingly, H4 posits that successful teams are better able to make dynamic, linking 
adjustments based on the results of group compounding interaction. Measuring the 
type and magnitude of the strategic link to evolving success is important, new to the 
field and demonstrated here. 
2.6 Summary 
Hla - Hid: Scholarly evidence indicates that whilst use of screening models could 
reduce failure rates, they are under-utilised by practitioners and need improvement 
(Cooper and de Brentani 1984; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988; Wind and Mahajan 
1988; Mahajan and Wind 1992). Model inadequacy, low expected value from using 
priori methods only, naive models and/or inability to deal with the dynamics of the 
1990's marketplace may explain why up-front actives are poorly performed. 
Evidenced by scholarly calls for improvement and practical under-utilisation, testing 
H, a through Hld is important. Results should bridge gaps in the literature currently 
and add needed quantitative sophistication to overcome possible construct validity 
problems (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Mahajan and Wind 1992) resulting, 
in part, from measurement timing error and survivor bias. Furthermore, these results 
could demonstrate flexibility characteristics cardinal to future third generation process 
models (Cooper 1994b). 
H2 - H4: Re-examination of both PLC (H2) and order/innovation (H3) is especially 
important in today's dynamic environment. Mounting pressure to innovate fast and 
frequently make PLC and order/innovation conditioned models desirable, especially 
given the current trend to reduce cycle time. 
Finally, hypothesis H4 is needed to demonstrate that successful teams are better able 
to make dynamic changes in initial screening strategy as markets and processes 
evolve over time. Given strategy's lack of validation in the NPD forecasting 
literature (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) combined with the calls for dynamic 
environment avoidance (Cooper 1980b), 'project level strategic reaction guidance is a 
worthy objective. 
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Chapter Three - Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This research utilises Churchill's (1991) six step sequence recommended for use in 
marketing research (see Figure 3-1). Chapter three explains the application of steps 
two through five. It describes the procedures used to examine all hypotheses listed in 
Chapter two. The chosen method emanates from seminal authors to allow a valid 
comparison. 
Figure 3-1: Research process used (Churchill 1991) 
1. Formulate the problem 
2. 'Determine the research design 
How much Is already known? .-". 
Can a hypothesis be formulated? 
W hat types of questions need to be ensw Bred? -" - 
W hat tune of study w ill beat address the research question? - ' "' °' 
- 
ß. t 1 3. Design Data Collection Method and Forms 
Caa existing data be used to advantage? 
W hat to to be measured? How? .ý % W hat is the source of the data? 
" Can objective answers be obtained by asking people? 
How should people be questioned? 
Should the questionnaires be administered to person, over the phone. or through the mall 
Should electronic or mechanical means be used to make the observation? - "' 
W bat specific behaviours should the observers record? 
Should structured or unstructured Items be used to collect the data? 
Should the purpose of the study be made know a to the respondents? "-. 9- 
Should ruing scales be used in the questiunnairot I '1 I 'Y" i 
f. Design Sample and Collect Data 
W hat is the target population? 
Is a sam pie necessary? 
" -, Is a probability sample desirable? 
"` How large should the um pie bet 
How should the sample be selected? 
i" 
rM", "°,, +. 
"ý 
Who will gather the data? 
Now long will the data gathering take? 
_ ," How much supervision Is needed? 
What operational procedures will be followed? 
W hat methods w 111 be used to ensure the quality of the data collected? 
S. 'Analyse and interpret the Dola 
Who will handle the editing of the data? 
How will the data be coded? 
Who w ill supervise the coding? - 
W Ili pom peter or hand tabulation be used? 
W hat tabulations are called for? ,-.. W hat analysis techniques will be aced? 
6. Prepare the research report 
3.2 Previous methodological designs 
NPD methodology for go/kill determination has evolved from developing personal 
checklists via judgement (see Figure 2-1, panel B) to regressing perceived success 
and failure antecedents (Cooper 1979b, 1981,1985a, 1992; Cooper and de Brentani 
1984; Zirger and Maidique 1990; see Figure 2-1 panel F). Common designs should 
have developed to provide a replicative, integrated scientific approach for advancing 
the field. ' Unfortunately, there is a wide variation in research designs, methods and 
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operationalisations of the dependent and explanatory variables used to study new 
product performance (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Simple first level designs employing descriptive statistics including means, 
frequencies and proportions are, unfortunately, still common in new work. 
They 
stand along side third and fourth level analysis22. The best overall 
design is the one 
used by Cooper in his early NewProd project work 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981). All others, 
except Rothwell et al (1974) and Maidique and Zirger 
(1984), either lack rigour or 
complete reporting for summarisation, replication and field improvement 
(Montoya- 
Weiss and Calantone 1994). This work is grounded in the NewProd design and 
modified only based on scholarly calls for improvement and published requests 
by 
practitioners. 
3.2.1 NewProd methodology 
In Cooper's earliest NewProd work (1979a) he developed a conceptual model of six 
new product development constructs (see Figure 2-2 ). From these, seventy-seven 
antecedents were selected for potential contribution to success and failure. A 
questionnaire was mailed to functionally neutral managers soliciting perceptions of 
antecedent importance vis-ä-vis actual success or failure. One-hundred and ninety- 
five actual new product project success/failure cases were obtained from a 
government sampling frame of active industrial product producers in Ontario and 
Quebec Canada. 
Respondents were asked to select two "recent" projects, one a clear cut commercial 
success and the other a similarly distinct failure23. They were asked to rate the project 
intervally from 0 to 10. Total agreement with the antecedent variable statement was a 
"10". Total disagreement was a "0" (see APPENDIX A, question #8). Benchmarks 
for performance measurement were not used' leading to probable measurement 
timing error and survivor bias. After telephone follow-up for "assistance and 
encouragement" and correction for, " inappropriate or non-existent firms", a 69% 
response rate was achieved25. Cooper's analysis utilised simple designs stressing 
means, simple correlation and analysis of variance. 
Z2 Montoya-Weiss and Calantone (1994) suggest that the nature of statistical inference and deduction has improved over time with empiricism 
evolving from: (1) descriptive statistics (means, frequencies and proportions); (2) tests of differenc&similarities (t-teat, binomial test. ANOVA, 
MANOVA and X2) (3) measures of dimensionality (factor analysiis, cluster analysis and discriminant analysis) and (4) interpretation of parameters 
statistically (correlation analysis, canonical correlation analysis, regression analysis, path analysis and structural equation models). 
23 projects that exceeded or fell short of minimum acceptable profitability for the type of project or investment, regardless of the way profitability 
was measured (scale from -5 to +5). This limited focus on profitability was later determined to be too narrow (Cooper and Klcinschmidt 1987a). 24 Crawford (1979) suggests a serious issue with failure studies revolves around how long a product is allowed to continue before success/failure is 
determined. Depending on industry. the setting and the buyer's decision process, strategy. management of the process and major expenditures of 
money can "fix problems" and thus affect the success ratio (see Cooper, Robert G., The NewProd System: The Industry Experience, Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, June, 1992.9: 113-127). If studies are (the typical) five year variety, researchers may be studying remedial 
marketing skills not success and failure of original innovation at the screen, 
25 this "adjustment" is confusing given that the respondents were pre-screened. 
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Using the same data set, Cooper (1979b) advanced the methodology by applying 
factor analysis (Schocker, Gensch and Simons 1969) to eliminate the multicollinearity 
of the seventy-seven variable antecedents. Eighteen orthogonal 
(see APPENDIX B) 
factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 were accepted followed by discriminant 
analysis (Simon and Freimar 1970) to forecast success/failure and determine the 
weightings of the factors in the screening model. Eleven of the eighteen factors 
differentiated well between new product success and failure. The model was 
validated using the split-half method. 
Ultimately, these seventy-seven variables were reduced to forty-eight for his 1981 
linear regression work and the interative 1985 work. Here he refined the procedure 
further by applying fourth level linear regression to thirteen orthogonal factors 
constructed using principal component analysis and varimax rotation. Eight were 
significant in predicting success. Chronbach alphas were not used to confirm internal 
consistency in any of these works. 
With the exception of an occasional fourth level linear approach such as Calantone 
and Di Benedetto's 1990 use of canonical correlation (see APPENDIX B) to measure 
the interaction between and within the sets of variables, no other methodologies have 
made inroads in the field. As such, NewProd's method stands as the definitive 
methodology for retrospective, deterministic linear forecasting model development. 
3.2.2 Other forecasting model methodology 
To determine manager's accept/reject criteria Cooper and de Brentani (1984) used the 
same statistical methodology but chose variable sets differently. They studied 
screening factors from sixty-three industrial firms asking each to identify an "accept" 
and a "reject" proposal. Three-hundred and seventy projects were rated on each of 
eighty-six items using an eleven point Likert scale from -5 (strongly reject) to +5 
(strongly accept). ' Using factor analysis with principal component extraction and 
varimax rotation, an eleven factor solution was chosen based on the scree test (see 
APPENDIX B, Cattel 1966). This, along with the use of Chronbach alpha scores to 
judge internal consistency, was new to these type screening studies and an important 
improvement. 
Cooper and de Brentani's study of the financial services industry (1991) used and 
improved on the now evolving methodology. Like Cooper's early work, a conceptual 
framework was developed to describe the new service process and environment. 
Continuing the improvement of construct validation, Chronbach alphas tested internal 
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consistency. However, the performance measurement technique was also improved 
by the use of a three level categorisation based on: (1) simple success/failure; (2) 
degree of success/failure and (3) level of objective attainment. Unfortunately, use of 
simple one way ANOVA of success/failure and Pearson product-moment correlations 
failed to enhance field statistical elegance. 
The initial Stanford Innovation Project (Maidique and Zirger 1984) used a design 
which did not resemble NewProd. It began by: (1) collecting unstructured data for 
variable set determination; (2) constructing success/failure innovation pairs for fifty- 
nine innovations and (3) performing an in-depth case study of a twenty firm sub-set. 
The 1990 follow-up (Zirger and Maidique 1990) used factor analysis and discriminant 
analysis in a manner quite similar to NewProd (Cooper 1979b). This reaffirmed the 
eminence of third level designs for success prediction and analysis. 
3.3 Thesis research design 
This design resembles most closely the reasonably thorough NewProd project, 
because consistency of design, replication and synthesis is needed (Montoya-Weiss 
and Calantone 1994). It adheres to NewProd's methodological foundations so as to 
replicate, validate temporally and synthesise. However, adding new heterogeneous 
variables to the established homogeneous data set and then judging their relationship 
over time using a discrete simulation must be considered exploratory. 
To advance the methodology incrementally, a maximum three year retrospective 
benchmarked at one year post launch was used in lieu of the traditional five years. 
This was done to reduce perceived measurement timing error and surviv ur bias. 
Second, third and fourth level statistical techniques encompassing tests of 
differences/similarities, measures of dimensionality and statistical parameters 
interpretation (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) were used for sound inferential 
generalisation to larger, similarly profiled active NPD populations. 
3.3.1 Conceptual framework, sampling frame sample selection and scope 
This work is grounded in a modified version of the NewProd conceptual framework 
(see Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3). This allows a comprehensive replicative analysis of 
seminal work. Still, it is flexible enough to support integration of new antecedent 
variables and assessment of their impact on the commercial outcome at both the 
initial screen and one year post launch. 
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The sampling frame chosen was Compact Disclosure, a CD ROM database 
containing 12,000 records of US public organisations having at least 500 shareholders 
of one class of stock or at least $5,000,000 in assets. A large non-probability (see 
APPENDIX B) sample (n=1300) was constructed from the frame of 1600, with the 
intention to acquire more NPD cases than the NewProd project (n=195 from 103 
firms). Firms were selected only from manufacturing SIC codes 2000 through 4000. 
The large sample was necessary to lessen the expected impact of a low response rate. 
This was unavoidable due to the over-inclusion of firms normally inactive in NPD , 
activities. This group of "probable low responses" was necessary to measure 
phenomena hypothesised in H326 within the short three year time constraint. The 
frame over represented industrial commercial machinery, electrical equipment, 
measurement instrumentation and chemicals whilst it under-represented "low 
technological" industry (see Figure 3-2). Hultink and Robben (1995) have found that 
background characteristics such as market served, product innovativeness, innovation 
strategy and general functional orientation of the firm do not influence the importance 
attached to measuring long-term and short-term new product success. Therefore, the 
heterogeneity of the sample should not bias the dependent variable. 
3.3.2 Level of data collection and performance/functional perspective 
Since the literature has skilfully side-stepped the issue of what the essence of new 
product success is (Hart 1993; Hultink and Robben 1995), this work used a 
combination of well established definitions. Consistent with NewProd, 
success/failure data was collected at the project level. Consistent again, performance 
was measured intervally from -5 to +5. This score represented the perceived level of 
performance in a single product market one year post launch. This period is 
consistent with those suggesting at least six months is necessary to measure entry 
strategy characteristics (Green, Barclay and Ryans 1995)2''. 
The traditional operationalisation of success has been subjective and defined as the 
amount the project exceeded or fell short of minimum acceptable profitability 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981). Subjective measurement may be acceptable when accurate 
objective measures are unavailable or are very difficult to ascertain (Dess and 
Robinson 1984; Pearce, Robbins and Robinson 1987). Indeed, the experience of 
some authors encountering low response rates suggests that indirect measure may 
26 e. g. to compare high Innovation characteristics of success against low Innovation characteristics of success, sufficient numbers of high and low responses must be obtained for Duncan's multiple range test to be valid Implicit in low innovation processes is the low rate of new product introduction, especially within a constrained three year period. Over soliciting from the stone, clay, glass and other commodity like industries unduly ratio the non response rate and error potential. - 27 in the pilot test new product managers indicated that they regarded `12 months after launch' as a reasonable reference point for evaluating market entry outcome and a good surrogate for the *end of the NPD process". 
61 
well be more fruitful in assessing data (Hart 1993). However, unlike NewProd, this 
work used multiple subjective measures rather than single measures of new product 
success. 
The pilot study indicated that Griffin and Page's sixteen measures would be onerous 
or impossible to verify. This would have been especially true in a large postal survey 
susceptible to non-response and selection error. Since the determinants of new 
product success may be different depending on performance measurement 
operationalisation (Hart 1993; Hultink and Robben 1995), this work used "financial", 
"window of opportunity" and market impact measures. These have been found 
adequate to delineate performance (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a) and have 
precedent in recent work (Cooper and de Brentani 1991). Hence, success/failure 
performance was established as follows: 
1. Success/failure -a yes/no categorisation based on whether the project had met 
minimum criteria for success. 
2. Degree of success -a measure of -5 to +5, where +5 meant a great success and -5 
meant a great failure. 
3. Meeting specific criteria - the degree of meeting financial, window of opportunity 
and/or market impact performance measurement criteria (0-10)'. 
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28 The 1.10 scale wau used for consistency with the NewProd project antecedent measurement. The three performance measures were also necessary because long PLC projects with heavy front end capitalisation may not have been mature enough to measure using financial measures only. Conversely, abort PLC projects may have been successful but off the market by 1 year post launch. 
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In measuring the antecedents of success as perceived by the NPD managers29, it was 
important to select the two distant time frames (To and T) to capture different 
information awareness/availability states. These were thought to be nebulous during 
the initial screening stage and more concrete after commercialisation. 
3.3.3 Measurement technique. questionnaire construction, coding and editing 
Crawford (1979) criticises surveys. Asking company personnel to recall sets of new 
products over a five year period is too memory intensive, subjective and may vary 
between functions such as marketing and R&D. Further, potential problems exist 
when using single key informants (Phillips 1981). However, whilst variables 
measured retrospectively may produce key informant after-the-fact rationalisation, 
objectively worded scales are common in this type of work and are thought to limit 
post-hoc bias (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994). 
3-3: Potential sources of error in researcn intormation- 
1. Surrogate information error - Variation between the information required to solve the problem and information sought by the 
researcher. , ,.. 
2. Measurement error - Variation between the information sought by the researcher and the information 
produced by the' 
measurement process 
3. Experimental error -Variation between the actual impact of the independent variables and the impact attributed to the 
independent variables 
4. ' Population specificationerror - Variation between the population required 
to provide the needed information and the 
population selected by the researcher'; ,-,.... 
;. ," °' - ý`' t" 
''_' 
S. , Frame error - Variation between the population as defined by the researcher and the list of population members used by the 
researcher 
6. Sampling error - Variation between a representative sample and the sample obtained by using a probability sampling method 
Z Selection error- Variation between a representative sample and the sample obtained by using a non-probability sampling 
method.. ". .... ý: ° ,;,. "... " ., E, ... ý, ,,. 
8. Non-response error- Variation between the selected sample and the sample that actually participates in the study 
Postal surveys are rapid, anonymous, limit surrogate information error and are 
relatively inexpensive. The hope was to not to be as geographically limited as 
NewProd. In consideration of sample size requirements across a 3000+ mile US 
expanse, a postal survey was the only feasible method of data collection. This 
approach was least intrusive, allowed anonymity important to managers of failed 
projects and reduced experimental error (see Figure 3-3) and interviewer bias. It 
might have been better to perform a true longitudinal study tracking antecedents in 
real time (Cooper 1992). ' However, time was of the essence and longitudinal 
techniques are not without problems (Churchill 1991). Therefore, the trade-off in 
error potential was thought reasonable31. 
The questionnaire (APPENDIX A) emulates the NewProd instrument. It is appended 
only to examine additional antecedent relationships germane to the phenomenon 
29 Consistent with NewProd, in small organisation this was the president. In large organisations it was the division manager or new product development officer. 
30 Tull and Hawkins 1993. 
31 Cooper argem that longitudinal studies are not possible given the expense, time involved and the high ratio of 500 projects screened to 100 
projects launched and available ultimately, for study. 
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under study. Beginning with the "Cooper 30" variable subset (Cooper 1992), the 
questionnaire contained new variables essential to the validation of all hypotheses. 
The respondents were asked to choose either a successful or failed new product 
introduced within the last three years and to determine the extent to which the 
statement described the project at the initial screen (To) and one year post launch (T). 
Two different answers for the same question indicated that, over time, the perceive 
variable state of nature changed. This intellectually demanding technique extends the 
methodology incrementally but increases the probability of incomplete instruments, 
non-response error, experimental error from implied antecedent difference and/or 
measurement timing error from the retrospective approach. Therefore, vigilance was 
necessary in assessing the need for imputation32 as well as in assessing possible 
experimental or measurement timing error. Here, experimental and measurement 
timing error have converse influence manifest in disproportionately high amounts of 
antecedent statistical difference or equivalence over time. 
The final instrument was pre-tested by twenty local respondents to determine whether 
they could isolate precisely in memory, discrete states of nature by time period and 
whether the dual retrospective technique was "leading". All respondents were in 
general agreement that they could make the distinction with reasonable certainty" i. e. 
there was real difference for some but not for all variables over time. Further, they 
suggested that if the antecedent situation was stable over time, they felt no obligation 
to change their answer based on implied difference. However, most did indicate that 
the instrument was laborious. After minor editing, the pilot test was determined to be 
quite valid and thought to measure precisely what was intended. 
The two page questionnaire (APPENDIX A, one page back and front) using Cooper's 
scaling technique allowed the direct comparison of results. Performance, again like 
project NewProd, was measured on a continuous scale from -5 through +5 (Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1987a). -5 meant a great failure, falling far short of the minimum 
criteria and +5 meant a great success, far better than the minimum. Individual 
response scaling, whilst not normally distributed34, was internally consistent for each 
data set. 
32 assigning attributes to the non-respondents (of a survey) based on the characteristics of the respondents in order to adjust for non-response (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
33 some stated that, in many cases, complete documentation was still available for reference. 34 fnsinga suggests that studies which ask only one person to complete this type questionnaire using Cooper's scaling method are subject to a wide confidence interval, perhaps jeopardising conclusions. Further, the scale produces non-normally distributed responses (fninga 1986). His 
recommendation for smaller, more clearly defined scales from a larger number of respondents per firm, though preferable, would have reduced the validity of comparison and been impractical. 
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3.3.4 Implementation 
The first mailing (S) was sent with a cover letter to the firm's Vice President of 
Marketing. Consistent with Hultink and Robben (1995), it was to be passed along to 
the new product development manager or a staff member most knowledgeable 
in a 
clearly successful or failed project. As an incentive, study results were offered on 
floppy disk in the form of a PC compatible decision support system, Product-Wars®. 
A follow-up reminder letter with an additional questionnaire was sent approximately 
two weeks later to increase response further. "In every survey involving mail 
questionnaires, there should be a provision for at least one follow-up questionnaire so 
that any bias in the answers of original respondents can be partially corrected and so 
that some estimate of the probable answers of non-respondents can be made from the 
two groups of respondents" (Lambert and Harrington 1990 p8). The same procedure 
was used in the second wave (S) sent approximately three months later. 
Using a one way ANOVA at p=. 05, a 6.6% difference in 151 variable distribution 
means was observed between sample collection dates. Methodologically consistent 
with Song and Parry (1994), separate factor analyses results were compared by time 
period to determine if this minimal antecedent difference would produce an unstable 
factor analysis by sample. Sample Sl at To explained 72.2% of variation compared 
with 78.4% explained for S2 at To. Factors with Eigenvalues >1 were almost 
identical though in slightly different order. Factor analysis of sample S2 at To 
explained 71.6% of variation compared with 78.5% explained for S2 at T1. Again, 
factors were almost identical. These slight differences suggests minimal imputation 
(Tull and Hawkins 1993, see APPENDIX B) is required fornon-respondent result 
adjustment (Armstrong and Overton 1977; Pace 1939)35. Furthermore, Suchman 
(1962) believes that non-response bias in certain situations may be to the researcher's 
advantage, especially in extreme circumstances when the emphasis is upon the 
phenomena being studied and not upon its distribution to the general population. 
Here extrapolation to the general population is not desired since the primary interest 
is in active NPD population phenomena. Therefore, the minimal non-response bias 
was judged not to be a significant problem and the samples were combined. This 
yielded a final SPSS data file of 260 valid and complete cases. 
This SPSS data file analysed contained one-hundred and fifty-one independent 
intervally scaled variables. Seventy-five used Cooper's eleven point scale and 
35 Response is related to early versus later respondent interest in the subject. Late respondents are thought closer to actual non responders and 
answering because of increased stimuli of follow. ups, incentives etc.. 
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comprised data set A, the retrospective perceptions of new product development 
managers at the initial screen (T0). Seventy-six36 comprised data set B, the 
retrospective perceptions of these same managers at one year post launch (T). NPD 
product market history37, along with time from screen to launch and length of PiLC 
were scaled metrically. The remainder were nominally scaled or qualitative data 
representing industrial demographics. 
Two-hundred and ninety three questionnaires were returned. Thirty-three were 
incomplete or otherwise unusable yielding 190 success cases and 70 failure cases. 
This success/failure ratio is comparable to that achieved in previous comparative 
studies (de Brentani 1986; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993). After correcting for 
inappropriate, non-existent, subsidiary and/or duplicate firms, the final response rate 
was determined to be 21.7% based on an adjusted sample size of 1198. Since 
significant numbers of companies do not conduct new product development activities 
(Wind and Mahajan 1988), this is reasonable given the broad dimensions of the 
research, the necessity of including non-active firms for comparison and testing in H. 
and H3 and the demanding questionnaire (as reported by respondents and 
non-respondents alike). Further, this rate is quite consistent with Robertson, 
Eliashberg and Rymon's (1995) comparison of US and UK rates38 and with other 
industrial marketing research field studies reported recently (Achrol and Stern 1988; 
Anderson, Chu and Weitz 1987; Gatignon and Robertson 1989; Heil and Walters 
1993; Puto, Patton and King 1985; Sujan 1986). 
Instrument coding was pre-tested and governed by dBASE/PARADOX=SPSS 
import syntax. Pilot and early responses were cross-tabulated and sample analyses 
performed to insure all tests required by the hypotheses were possible, valid and ran 
reliably. Cross-checks of results were performed at regular intervals to insure the data 
entry integrity. 
3.4 Statistical analysis and models 
A combination of second, third and fourth level procedures apply to the seven 
hypotheses tested. 
3.4.1 Second level tests - ANOVA and paired-samples t-tests (see APPENDIX 
B) 
To test whether two or more population means are! equal, Hla uses: 
36 one question referred to only data eet B at Tl., 37 aggregate success, failure and kill performance in the specific product market over the previous three year period. 38 In their study, the US response rate was 23.3% and the UK rate was 20.2% 
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1. ANOVA to test the null hypothesis that data come from an NPD population in 
which the mean of the variable tested is equal for both successful and failed cases. 
i. e. determines which variables are significant to success at To and at T1. 
2. the two-tail, paired-samples t-test to examine the null hypothesis that the data 
come from an NPD population in which the means of two related variables are 
equal. i. e. determines which variables experience significant perceived changes in 
magnitude between To and T1. 
The combined results are used to argue for acceptance of Hla. 
Since by definition, all factors constructed from orthogonal factor analysis methods 
have a distribution mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, these techniques were not 
possible to test for Hlb or Hlc. In the aggregate, they display no variance between 
factors. As such, ANOVA procedures are impossible. Therefore, H, b and Hlc use 
observation of important output statistics along with distribution factor and residual 
error differences by success/failure to determine differences. Hld uses a one-way 
ANOVA to test for differences in predictive distribution accuracy. 
In support of H2 and H3, Duncan's multiple range test was used to determine 
significant differences in success factor distribution and residual accuracy due to 
PiLC and order/innovation conditions among and between time periods. H4 uses a 
paired-samples t-test to determine differences in strategic reaction ability over time by 
success and failure cases individually. 
3.4.2 Third level tests - Factor analysis (see APPENDIX B) 
Consistent with Schocker, Gensch and Simons (1969), factor analysis was used to 
reduce the number of variables to a smaller set of independent factors for use in linear 
regression. The SPSS for Windows 6.0 algorithm for conducting factor analysis first 
computes the "ith" standardised variable expressed as: Xi = Ai, + Ai2F2 +.. . +A; kFl + 
U;. The "Fs" represent the common factors with all variables being expressed as 
functions of these variables. The "As" are the coefficients used to combine the 
factors and the "U" represents the unique factor, the part of the function which cannot 
be explained by the common factors. Utilising the result from this formula, X;, the 
"ith" standardised variable is then used in the general expression below, for 
estimating the "jth" factor: 
P 
Fj = >W; X, =W 1X, +W 2 X2+... +WpX, . 
The "Wi(s)" are the factor score, coefficients and "p" is the number of variables 
(Norusis 1993). The results are subsets of highly correlated variables within factors 
and conversely, no correlation between orthogonal factors. 
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Two separate factor analysis were performed, one at To and the other at T1. These 
were then analysed separately to determine the quality of each result and to establish 
if differences existed between factorial solutions by time period. Parsimonious, 
intuitively logical solutions in support of the research objectives were sought using 
different extraction39 and rotation40 techniques. Solution quality was based on: 
- high factor loadings 
- high factor Chronbach alpha scores41 
- amount of common factor variance explained by the solution 
- Eigenvalues greater than 1 
- factorial consistency with past work 
- an appropriate levelling of the scree (and) 
- parameter normalcy with past work. 
3.4.3 Fourth level tests - Linear regression (see APPENDIX B) 
Linear regression using stepwise selection of the orthogonal factors resulting from the 
factor analysis was used to study relationships important in the model. The SPSS for 
Windows 6.0 algorithm for conducting a multiple linear regression analysis is defined 
as follows: Yi = BO + BIXi + B2 X2i + ... +BpXp1 +ej. "XP; " indicates the value 
of the "ph " independent variable for case "i". e; is the error component. The model 
assumes that there is a normal distribution of the dependent variable for every 
combination of values of the independent variables (Norusis 1993). This assumption 
is violated by Cooper's NewProd linear regression model (Cooper 1981). The 
forward stepwise method of independent variable inclusion was used with a 
probability of F to enter of . 05 and a probability of F to remove of . 10. This is a very 
conservative stepping method and minimises the likelihood of arbitrary variables 
entering or being removed from the model by chance. 
3.5 Hypotheses testing decision rules 
Hypotheses Hla, Hlb, Hlc and Hld deal with the evolution of individual variables, 
factors constructed from these variables, significant dimensions of success and model 
accuracy as they are perceived by managers to evolve over the NPD process. 
Acceptance should be based on the significance of difference between time periods, 
along with the magnitude of the demonstrable change. Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 deal 
with conditional changes in success dimensions based on product life cycle, order of 
entry/level of innovation and ability to deal with strategic requirements over the life 
39 principal Components, un-weighted least square, generalised least squares, maximum likelihood, principal axis factoring, alpha factoring and image factoring. -- 
40 varimax. equimax, quartimax and direct oblique. 41 Q ro bach alpha scores measure internal consistency. Whilst those >. 5 are considered satisfactory (Cooper and de Brennani 1991b). factors with scores <5 were allowed to remain in the solution because of the exploratory requirements of heterogeneous data integration (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
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of the process. Acceptance of H2 and H3 should be based on changes in success 
dimensions, as conditions are applied to the aggregate models developed in Hlc, both 
within and between time periods. Acceptance of H4 should be based on strategic 
reaction differences observed in dimensions and variables between successful and 
failed cases. 
3.5.1 Rules for testing hypotheses H1a 
Hla should be accepted and the null form rejected if either: 
- the variables shown significant to success at To are different than those shown 
significant at T1. Demonstration of significant difference for a large selection of 
variables using a one-way ANOVA at p. <. 05 constitutes acceptable proof (or) 
-a change in magnitude from To to Tl is demonstrated in a large selection of the 
variables. Demonstration of significant magnitudinal change for a large selection 
of variables using a paired samples t-test at a 95% confidence interval constitutes 
acceptable proof. 
3.5.2 Rules for testing hypotheses Hib. H1c and Hld 
Neither ANOVA or related pair t-tests is appropriate to test Hb or Hlc. Therefore, 
Hlb should be accepted and the null form rejected if: 
- by observation, differences exists over time based on manual item by item 
analysis of factor set construction, Eigenvalue, percent of variance, loadings 
and/or factor Chronbach alpha scores. 
To test H, c, ANOVA is impossible again. Therefore, H, c should be accepted and the 
null form rejected if: 
- in the aggregate, the linear regression models and dimensions of success, at p=. 05 
to enter and p=. 1 to remove, are observably different over time. This should be 
demonstrated by important differences in model analysis of variance/validity, 
regression coefficient selection/order/size/error, model standard error and/or 
significance level. 
- this should be 
supplemented by differences in factor and residual distributions by 
success/failure. 
Hld attempts to validate a significant difference in the predictive accuracy of each 
function constructed in Hlc. Therefore, Hld should be accepted and the null form 
rejected if: ,.. 
- after using a paired-samples t-test at a 95% confidence interval, a significant 
difference in accuracy exists in the aggregate To and Tl linear regression 
predictive distributions. 
3.5.3 Rules for testing hypotheses H2 H3 and H4 
H. deals with changes in factors of success when conditioned by P; LC. Because the 
PLC variable was not normally distributed (see Figure 3-4), the PiLC variable was re- 
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computed into three categories; short (0-3 years, n= 71), medium 
(3.001 years to 
4.999 years, n= 76) and long (5 years and longer, n= 5742). 
Based on comparing model and dimensional differences within and between time 
periods categorically, H2 should be accepted and the null form rejected if: 
- the categorical linear regression models and 
dimensions of success at p=. 05 to 
enter and p=. 1 to remove, are different within and between time periods. This 
would be demonstrated by observing important differences in model 
ANOVA/validity and coefficient selection/order/size/error, model standard error 
and/or significance level. 
- further, this difference should be confirmed, ideally, by significant 
differences 
between common factor and residual error distributions demonstrated using 
Duncan's multiple range test at p=. 0543 by success/failure. 
H3 deals with changes in factors of success when they are conditioned by 
order/innovation'. Consistent with Crawford's affirmation of innovativeness as a 
function of timing (Crawford 1994), before conducting the linear regression analysis 
at To and T1, the SPSS file was categorised by the normally distributed "ls` in" factor 
at both periods. Data sets A and B were divided into: (1) high levels of innovation 
for products entering early (top 1/3 of the normalised factor at To and T); (2) medium 
levels of innovation for products entering somewhere in the middle (middle 1/3 of the 
normalised factor at To and T) and (3) low levels of innovation for products entering 
42 the PiLC analysis is of 204 cases. 56 respondents failed to give PiLC estimates in months and years. 
43 The categorisation produces 6 non-normal distributions. Because these exhibit variance, Duncan's multiple range test is appropriate. 
44 Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) used a subjective process classifying: (1) highly innovative products as 'new-to-the-world" and *product lines 
innovative to the company"; (2) moderately Innovative products as 'lines new to the firm but not new to the world' along with 'new Items in existing 
product lines" and (3) low innovative products as 'all modifications, redesigns, repositionings and minor extensions". In this hypothesis. the 
phenomena of order of entry and relative level of innovation were treated as related because they tapped the same dimension. Three categories of 
high/tat, medium/middle and lowllate related innovativeness with entry timing was logical and consistent with Crawford (1994) Le. the first-in a new 
product market Is implicitly, the most innovative, 
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late (bottom 1/3 of the normalised factor at T. and T). To operationalise this concept, 
frequency distributions of the normalised ORDER factor were obtained at To (factor 5, 
Figures 3-5a) and the normalised ORDER factor at T, (factor 6, Figure 3-5b). 
H3 should be accepted and the null form rejected if: 
- categorical linear regression models and dimensions of success, at p=. 05 to enter 
and p=. 1 to remove, are different within and between time periods, This would be 
demonstrated by observing important differences in model ANOVA/validity and 
coefficient selection/order/size/error, model standard error and/or significance 
level. 
- further, this difference should be confirmed, ideally, by significant differences 
between common factor and residual error distributions demonstrated using 
Duncan's multiple range test at p=. 05 by success/failure. 
H4 deals with the effects of initial and reactive strategy. It should be accepted and the 
null form rejected if: 
- the aggregate linear regression strategic reaction factor is significant at both To 
and Tl and there is an obvious increase or decrease in the factor's importance over 
time (or) 
- the individual strategic reaction variables constituting the factor change in 
statistically significant and different ways over time for success versus failure 
cases. This must be demonstrated by significant magnitudinal difference using 
the paired samples t-test procedure at a 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 3-5(a) 
Histogram of ORDERlnnovation 
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Figure 3-5(b) 
Histogram of ORDER/innovation 
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3.6 Strengths and limitations 
The strength of this methodology lies in its continuation and incremental 
improvement of techniques developed by Cooper and others. Whilst experimental in 
its use of discrete simulation, inter-disciplinary factor integration and constraints used 
to produce conditional models, all methodological components emulate established 
methods, thus satisfying calls for replication, temporal validation and synthesis 
(Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Never the less, NewProd's methodology does have important weaknesses. There is 
always the potential for population specification and selection error when using a 
postal survey. Acknowledged by Cooper (1979a, 1979b, 1981), this plus potential 
non-response error is equally important here. More problematic is the possibility of 
measurement timing error and post hoc bias based on changes in the product, its 
environment and strategy following the initial screen (Cooper 1992). Between the 
initial screen and the time of performance measurement, products may languish 
and/or receive marketing adjustment before catching on. This creates models 
favouring earlier projects (Crawford 1979) laden with measurement timing error and 
survivor bias (Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Mitchell 1991). A real time 
longitudinal study would limit measurement timing error. However, these are not 
possible for large samples given data collection expense, time consumed and the 5/1 
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ratio of concepts to valid cases (Cooper 1992). Further, though regularly 
recommended, a fixed panel supporting a longitudinal validation has weaknesses of 
its own. Problems include non-representativeness due to high dropout/mortality rates 
and compensation bias, as well as significant differences noted between data 
generated by mail panel versus telephone interviewing (Churchill 1991). 
This work is more precise than other retrospectives. It limits the sample to three 
rather than five year old projects and measures performance consistently for the entire 
sample at one year post launch. This minimises survivor bias by including more 
failed products and those marginally successful but killed shortly after launch. This is 
the first time kill phenomena, regularly overlooked (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1990a), have been knowingly measured. Contrarily, this method creates "beginner 
bias". Thus it is unable to account for projects judged a success or failure at one year 
post launch but which fail or succeed over the long-term. 
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Chapter Four - Analyses and findings 
(Hla, Hlb, Hic 
and Hjd) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter enumerates the findings of this research based on the methodologies 
presented in Chapter 3. Definitions of the statistical tests used are 
found in 
APPENDIX B. 
Figure 4-1: success/failure distribution 
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4.1.1 Adequacy of the dependent variable 
Two-hundred and ninety three questionnaires were returned. Thirty-three were 
unusable. The data from the remaining 260 instruments were judged to be valid, very 
representative of the sampling frame and appropriate to the phenomena studied. 
Figure 4-1 displays the dependent variable's aggregate frequency distribution and 
proportion by answer. The aggregate mean performance measurement on the -5 
through +5 scale was 1.62. The success mean was 3.351 (n=190), and the failure 
mean was -2.886 (n=70). With a kurtosis of -. 624 and a skewness of -. 781, like 
NewProd, the success/failure distribution was not normal. This may be due to 
Cooper's scaling technique (Insinga 1986). 
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4.1.2 Definition of performance 
Subsets of the sixteen established measures of performance (Griffin and Page 1993) 
can change from conceptualisation to commercialisation (Ronkainen 1985) and over 
the life of the product (Hultink and Robben 1995). Therefore, the actual definition of 
success and the point in the NPD process at which success is measured, is quite 
important. This work used recent field precedent in defining success types (Cooper 
and de Brentani 1991). These were: (1) simple success or failure -a categorical 
yes/no answer; (2) interval degree of success -a measure from -5 to +5 and (3) 
performance assessment as the degree of "financial", "window of opportunity" and/or 
"impact" measured intervally from 0 to 10. "Financial" measurement was defined as 
project profit, ROI and/or payback. "Window" measurement was defined as new 
markets and/or product categories opening as a result of the project. "Impact" 
measurement was defined as the project's effect on domestic and/or foreign market 
share (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a). All three were measured retrospectively at 
both the initial screen and at one year post launch. 
4.1.3 Relationship of performance measures 
Problematic for the field is that measuring success in one of the three recommended 
ways does not translate into success on the other two (Cooper 1984a, 1984b; Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1987a). In fact, strategy leading to certain types of success may 
even prevent other types from occurring (Hultink and Robben 1995). Therefore, 
averaging the three criteria would only dilute useful variation. More pertinent to 
establishing the validity of the dependent variable are tests of significance and 
direction of linear association of all three measures over time. 
All intervally scaled success/failure scores of -5 through +5 matched the categorical 
choice of success or failure absolutely. To determine whether "financial", "window" 
and/or "impact" accomplishment was related to success/failure categorical choice, a 
Chi-square (X2) test of independence wasconducted. The test results are illustrated 
in Table 4-la. Table 4-lb illustrates the results of a two tailed bivariate correlation 
procedure. It relates the direction and strength of the -5 to +5 intervally scaled 
measure of success with the 0 to 10 measure of performance criteria. Table 4-lc 
illustrates a paired-samples t-test used to determine if performance criteria results 
differed significantly over time., Table 4-1d displays significant differences in 
performance measurement criteria by success/failure cases by time period. 
ýýý ýj ý xl "ýti 
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Pearson's chi-square statistics and Likelihood ratios in Table 4-la test the null 
hypothesis that there is no relationship between the categorical level success/failure 
choice and interval level performance criteria by time period. 
Overall results of using 
three success measures, rather than just financial measures, were favourable and 
consistent with previous recommendations and findings (Cooper de Brentani's 
1991; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a; Maidique and Zirger 1985). At To, none of the 
measures are significant at p=. 05. This is not surprising since early 
information is 
tentative at best. None-the-less, two of the three X2 values approach significance 
with "impact" significant at p=. 07. This is not surprising either given Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt's (1987a) finding that protocol - "defining customer needs, wants, 
preferences and the target market prior to initiating product development" - 
is 
correlated with success measured as "impact". It also supports Hultink and Robben's 
(1995) finding that short term success is measured on product-level measures such as 
speed-to-market, whether the product gets launched on time and product 
developmental costs. It is apparent, even at this early point in the process, that the 
idea's perceived impact on share is consequential to it being judged a successful 
project to be passed along to the next stage/gate. 
All three measures are significant at T1. This indicates that the performance criteria 
are related to the success/failure categorical selection by one year post launch. Their 
different and increasing significance over time is consistent with Hultink and 
Robben's accepted hypotheses (1995) that a firm's time perspective influences the 
core measures of success and with Ronkainen's (1985) explanation that go/no- 
go/continue criteria change across development stages. 
Table 4-la: Chi-square (X2) results of success/failure relationship to 
performance criteria 
Criteria Pearson X Significance Likelihood Ratio Significance 
Financial To 15.135 . 127 16.075 . 098 
Financial T, 19.875 . 03 19.048 . 04 
Window TO 12.457 . 33 12.041 . 361 
Window T, 25.523 . 004 25.000 . 05 
Impact To 16.940 . 076 16.852 . 078 
Impact TI 32.205 . 000 30.570 . 001 
Table 4-1b illustrates the two-tailed bivariate Pearson's r statistic. This is a measure 
of linear association between the simple interval measure of success/failure and the 
interval measure of performance criteria. The results support the X2 categorical 
results above. The consistent positive correlation between actual performance scaled 
-5 through +5 and all three performance criteria scaled 0 through 10 at both T. and T, 
supports the validity of all performance measurement criteria. Their increasing 
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strength over time suggests they are valid measures of an evolving success/failure 
dynamic. 
Consistent again with Hultink and Robben (1995) the time perspective did influence 
the measures of success. However, the moderate strength of the correlation 
coefficients between "financial" and "impact" measures at To and "financial" and 
"window" measures at Tl is at odds with their counterintuitive conclusion that few 
significant associations exist among financial and non-financial measures of NPD 
success. Clearly there is a relationship between early "impact" and "financial" 
performance as well as later "financial" and "window" performance. 
Table 4-lb: Performance measurement correlation analysis* 
Measure Actual Financial TO Financial TI Window TO Window TI Impact TO Impact TI 
Actual 1.0000 . 0705 . 2039 . 0254 . 2604 . 1681 . 2942 
Financial To . 0705 1.0000 . 
7196 . 1430 . 1579 . 3262 . 
1018 
Financial T, 
. 2039 . 
7196 1.0000 . 0803 . 3399 . 
1961 . 3198 
Window To . 0254 . 1430 . 0803 1.0000 . 4663 . 3459 . 2261 
Window Ti 
. 
2604 . 1579 . 3399 . 4663 1.0000 . 3788 . 5933 
Impact To 
. 1681 . 
3262 . 1961 . 3459 . 3788 1.0000 . 6531 
Impact Ti 
. 2942 . 
1018 . 3198 . 2261 . 5933 . 6531 1.0000 
bof 
cs 
indicates significance at p=. Ol, 2-tail test 
Table 4-1c panel C displaying the'aggregate paired-samples t-test seems to suggest 
there is no statistically significant change in performance over time. In the aggregate, 
window of opportunity criteria decline and financial and market share performance 
rises slightly. Though sensible, none change at statistically significant levels. 
However, when sorted by success/failure, "financial' and "window" measure 
decreases are observed for failures at p=. 07 (see Table 4-1c panel ). This is more 
meaningful when combined with statistically significant success case increases for 
financial criteria accomplishment at p=. 05. Once again this supports Hultink and 
Robben's (1995) and Ronkainen (1985) that performance measurements are perceived 
to differ over time. Additionally, it supports Hultink and Robben's finding that 
financial achievement, profitability, margins, and ROI are key foci in longer term 
performance measurement. 
The significant "financial" success case change over time is noteworthy for NPD 
model developers., This supports Cooper and de Brentani's (1984) finding that 
financial measures are the most important managerial accept/reject criterion. Further, 
it is consistent with an 88% agreement by practitioners (Calantone, Di Benedetto and 
Haggblom 1995) that financial risk assessment should be incorporated into new 
product project evaluation (Cardozo and Smith 1983; Page 1993) and with 
77 
Ronkainen's findings (1985) that financial variables are critical in the go/no- 
go/continue decision-making processes. 
Table 4-1c: Performance measurement criteria change 
MEAN' Success n=190 
(73.1%) 




Measures of performance To T, Sig. b T, T, Sig. Ta T, sig. 
Financial performance 
(0-10) 
6.8105 7.1211 . 052 6.5143 5.9714 . 072 
6.7308 6.8115 . 571 
Window of opportunity (0-10) 6.5053 6.5632 . 707 6.3714 4.7143 . 071 6.4692 
6.0654 . 137 
Market share impact (0-10) 6.7158 7.0105 . 117 5.4286 4.9714 . 159 
6.3692 6.4615 . 571 
Mean values across projects of performance measurement criteria (O=strongly disagree to 10eenongiy agree) 
b Significance level of the difference in mean performance measurement criteria over time (ANOVA, two-tail t-tat) 
Table 4-1d is consistent with all evidence above. It displays the results of aggregate 
independent t-test performance differences by success/failure. Though financial and 
window criteria were not significantly different for success/failure cases at To, all 
three criteria were different by one year post launch. The significance of "impact" to 
success at To reinforces the finding supporting Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987a) and 
Hultink and Robben (1995) above. It confirms that a project can be promoted to the 
next stage/gate evaluation if its early "impact" score at To is acceptable. 
Table 4-1d: Performance measurement criteria differences by success/failure 
Aggregate independent t-test performance differences by success/failure 
Financial To = . 4863 
Financial T, =. 0076 
Window To p=. 8429 
Window T, =. 0000 
ImpactTo =. 0030 
Impact T, =. 0000 
These combined results are in harmony with those suggesting an evolution of go/no- 
go/continue criteria is normal (Hultink and Robben 1995; Ronkainen 1985). 
Moreover, they caution that failing to meet early performance measurement criteria 
should not necessarily kill an otherwise acceptable project. Even if a project's 
financial and window of opportunity criteria are nebulous at the initial screen, its To 
impact score may be enough to move it along - if it can meet financial criteria by one 
year post launch. This is quite significant because giving a project a GO! based first 
on meeting minimum impact criteria and then based on meeting financial 
performance conditions by one year post launch is the literature's first empirical 
demonstration of fuzzy performance measurement (Cooper 1994b).. Using temporal 
benchmarking techniques (Griffin 1993) to discover other fuzzy relationships can lead 
to cycle time reduction (Cooper 1995) which is fundamental to competitive strategy 
in many industries (Carmel 1995). 
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4.2 Hypothesis Hla 
Many variables relating to a new product's success are dynamic not static and are 
perceived to evolve over time from the initial screen to the end of the first year of 
market entry. 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Table 4-2 illustrates the results of the one way ANOVA for all cases, success cases 
only and failure cases only. The asterisks (*) indicate the time period in which the 
variable was significant to success and level of significance45. If variables changed in 
significance over time, either absolutely or by degree of significance, the change is 
noted in the last column. 
Results from the paired-samples t-test are displayed in Table 4-4. Again, the number 
of asterisks defines the significance level. An arrow in the last column indicates the 
direction of magnitudinal change over time. 
4.2.2 ANOVA findings 
The one way analysis of variance indicates that many variables do change in 
perceived significance by time period. 
Table 4-2: 1 Way ANOVA at To and T146 
TO Sig. =. 05*=. 10 Tj Sig. **=. 05*=. 10 
F_PCERCN ** ** 
K_PCERCN 
JIS 
PERCNT I** ** 
Sig. TI Sig. Changed 
r eGw'ý' **=. 05 =. 05 ftu m 





This product was (please rate ALL types of new products: ) 
1. " New-go-the-world (a due innovation in the product marke lace listed above) ** changed 
2. "A new product line 
3. " An addition to an existing product line * changed 
4. " Improvement in or revision to an existing product 
S. "A repositioning 
6. "A cost reduction 
7. Ourfsm developed clear strategies to deal with deficienciesproblems in the area of ** changed 
Newness/Innovation 
8. After the 1 year entry period, this product was considered a Failure/Success (-5=great failure 
+5=great success) 
ýý3F' ä91. p i ii 
The following were important in the GO/NO GO decision process (please rate ALL barriers to 
entry): 
24. " Cost advantages of incumbents (economies of scale) 
25. " Product differentiation (proprietary product differences) of the incumbents 
.- 26. " Brand identity ** ** 
27. " Customer switching costs 
28. " Capital requirements 
29. " Access to distribution channels 
30. " Absolute cost advantages (teaming curve, access to inputs, proprietary design etc. ) 
31. " Government Policy 
32. " '' - Expected retaliation 
33. Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an important consideration in this market ** ** 
45ýý: pc05; ý"pcl. 
46 Bold italics . new to the NPD forecasting literature in this form. 
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entry decision 
34. Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an important consideration in this ** ** 
market entry decision 
35. The product would have done better if marketed by almost any of our major competitors 
36. Our furn developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of Barriers to ** ** 
Entry 
r"'17111W MINIM 37. Our company's financial resources were more than adequate for this project 
38. Our company's R&D skills & people were more than adequate for this project ** ** 
39. Our company's engineering skills & people were more than adequate for this project ** ** 
40. Our company's marketing research skills & people were more than adequate for this project ** ** 
41. Our company's management skills were more than adequate for this project ** ** 
42. Our company's production resources or skills were more than adequate for this project 
43. Our company's sales force &/or distribution resources & skills were more than adequate for ** ** 
this project 
44. Our company's advertising & promotion resources & skills were more than adequate for this ** changed 
project 
45. Ourfirm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of Resource ** ** 
Requirements 
46. Our product was highly innovative - totally new to the market 
47. The product specifications - exactly what the product will be - were very clear * changed 
48. The technical aspects - exactly how the technical problems will be solved - were very clear ** ** 
49. The potential customers for this product were totally new to our company * changed 
50. The product class or type of product itself was totally new to our company ** ** 
51. We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of customer need or use before ** ** 
52. The competitors we face in the market were totally new to our company ** ** 
53. The product "fit in" with a family of products we already had on the market ** ** 
54. The product which entered the market was significantly different than that approved at the 
initial screen 
55. Ourfum developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the Nature of the Project ** ** 
56. Compared to competitive products (or whatever the customer was using) our product offered ** ** 
a number of unique features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
57. Our product was clearly superior to competing products in terms of meeting customer needs ** ** 
58. Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her costs, when compared to what he/she ** changed 
was using 
59. Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do something that he/she could not do ** changed 
with what was available on the market 
60. Our product was of higher quality - however quality is defined in this market - than ** changed 
competing products 
61. Our product was priced considerably higher than competing products 
62 Ourfrnn developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the Final Product ** ** 
63. Potential customers had a great need for this class or type of product ** ** 
64. The dollar size of the market (either existing or potential market) for this product was large ** changed 65. The market for this product was growing very quickly ** ** 
66. The market was characterised by intense price competition 
67. There were many competitors in this market * changed 68. There was a strong dominant competitor- with a large market share - in this market 69. Potential customers were very satisfied with the products (competitors' products) they were ** ** 
currently using 
70. Users' needs changed quickly in this market -a dynamic market situation 
71. We were the ust to market this product ** changed 72. We were not first to market this product; we followed close behind however 
73. We entered the market in its late growth stage * ** 
74. We entered the market somewhere between its maturity and decline 
75. The fast rate of technological change was important in this product market 
76. Competitors introduced new products into this market very quickly 
77. Competitors withdrew products from this market very quickly 
78. R&D in this market produced many advancements in the production process and ensuing products 
79. Production methods in this market changed very quickly 
80. The amount of change (technological leap/boundary distance) was important in this product market 
81. New products introduced into this market were much more technologically sophisticated than those replaced 
82. R&D in this market produced i ifi s gn cant advancements in the production process and ensuing products 
83. This product had a long life cycle in its original form (before modifkations were * changed 
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necessary) 
84. We spent a long time on the market research for this product ** changed 
85. Market cyclicality was important in the decision to enter this market 
86. Market seasonality was important in the decision to enter this market 
87. The contribution margin was important in the decision to enter this market ** changed 
88. The primary market for this product was domestic (over 50% in US) 
89. Ourfum developed clear strategies to deal with difficulties inherent in this market ** ** 
At p=. 1,30 variables out of the 75 tested (40%) were significant to success at To 
7. At 
T1,41 variables (54.67%) were significant to success'. Of the 30 variables 
significant at T0,28 are significant at T, also (93.3%). In large part, individual 
variables significant to success at the initial screen are perceived to remain significant 
over time. This argues for acceptance of the null hypothesis. On the other hand, 13 
of 75 variables (17.33%) did not become significant until time T1. This represents a 
43.3% change in the original significant 30 variable environment and a 46.43% 
change based on the 28 variable, mutually inclusive environments. This argues for 
rejection of the null form and acceptance of the alternative hypothesis of change over 
time. 
Table 4-3 illustrates the difference between the two environments. The left column 
contains the 28 variables significant to success at both periods. The right column 
contains the 13 variables that managers perceive become significant only over time. 
Of the mutually inclusive variables significant at both time periods, 13 of 28 
(46.43%) are newly demonstrated in the NPD forecasting literature. Of those which 
become significant only over time, 6 of 13 (46.15%) are new. Clearly, managers 
perceive a significant change in NPD antecedents of success over time. 
Table 4-3: Comparison of common versus unique variables over time 
(summary of temporal stability/instability over time) Boldildi. -. wtowefieldinµufo 
The 26 variable statements significant to success/failure at both The extra 13 variables statements that become significant 
time periods Le. STABLE ANTECEDENTS to success/failure only over time Le. UNSTABLE 





5. This product was a repositioning 1. This product was new-to-the-world 
13 This product was an addition loan existing product line 
7. Ourfirm developed clear strategies to deal with 
deficiencies/problems in the area of Newness/lnnovation ,,. BARRIERS BARRIERS 
26. The following were important in the G0/NO GO decision t .' 
process - brand identity 
33 Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an important :t,, ". 
consideration in this market entry decision 
34. Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an 
important consideration in this market entry decision 
35. The product would have done better if marketed by almost 
any of our major competitors - -... ' , 36. Ourfum developed clear strategies to deal with 
deficiencies in the area of Barriers to Entry 
RESOURCES 'RESOURCES 
47 27 variable at pc05 (36%). 
48 38 vuiables at pc05 (37.3%). 
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38. Our company's R&D skills & people were more than 
adequate for this project 
39. Our company's engineering skills & people were more than 
adequate for this project 
40. Our company's marketing research skills & people were 
more than adequate for this project 
41. Our company's management skills were more than adequate 
for this project 
43. Our company's sales force &/or distribution resources & 
skills were more than adequate for this project 
45. Ourfirm developed clear strategies to deal with 
deficiencies in the area of Resource Requirements 
PROJECT 
48. The technical aspects - exactly how the technical problems 
will be solved - were very clear 
50. The product class or type of product itself was totally new to 
our company 
51. We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of 
customer need or use before 
52. The competitors we face in the market were totally new to 
our company 
53. The product "fit in" with a family of products we already 
had on the market 
55. Ourfirm developed clear strategies to deal with 
deficiencies in the Nature of the Product 
FINAL PRODUCT 
56. Compared to competitive products (or whatever the 
customer was using) our product offered a number of unique 
features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
57. Our product was clearly superior to competing products in 
terms of meeting customer needs 
62. Ourfirm developed clear strategies to deal with 
deficiencies in the Final Product 
MARKET 
63. Potential customers had a great need for this class or type of 
product 
65. The market for this product was growing very quickly 
69. Potential customers were very satisfied with the products 
(competitors' products) they were currently using 
73. We entered the market in its late growth stage 
89. Ourfirm developed clear strategies to deal with djoiculties 
Inherent in this market 
44. Our company's advertising & promotion resources 
skills were more than adequate for this project 
PROJECT 
47. The product specifications -exactly what the 
product', 
will be - were very clear 
a 
FINAL PRODUCT ; 58. Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her-,,, 
costs, when compared to what he/she was using 
59. Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do 
something that he/she could not do with what was available 
on the market 
60. Our product was of higher quality - however quality is, 
defined in this market - than competing products 
MARKET 
64. The dollar size of the market (either existing'or' 
potential market) for this product was large, 
71. We were the first to market this product -, ',, 3 
83. This product had along life cycle in its original form 
(before modifications were necessary) 
84. We spent a long time on the market research for this 
product ;. ' 
87. The contribution margin was important in the 
decision to enter this market 
4.2.3 Paired samples t-test findings 
In addition to determining whether variables are significant at To, Tl or both, the 
examination of changes in variable magnitude is important as an indicator of direction 
and emphases. Results for the paired samples t-test for all cases, failure cases and 
success cases are displayed in Table 4-4. Figure 4-2,4-3 and 4-4 illustrate 
graphically, this difference and direction49 at the p=. 10 level by all, by success and by 
failure cases. Because of the lack of comprehensive reporting (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994), means, t values, r values, degrees of freedom and significance are 
reported for all variables by successes, failures and in the aggregate. 
Because most levels of significance are at p=. 05, the change in variable distribution 
means of over time is likely not to be caused by chance. With respect to all cases 
(n=260), 27 of 725° variables (37.5%) changed in magnitude (see Figure 4-2). For 
49 The increase () or decrease (u) In the variable's importable over time is indicated at the . 05 (29) or. 1 (ii) level. Up or down arrow direction 'nut be interpreted as favourable or unfavourable respectively, in the context of the variable siatemem. 50 failure and kill variables do not change over time i. e. 72 not 75 variables. 
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success cases (n=190), 25 of 72 (34.7%) variables changed in magnitude (see Figure 
4-3). For failure cases (n=70), 29 of 72 (40.3%) variables changed in magnitude (see 
Figure 4-4). This difference illustrates at least two similar but critically different 
environments affecting the new product development process from To to T1. The 
implications of this are discussed in section 4.6. 
Table 4-4: Paired samples t-test & correlation - T. (minus)T, 
A=A/l cases (the aggregate) 
F=Failures only 
S--Successes only 




05 = ** Dn 
10=* 
1. " New-to-the-world (a true 
innovation in the product marketplace listed 
above) 
A: 5.7654 5.3769 0.39 . 904 t =3.84 at. 000/259df 
** 
F: 5.3143 4.4857 0.83 . 855 t=3.48 at . 001/69df ** 
S: 5.9316 5.7053 0.23 . 923 t=2.16 at. 032/189df ** 
2. "A new product line A: 6.3423 5.9923 0.35 . 892 t=3.13 at. 002/259df ** 
F: 6.8714 6.2000 0.67 . 899 t=3.36at. 001/69df ** 
S: 6.1474 5.9158 0.23 . 891 T=1.73 at. 084/189df 
3. " An addition to an existing 
product line 
A: 4.3385 4.2538 0.08 . 932 t=. 88 at. 377/259df 
F: 3.6571 3.4571 0.20 . 938 t=1.18 at. 243/69df 
S: 4.5895 4.5474 0.04 . 929 t=. 37 at. 715/189df 
4. " Improvement in or revision to an 
existing product 
A. 3.5192 3.4269 0.09 . 925 t=. 95 at . 345/259df 
F: 3.0571 2.7714 0.29 . 828 t=1.12 at. 267/69df 
S: 3.6895 3.6684 0.02 . 952 t=. 22 at . 824/189df 
5. "A repositioning A: 2.3231 2.3538 -0.03 . 878 t=-. 30 at . 765/259df 
F: 1.3714 1.6286 -0.26 . 852 t=-1.47 at . 146169df 
S: 2.6737 2.6211 0.05 . 882 t=. 42 at. 674/189df 
6. "A cost reduction A: 2.0692 1.9962 0.07 . 895 t=. 77 at . 439/259df 
F: 1.7429 1.7857 -0.04 . 882 t=-. 24 at . 812/69df 
S: 2.1895 2.0737 0.12 . 898 t=1.04 at. 299/189df 
7. Our firm developed clear strategies to 
deal with deficiencies/problems in the area 
of Newness/Innovation 
A. 5.1885 4.8615 0.33 . 389 t=. 86 at . 392/259df 
F. 4.8571 2.6714 2.19 
. 405 1=1.65 at. 103/69df 
S: 5.3105 5.6684 -0.36 . 725 t=-2.18 at. 030/189df ** 
24. " Cost advantages of incumbents 
(economies of scale) 
A. 4.6038 4.600 0.00 . 867 t=. 04 at . 972/25 
F: 4.4286 4.3571 0.07 . 852 t=. 33 at . 746/69df 
S: 4.6684 4.6895 -0.02 . 872 t=-. 17 at. 8651189df 
25. " Product differentiation 
(proprietary product differences) of the 
incumbents 
A. 6.7308 6.6577 0.07 . 787 t=. 55 at. 581/259df 
F: 6.7429 6.4143 0.33 . 695 t=1.1 at. 275/69df S: 6.7263 6.7474 -0.02 . 821 t=-. 15 at . 884/189df 
26. " Brand identity A: 5.5154 5.6808 -0.17 . 840 t=-1.33 aL184/259df F: 4.5857 4.6286 -0.04 . 860 t=-. 19 at . 850/69df S: 5.8579 6.0684 -0.21 . 826 t=-1.42 at. 158/189df 
27. " Customer switching costs A: 3.7192 3.8769 -0.16 . 827 t=-1.35 at. 177/259df 
F: 3.3714 3.3571 0.01 . 780 t=. 06 at . 954/69df 
S: 3.8474 4.0684 -0.22 . 843 t=-1.68 at. 094/189df * 28. " Capital requirements A: 4.6423 4.7077 -0.07 . 792 t=-. 48 at . 630/259df 
F: 4.6429 5.0286 -0.39 . 769 t=-1.42 at . 160/69df S: 4.6421 4.5895 0.05 . 802 t=. 34 at . 736/189df 
29. " Access to distribution channels A: 5.1462 5.4154 -0.27 . 866 t=-2.35 at. 019/259df ** F: 5.3714 5.4571 -0.09 . 753 t-. 31 at. 760/69df 
S: 5.0632 5.4000 -0.34 . 901 t=-2.85 at. 005/189df ** 30. " Absolute cost advantages 
(learning curve, access to inputs, proprietary 
design etc. ) 
A. 4.8231 4.95 -0.13 . 804 t=-1.04 at. 299/259df 
F: 4.6857 4.6714 0.01 . 742 t=-. 05 at. 958/69df S: 4.8737 5.0526 -0.18 . 826 t=-1.33 at. 186/189df 31. " Government Policy A: 2.0500 2.2192 -0.17 . 895 t=-1.85 at 
. 065/259df 
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A=All cases (the aggregate) 
F=Failures only 
S=Successes only 








F. 2.0000 2.1571 - 0.16 . 875 t =-. 87 at. 390/69df 
S: 2.0684 2.2421 - 0.17 . 901 t =-1.64 at . 102/189df 
32. " Expected retaliation A. 2.5615 2.7154 -0.15 . 837 t=-1.45 at. 149/Z59df 
F: 2.2143 2.4714 -0.26 . 869 t=-1.42at. 161/69df 
S: 2.6895 2.8053 -0.12 . 826 t=-. 90 at . 371/189df 
33. Expected speed of competitive 
retaliation was an important consideration 
in this market entry decision 
A: 3.8115 4.0192 -0.21 . 828 t=-1.71 at. 089/259df * 
F: 2.7143 2.7143 0.00 . 866 t=0.0 at 1.0/69df 
S: 4.2158 4.5000 -0.28 . 809 t=-1.86 at. 065/189df * 
34. Expected magnitude of competitive 
retaliation was an important consideration 
in this market entry decision 
A: 3.3769 3.5538 -0.18 . 807 t=-1.44 at. 151/259df 
F: 2.4857 2.4571 0.03 . 744 t=. 12 at . 905/69df 
S: 3.7053 3.9579 -0.25 . 816 t=-1.76 at. 080/189df * 
35. The product would have done better if 
marketed by almost any of our major 
competitors 
A. 2.9423 3.1154 -0.17 . 894 t=-1.80 at. 073/259df * 
F: 3.6000 4.1714 -0.57 . 855 t=-2.44 at. 017/69df ** 
S: 2.7000 2.7263 -0.03 . 912 t=. 27 at. 787/69df 
36. Our firm developed clear strategies to 
deal with deficiencies in the area of Barriers 
to Entry 
A: 4.2308 4.4077 -0.18 . 789 t=1.43 at. 1.54/259df 
F: 3.4143 3.0429 0.37 . 687 t=1.50 at . 138/69df 
S: 4.5316 4.9105 -0.38 . 808 t=-2.71 at. 007/189df ** 
37. Our company's financial resources were 
more than adequate for this project 
A: 6.6846 6.1423 0.54 . 840 t=4.51 at. 000/259df ** 
F: 6.7571 5.7000 1.06 . 822 t=4.16 at . 000169df ** 
44 
S: 6.6579 6.3053 0.35 . 855 t=2.65 at. 009/189df ** 
38. Our company's R&D skills & people 
were more than adequate for this project 
A. 7.0346 6.6692 0.37 . 776 t=2.88 at. 004/259df ** 
F: 6.4143 5.7286 0.69 . 810 t=2.94 at . 004/69 ** S: 7.2632 7.0158 0.25 . 755 t=1.65 at. 101/189df 
39. Our company's engineering skills & 
people were more than adequate for this 
project 
A. 6.8538 6.5500 0.30 . 807 t=2.58 at . 010/259df ** 44 
R. 6.1429 5.5000 0.64 . 857 t=3.04 at . 003/69df ** S: 7.1158 6.9368 0.18 . 777 t=1.28 at. 203/189df 40. Our company's marketing research 
skills & people were more than adequate for 
this project 
A: 5.9115 5.8385 0.07 
1.756 
t=. 59 at . 556/259df 
F: 5.2143 4.6714 0.54 . 711 t=2.23 at . 029/69df S: 6.1684 6.2684 -0.10 . 762 t=-. 70 at . 482/189df 41. Our company's management skills were 
more than adequate for this project 
A: 6.2115 5.9269 0.28 
. 703 t=2.11 at. 036/259df ** 
F: 5.4143 4.5714 0.84 . 506 t=2.55 at . 013/69df ** S: 6.5053 6.4263 0.08 . 763 t=. 58 at . 563/189df 42. Our company's production resources or 
skills were more than adequate for this 
project 
A. 6.6923 6.4308 0.26 
. 702 t=1.89 at . 060/259df * 
F: 6.6429 6.0286 0.61 
. 778 t=2.59 at . 012/69df ** S: 6.7105 6.5789 0.13 
. 676 t=. 79 at . 432/189df 43. Our company's sales force &/or 
distribution resources & skills were more 
than adequate for this project 
A: 6.2615 5.7923 0.47 . 742 t=3.58 at. 000/259df ** 
F: 5.5571 4.7000 0.86 . 788 t=3.63 at. 001/69df ** S: 6.5211 6.1947 0.33 
. 714 t=2.09 at . 038/189df ** 44. Our company's advertising & 
promotion resources & skills were more 
than adequate for this project 
A. 5.5731 5.3731 0.20 
. 829 t=1.77 at . 078/259df * 
F: 5.1571 4.4286 0.73 
. 828 t=3.4 at . 001/69df ** 44 S: 5.7263 5.7211 0.01 
. 832 t=. 04 at . 968/189df 45. Our firm developed clear strategies to 
deal with deficiencies in the area of 
Resource Requirements 
A. 4.3692 4. Z538, 
- 0.12 . 784 t=. 96 at . 340/259df 
F: 3.7429 3.1714 0.57 
. 737 t=2.34 at . 022/69df ** S: 4.6000 4.6526 -0.05 . 796 t=-. 38 at . 702/189df 1 46. Our product was highly innovative - A: 6.0846 5.8846 0.20 . 894 t=1.99 at. 048/259df ** 
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A=All cases (the aggregate) m ean TO mean TI TO-TI r Paired-samples Unequal Up 
F=Failures only Tatest . 05 = ** Dn 
S=Successes only . 10 = 
totally new to the market 
F : 6.0571 5.3286 0.73 . 880 t=3.45 at. 001/69df 
** 
S : 6.0947 6.0895 0.01 . 905 t=. 05 at. 962/189df 
47. The product specifications - exactly A: 6.6500 6.7500 -0.10 . 736 t=-. 74 at . 462/259df 
what the product will be - were very clear 
F: 6.3714 6.2286 0.14 . 740 t=. 59 at . 554/69df 
S: 6.7526 6.9421 -0.19 . 734 t=-1.16 at . 248/189df 
48. The technical aspects - exactly how the A: 6.0231 5.9192 0.10 . 630 t=. 67 at . 503/259df 
technical problems will be solved - were 
very clear 
F: 5.4571 4.8000 0.66 . 735 t=2.56 at. 013/69df ** 
S: 6.2316 6.3316 -0.10 . 580 t=-. 53 at . 595/189df 
49. The potential customers for this product A: 3.8846 3.8962 -0.01 1 . 918 t=-. 12 at . 903/259df 
were totally new to our company 
F: 4.5286 4.4429 0.09 t=. 76 at A50/69df 
S: 3.6474 3.6947 -0.05 . 893 t=-. 39 at . 699/189df 
50. The product class or type of product A: 4.7846 4.5154 0.27 t=3.21 at . 001/259df 
itself was totally new to our company 
F: 5.8714 . 5857 0.29 
F 
t=1.84 at. 07/69df 
S: 4.3842 4.1211 0.26 t=2.64 at . 009/189df 
51. We had never made or sold products to A: 4.5308 4.4385 0.09 t=. 88 at . 378/259df 
satisfy this type of customer need or use 
before 
F: 5.8143 5.7286 0.09 t=. 9 at . 369/69df 
S: 4.0579 3.9632 0.09 . 890 t=. 68 at . 496/189df 
52. The competitors we face in the market A: 3.0077 3.1115 -0.10 . 934 t=-1.25 at. 211/259df 
were totally new to our company 
F: 4.0000 4.1571 -0.16 . 959 t=-1.14at. 257/69df 
S: 2.6421 2.7263 -0.08 . 920 t: =-. 83 at . 408/189df 
53. The product "fit in" with a family of A: 6.3423 6.2692 0.07 . 880 t=. 64 at . 524/259df 
products we already had on the market 
F: 5.2571 4.7857 0.47 . 900 t=2.3 at . 025/69df ** TT- S: 6.7421 6.8158 -0.07 . 867 t=-. 54 at. 589/189df 
54. The product which entered the market t-test not applicable 
was significantly different than that 
approved at the initial screen 
55. Our firm developed clear strategies to A: 4.0154 4.3615 -0.35 . 611 t=-2.25 at . 025/259df ** deal with deficiencies in the Nature of the 
Project 
R. 3.3714 3.3143 0.06 A65 t=. 18 at . 855/69df S: 4.2526 4.7474 -0.49 . 639 t=-2.83 at . 005/189df ** TT- 56. Compared to competitive products (or A: 7.9808 7.7731 0.21 . 622 t=1.51 at. 131/259df 
whatever the customer was using) our 
product offered a number of unique 
features, attributes or benefits to the 
customer 
F: 7.4714 6.5429 0.93 . 663 t=3.36at. 001/69df ** S: 8.1684 8.2263 -0.06 . 595 t=-. 38 at. 707/189df 
57. Our product was clearly superior to A: 7.3538 6.9231 0.43 . 669 t=3.00 at . 003/259df ** 
competing products in terms of meeting 
customer needs 
F: 6.7143 5.1143 1.60 . 623 t=5.31 at. 000/69df ** S: 7.5895 7.5895 0.00 . 691 t=0.0 at 1.0/189df 58. Our product permitted the customer to A: 5.8846 5.5231 0.36 . 866 t=3.09 at. 002/259df ** 
44 
reduce his/her costs, when compared to 
what he/she was using 
F: 5.8286 4.6714 1.16 . 789 t=4.24 at. 000/69df ** 
44 
S: 5.9053 5.8368 0.07 
. 902 t=. 58 at. 564/189df 59. Our product permitted the customer to A: 6.2192 5.8038 0.42 . 491 t=1.35 at. 177/259df do a job or do something that he/she could 
not do with what was available on the 
market 
F: 6.2857 4.5286 1.76 
. 198 t=1.6 at . 113/69df 
S: 6.1947 6.2737 -0.08 . 920 t=-. 77 at. 440/189df 60. Our product was of higher quality - A: 7.1962 6.7346 0.46 . 397 t=1.25 at. 213/259df however quality is defined in this market - 
than competing products 
F. 6.1286 5.4857 0.64 . 800 t=2.98 at. 004/69df ** 
85 
A=4II cases (the aggregate) 
F=Failures only 
S=Successes only 








S: 7.5895 7.1947 0.39 . 352 t=. 79 at. 431/189df 
61. Our product was priced considerably 
higher than competing products 
A: 4.8308 4.8385 -0.01 . 900 t=-. 
08 at . 935/259df 
F. 4.9571 5.0000 -0.04 . 896 t=-. 
23 at . 816/69df 
S: 4.7842 4.7789 0.01 . 901 t=. 05 at . 
962/189df 
62. Our firm developed clear strategies to 
deal with deficiencies in the Final Product 
A: 4.7077 4.8808 -0.17 . 767 t=-1.40 at. 161/259df 
F: 3.8429 3.3857 0.46 . 589 t=1.6at. 114/69df 
S: 5.0263 5.4316 -0.41 . 810 t=-3.16 at. 002/189df ** 
63. Potential customers had a great need 
for this class or type of product 
A: 6.9885 6.6385 0.35 . 657 t=2.50 at. 013/259df ** 
F: 6.3429 5.0000 1.34 . 555 t=4.0 at . 000/69df ** 
S: 7.2263 7.2421 -0.02 . 705 t=-. 11 at. 909/189df - 64. The dollar size of the market (either 
existing or potential market) for this product 
was large 
A: 6.8846 6.6231 0.26 . 705 t=1.96 at . 051/259df ** TT 
F: 6.5857 5.4571 1.13 . 729 t=4.08 at. 000/69df ** 
S: 6.9947 7.0526 -0.06 . 706 t=-. 40 at . 691/189df 
65. The market for this product was 
growing very quickly 
A: 5.8808 5.7192 0.16 . 740 t=1.19 at . 236/259df 
F: 4.6857 4.1143 0.57 . 682 t=1.88 at. 065/69df * 
S: 6.3211 6.3105 0.01 . 741 t=. 07 at . 943/189df 
66. The market was characterised by 
intense price competition 
A: 4.6192 4.9038 -0.28 . 900 t=-3.02 at. 003/259df ** 
F. 4.9000 4.9429 -0.04 . 943 t=-. 30 at . 763/69df 
S: 4.5158 4.8895 -0.37 . 884 t=-3.18 at . 002/189df ** 
67. There were many competitors in this 
market 
A: 4.6731 4.6192 0.05 . 413 t=. 13 at. 894/259df 
F: 5.9143 4.8714 1.04 . 409 t=. 80 at . 424/69df S: 4.2158 4.5263 -0.31 . 508 t=1.12 at. 263/189df 
68. There was a strong dominant 
competitor- with a large market share - in 
this market 
A: 5.0577 5.1731 -0.12 . 913 t=-1.19 at . 233/259df 
F: 5.2429 5.4000 -0.16 . 908 t=-. 82 at. 415/69df S: 4.9895 5.0895 -0.10 . 915 t=-. 89 at . 373/189df 
69. Potential customers were very satisfied 
with the products (competitors' products) 
they were currently using 
A: 4.9038 4.9308 -0.03 . 888 t=-. 31 at. 754/259df 
F: 5.6714 5.9857 -0.31 . 887 t=-2.05 at. 044/69df ** S. 4.6211 4.5421 0.08 . 885 t=. 77 at . 440/189df 70. Users' needs changed quickly in this 
market -a dynamic market situation 
A: 3.5692 3.6769 -0.11 . 918 t=-1.38 at. 169/259df 
F. 3.4286 3.3571 0.07 . 983 t=1.04 at . 30/69df S: 3.6211 3.7947 -0.17 . 896 t=-1.68 at. 095/189df 71. We were the first to market this product A: 5.5462 5.4269 0.12 . 932 t=1.24 at . 218/259df F: 4.9143 4.3000 0.61- . 887 t=2.68 at . 009/69df ** S: 5.7789 5.8421 -0.06 . 949 t=-. 64at. 523/189df 72. We were not first to market this 
product; we followed close behind however 
A: 2.9346 2.8077 0.13 . 919 t=1.54 at. 125/259df 
F: 3.3429 3.2857 0.06 . 913 t=. 35 at . 728/69df S: 2.7842 2.6316 0.15 
. 920 t=1.6 at. 111/189df 73. We entered the market in its late 
growth stage 
A: 2.9654 2.8846 0.08 . 938 t=1.13 at. 259/259df 
F: 3.5714 3.600 -0.03 . 939 t=-. 19 at . 850/69df S: 2.7421 2.6211 0.12 
. 937 t=1.51 at. 134/189df 74. We entered the market somewhere 
between its maturity and decline 
A: 2.0269 2.2385 -0.21 . 613 t=-. 89 at. 373/259df 
F: 2.1571 2.1000 0.06 
. 914 t=. 38 at . 703/69df 
S: 1.9789 2.2895 -0.31 . 569 t=-. 97 at . 3321189df 75. The fast rate of technological change 
was important in this product market 
A: 4.4308 4.5731 -0.14 . 904 t=-1.52 at. 131/259df 
F: 4.0714 4.000 0.07 
. 949 t--. 54 at . 591/69df 
S: 4.5632 4.7842. -0.22 . 889 t=-1.86 at. 064/189df 76. Competitors introduced new products 
into this market very quickly 
A: 3.8423 4.2115 
, 
-0.37 . 841 t=-3.30 at . 001/Z59df ** TT- 
F: 3.9000 4.0286 -0.13 . 906 t=-. 76 at . 452/69df 
S: 3.8211 " 4.2789 -0.46 . . 818 t=-3.28 at. 001/189d f ** TT- 
86 
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77. Competitors withdrew products from 
this market very quickly 
A: 2.6038 2.6308 - 0.03 . 926 t =. 39 at. 698/259df 
F: 2.7571 2.7143 0.04 . 982 t =. 6 at. 552/69df 
S: 2.5474 2.6000 -0.05 . 900 t=-. 58 at. 564/189df 
78. R&D in this market produced many 
advancements in the production process and 
ensuing products 
A: 3.8115 4.0846 -0.27 . 876 t=-2.84 at . 005/259df 
W 
F: 3.8429 3.9000 -0.06 . 926 t=-. 39 at. 698/69df 
S. 3.8000 4.1526 -0.35 . 858 t=-2.94 at . 004/189df ** 
79. Production methods in this market 
changed very quickly 
A: 2.8154 3.0269 -0.21 . 907 t=-2.87 at . 004/259df ** 
F: 2.8571 3.1286 -0.27 . 899 t=-1.64 at . 105/69df 
S: 2.8000 2.9895 -0.19 . 911 t=-2.35 at. 020/189df ** 
80. The amount of change (technological 
leap/boundary distance) was important in 
this product market 
A: 4.4654 4.6577 -0.19 . 860 t=-1.76 at . 080/259df * 
F: 4.2286 4.2857 -0.06 . 913 t=-. 33 at. 745/69df 
S. 4.5526 4.7947 -0.24 . 838 t=-1.79 at. 075/189df 
81. New products introduced into this 
market were much more technologically 
sophisticated than those replaced 
A: 5.3692 5.2000 0.17 . 647 t=. 69 at . 492/259df 
F: 5.3571 5.3000 0.06 . 937 t=. 35 at . 724/69df 
S: 5.3737 5.1632 0.21 587 t=. 63 at . 526/189df 
82. R&D in this market produced 
significant advancements in the production 
process and ensuing products 
A: 4.2385 4.3846 -0.15 . 869 t=-1.46 at. 144/259df 
F: 4.0714 4.1286 -0.06 . 928 t---. 39 at . 701/69df 
S: 4.3000 4.4789 -0.18 . 845 t=-1.43 at. 155/189df 
83. This product had a long life cycle in its 
original form (before modifications were 
necessary) 
A: 5.7654 5.3692 0.40 . 823 t=3.40 at . 001/259df ** 
F: 5.7429 4.8000 0.94 . 818 t=3.95 at . 000/69df ** S: 5.7737 5.5789 0.19 
. 832 t=1.49 at. 137/189df 
84. We spent a long time on the market 
research for this product 
A: 3.3231 3.4615 -0.14 . 849 t=-1.44 at . 152/259df 
F: 3.1000 2.8429 0.26 . 872 
It--1.52a t . 132/69df S. 3.4053 3.6895 -0.28 . 844 t=-2.48 at. 014/189df ** 85. Market cyclicality was important in the 
decision to enter this market 
A: 2.1462 2.1308 0.02 . 946 t=. 27 at. 791/259df 
F: 2.1857 2.0571 0.13 . 956 t=1.17 at . 244/69df S: 2.1316 2.1579 -0.03 . 942 t=-. 39 at . 700/189df 86. Market seasonality was important in 
the decision to enter this market 
A: 1.6808 1.7231 -0.04 . 935 t=-. 7 at . 487/259df 
F: 1.4286 1.3571 0.07 , 969 t=. 93 at . 357/69df S: 1.7737 1.8579 -0.08 . 925 t=-1.08 at . 282/189df 87. The contribution margin was important 
in the decision to enter this market 
A: 5.7000 5.7500 -0.05 . 861 t=-. 47 at . 638/259df 
F: 5.4429 4.9000 0.54 
. 875 t=2.61 at. 011/69df ** S: 5.7947 6.0632 -0.27 . 860 t=-2.24 at . 026/189df ** 88. The primary market for this product 
was domestic (over 50% in US) 
A: 7.6231 7.4308, 0.19 
. 850 t=1.76 at. 080/259df * 
F: 7.5714 7.5000 0.07 
. 892 t=. 39 at . 70/69df 
° S: 7.6421 7.4053 0.24 
. 833 t=1.77 at. 078/189df 89. Our firm developed clear strategies to 
deal with difficulties inherent in this market 
A: 4.9538 4.8077 0.15 . 782 t=1.18 at . 240/259df 
F. 3.5857 2.9429 0.64 
. 689 t=2.48 at. 016/69df S: 5.4579 5.4947 -0.04 . 785 t=-. 27 at. 791/189df 
4.2.4 " Conclusion 
From the one way ANOVA above it is clear that there is a sizeable carry over effect 
of variables significant at both To and T1. This argues for the acceptance of the null 
form i. e. the two environments are equal. However, there exists also a set of 
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distinctly different variables at work during this period which are significant over 
time. This argues for concluding that a difference does exist, rejection of the null 
form and acceptance of the alternate form. These differences are augmented by the 
results of the paired-samples t-test and support the conclusion that significant 
magnitudinal evolution does occur in aggregate, success and failure cases. This 
argues even more strongly for acceptance of the alternate form, as this change in 
selection and emphases affects the final outcome of the process. 
These conclusive results require acceptance of the alternate form of the hypothesis, 
that many variables relating to a new product's success are dynamic not static and are 
perceived to evolve over time. The null form is thus rejected. 
4.3 Hypothesis Hlb 
The factors constructed from screening variables are dynamic, not static with 
respect to their construction, percent of variance, order and magnitude and evolve 
over time from the initial screen to the end of the first year of market entry. 
4.3.1 Introduction 
To test hypothesis H, b, factor analysis was performed on the data sets at To and Tl 
independently. Factors, Eigenvalues, percents of variance, cumulative percents of 
variance, variables statements, their loadings, Chronbach alpha scores and average 
loading per factor are found in Table 4-5a and Table 4-5b for time To and T, 
respectively. These describe well, the normalised dimensional environments at the 
initial screen and 1 year after launch. Since normalised factors have a mean of 0 and 
a standard deviation of 1, a paired-samples t-test of factors to determine significant 
difference is impossible. Therefore, in the aggregate, factor by factor analysis, t-tests 
of factor loading differences and scree plots were necessary to determine if To results 
differed from T, results. 
Table 4-5a: Factor analysis - variable set "A" at T. 
Factor Eigen , °6 Cum Variable Description Variable Factor 
Var. % loadings Chronbach 
alphalavg 
1: Dynamic 8.88 11.8 11.8 The amount of change (technological leap/boundary . 79693 change in fast distance) was important in this product market 
growing market R&D in this market produced significant advancements in . 77981 
the production process and ensuing products 
Production methods in this market changed very quickly . 72506 The fast rate of technological change was important in this . 71265 product market 
R&D in this market produced many advancements in the . 70537 production process and ensuing products 
Users' needs changed quickly in this market -a dynamic . 57894 market situation 
51 flute values of factor loadings. 
/. 639751 
91 
Factor E igen % Cum V ariable Description Variable Factor 
Va. % loadings Chronbach 
alpha/avg 
loading 
New products introduced into this market were much more . 56640 
t echnologically sophisticated than those replaced 
Competitors introduced new products into this market very . 47835 
quickly 
The market for this product was growing very quickly . 41347 
2: Strategic 5.45 73 19.1 Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies . 79772 . 8349 
reaction in the Final Product 
/. 6583 
capability Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies . 71614 
in the Nature of the Project 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with difficulties . 70756 
inherent in this market 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies . 64650 
in the area of Resource Requirements 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies . 64225 
in the area of Barriers to Entry 
We spent a long time on the market research for this product . 43936 
3: Overall 4.94 6.6 25.7 Our company's sales force &/or distribution resources & . 75936 . 8209 
project skills were more than adequate for this project /. 6587 
/company Our company's marketing research skills & people were . 69001 
resource more than adequate for this project 
compatibility Our company's management skills were more than adequate . 68941 
for this project 
Our company's advertising & promotion resources & skills . 67934 
were more than adequate for this project 
Our company's production resources or skills were more . 62877 
than adequate for this project 
Our company's financial resources were more than adequate . 50542 
for this project 
4: New to the 3.23 4.3 30.0 We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of . 78503 . 8022 
firm, didn't fit customer need or use before /. 6963 
in The competitors we face in the market were totally new to . 77670 
our company 
The potential customers for this product were (not) totally . 69618 
new to our company 
The product class or type of product itself was totally new . 69049 
to our company 
The product (did not) "fit in" with a family of products we -. 53329 
already had on the market (negative)52 
5: 1" in new, 2.87 3.8 33.8 We were the first to market this product . 78447 . 7842 
highly New-to-the-world (a true innovation in the product . 72419 /. 6917 
innovative marketplace listed above) 
market Our product was highly innovative - totally new to the . 68572 
market 
We were not first to market this product; we followed close -. 57228 
behind however (negative) 
6: Superior 2.8 3.7 37.6 Our product was clearly superior to competing products in . 74770 . 6662 
unique product terms of meeting customer needs /. 5707 
meeting needs Compared to competitive products (or whatever the . 67551 
in large market customer was using) our product offered a number of 
unique features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
Potential customers had a great need for this class or type of . 67474 
product 
Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her costs, . 54366 
when compared to what he/she was using 
Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do . 42724 
something that he/she could not do with what was available 
on the market 
The dollar size of the market (either existing or potential . 35555 
market) for this product was large 
7: Alertness to 2.2 2.9 40.5 Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an . 84702 . 8225 ff threato important consideration in this market entry decision /. 7699 
competitive Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an important . 83638 retaliation consideration in this market entry decision 
Expected retaliation . 62642 8: 2.0 2.6 43.1 Our company's R&D skills & people were more than . 78978 . 
7878 
52 Cooper sod xleiruchm: dt (1994, p389) state that "Some variables are reverse-scale types (i. e. the less the bener). See also Cooper 1976,1981, 
1984,1985b; Cooper and de Brentani 1984. Such reversals, usually shown as (negative)and/or reworded in the context of the factor. provide no inconsistency given the context of the statement. Such negative variable constructs are quite common in the literature (see Table 4.5c) and correctly indicate the effect of the variable on the factor. 
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Technological adequate for this project 
/. 7192 
Our company's engineering skills & people were more than . 78641 resource 
adequacy adequate for this project 
The technical aspects - exactly how the technical problems . 
58147 
will be solved - were very clear 
9: Satisfied 1.9 2.5 45.6 Potential customers were very satisfied with the products . 71161 . 
6291 
, 
competitive (competitors' products) they were currently using 
/. 5710 
market There was a strong dominant competitor- with a 
large . 68621 
market share - in this market 
The market was characterised by intense price competition . 60927 
The product would have done better if marketed by almost . 27695 
any of our major competitors 
10: Exogenous 1.76 2.4 48.0 Market cyclically was important in the decision to enter this . 75213 . 
6448 
timing variables market 
/. 6603 
Market seasonally was important in the decision to enter . 74769 
this market 
Competitors withdrew products from this market very . 48119 
quickly 
11: Moderate 1.65 2.2 50.2 An addition to an existing product line 
' -- -----' --- ' --. 
. 69737 L AÖ . 
6196 
IAC7l. 
innovation ,,,, t ............ ... -.... W. _ .ar. __. Z 
new product line (negative) -. 62576 
12: Incremental 1.57 2.1 52.3 A cost reduction . 76912 . 5564 
innovation 
1 
A repositioning . 66642 /. 5947 
Cost advantages of incumbents (economies of scale) . 34859 
13: Innovative 1.52 2.0 54.3 Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 87792 . 8351 
strategy in deficiencies/problems in the area of Newness/Innovation 
/. 8755 
highly There were many competitors in this market . 87303 
competitive 
market 
14: Late 1A1 1.9 56.2 We entered the market somewhere between its maturity and . 74528 . 6532 
market entry decline 
/. 7352 
We entered the market in its late growth stage . 72510 
15: 1.39 1.9 58.1 Brand identity . 67985 . 4860 
Differentiation Access to distribution channels . 66497 /. 5280 
barriers Absolute cost advantages (learning curve, access to inputs, . 43315 
proprietary design etc. ) 
Product differentiation (proprietary product differences) of . 33398 
the incumbents 
16: NPD 1.28 1.7 59.8 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had . 7492 
history of kills Kills % (negative) -. 90616 /. 8364 
and success Success % . 76658 
17: NPD 1.25 1.7 61.5 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had 1.053 
history of Failure % (negative) -. 87497 /. 8750 
failure 
18: 1.14 1.5 63.0 Government Policy . 63361 . 2538 
Government Capital requirements . 55164 /. 5926 
capital barriers 
19: Domestic 1.13 1.5 64.5 The primary market for this product was domestic (over . 71834 1.0 
markets 50% in US) /. 7183 
20: Long life 1.11 1.5 66.0 This product had a long life cycle in its original form . 68837 . 2669 
cycle, high (before modifications were necessary) /. 5406 
price/high Our product was priced considerably higher than competing . 59347 
quality, strategy products 
Our product was of higher quality - however quality is . 34003 
defined in this market - than competing products 
21: Clear 1.06 1.4 67.4 The product specifications - exactly what the product will . 48237 
1.0 
product specs be - were very clear /. 4824 
22:. " 1.03 1.4 68.8 The contribution margin was important in the decision to . 79463 ' . 1673 
Contribution enter this market /. 5723 
margin Customer switching costs (negative) -. 34996 
53 In his factor analysis Cooper (1984) labels 5 of 11 single variable factors as "univariate dimensions'. '1.0 is by definition, because only one 
measure was included for this eonstruce (Green. Barclay and Ryans 1995 p. 9). 
54 NPD field Chronbach alpha scores have been used only since 1984. Though Some report Chronbach alpha's c. 5 (Cooper and de Brentani 1984). 
this is the minimum considered satisfactory (Cooper and de Brentani 1991). However, according to Cooper (1985a. p35) 'The criteria used in the 
screening decision should reflect the corporation's overall objectives, and in particular, its goals for its new product program. Not all of these criteria 
am quantifiable, nor are they necessarily internally consistent'. Nevertheless, If not for the exploratory nature of heterogeneous data integration and 
the importance of measuring their integrative effects on PLC and order/'innovation constrained models, factors 18 through 22 would have been 
eliminated for reasons of internal inconsistency and parsimony. 
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Table 4-5b: Fact or an alysis - variable set "B" at T, 
Factor Eigen % Cum Variable Description Variable 
Factor 
V o, {ý loadings Chronbach 
alpha/avg 
loading 
1: Dynamic 10.14 13.3 13.3 The amount of change (technological leap/boundary . 82154 . 
8572 
change distance) was important in this product market 
/. 6752 
R&D in this market produced significant advancements in . 78378 
the production process and ensuing products 
New products introduced into this market were much . 74754 
more technologically sophisticated than those replaced 
Production methods in this market changed very quickly . 72233 
R&D in this market produced many advancements in the . 71093 
production process and ensuing products 
The fast rate of technological change was important in . 68817 
this product market 
Users' needs changed quickly in this market -a dynamic . 52726 
market situation 
Competitors introduced new products into this market . 39979 
2: Strategic 5.17 6.8 20.2 Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 81U96 M 
reaction deficiencies in the Final Product 
/. 6701 
capability Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 77957 
deficiencies in the Nature of the Project 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 77011 
difficulties inherent in this market 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 67059 
deficiencies in the area of Barriers to Entry 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 66200 
deficiencies/problems in the area of Newness/Innovation 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with . 54572 
deficiencies in the area of Resource Requirements 
We spent a long time on the market research for this . 45160 
3: Superior 5.12 6.7 26.9 Our product was clearly superior to competing products in . 76320 . 8223 
product in large terms of meeting customer needs /. 5839 
rapid growth Compared to competitive products (or whatever the . 73035 
market customer was using) our product offered a number of 
unique features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do . 63634 
something that he/she could not do with what was 
available on the market 
Our product was of higher quality - however quality is . 61294 
defined in this market - than competing products 
Potential customers had a great need for this class or type . 60473 
of product 
Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her . 46619 
costs, when compared to what he/she was using 
The market for this product was growing very quickly . 43605 
The dollar size of the market (either existing or potential . 42104 
market) for this product was large 
4: 3.39 4.5 31.4 Our company's R&D skills & people were more than . 81307 . 8220 
Technological adequate for this project /. 6450 
resource Our company's engineering skills & people were more . 
81157 
compatibility than adequate for this project 
(synergy) Our company's production resources or skills were more . 60966 than adequate for this project 
The technical aspects - exactly how the technical . 59845 
problems will be solved - were very clear 
Our company's financial resources were more than . 55909 
adequate for this project 
The product specifications - exactly what the product will . 47791 be - were very clear 
5: New to the 2.97 3.9 35.3 We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of . 80463 . 7879 
firm, didn't fit customer need or use before /. 6895 
in The competitors we face in the market were totally new to . 76480 
our company 
The product class or type of product itself was totally new . 72503 
to our company 
The potential customers for this product were totally new . 68536 to our company 
The product (did not) "fit in" with a family of products we -. 46791 
already had on the market (negative) 
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highly New-to-the-world (a true innovation in the product . . 
innovative marketplace listed above) ' 
market Our product was 
highly innovative - totally new to the . 
69682 
market -. 58039 
We were not first to market this product; we (didn't) 
follow close behind (negative) 
7: Marketing & 2.25 3.0 41.6 Our company's sales force &/or distribution resources & . 73766 . 
8063 
management skills were more than adequate 
for this project /. 6631 
Our company's advertising & promotion resources & . 71065 resource 
compatibility skills were more than adequate 
for this project 
(synergy) Our company's marketing research skills & people were . 66635 
more than adequate for this project 
Our company's management skills were more than . 53766 
adequate for this project 
8: Alertness to 2.03 2.7 44.3 Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an . 80881 . 
8137 
threat of important consideration in this market entry 
decision /. 7552 
competitive Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an . 
79754 
retaliation important consideration in this market entry 
decision 
Expected retaliation . 65937 
9: Exogenous 1.98 2.6 46.9 Market seasonality was important in the decision to enter . 78150 . 6577 
timing variables this market 
/. 6360 
Market cyclicality was important in the decision to enter . 74417 
this market 
Competitors withdrew products from this market very . 38239 
quºcKiy 
10: Intense 1.89 2.5 49.3 There were many competitors in this market . 79799 . 
7083 
market The market was characterised by intense price . 
70215 1.7501 
competitiveness competition 
11: Satisfied 1.64 2.2 51.5 Potential customers were very satisfied with the products . 64010 . 5397 
customer with (competitors' products) they were currently using 
/. 5780 
dominant There was a strong dominant competitor- with a large . 62984 
competitor market share - in this market 
The product would have done better if marketed by . 46411 
almost any of our major competitors 
12: Moderate 1.59 2.1 53.6 Improvement in or revision to an existing product . 70835 . 5777 
level of product An addition to an existing product line . 68596 
/. 6382 
innovation (Not) a new product line (negative) -. 52022 
13: Financial 1.50 2.0 55.6 Capital requirements . 74310 . 6122 
barriers Absolute cost advantages (learning curve, access to . 62640 /. 5634 
inputs, proprietary design etc. ) 
Customer switching costs . 44307 
Cost advantages of incumbents (economies of scale) . 44120 
14: NPD 1.41 1.8 57.4 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had . 7492 
history of kills Kills % . 92170 /. 8526 
and success Success % (negative) -. 78354 
15: NPD 1.29 1.7 59.1 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had 1.0 
history of Failure% (negative) -. 83617 /-. 83617 
failure 
16: Incremental 1.27 1.7 60.8 A cost reduction . 82708 . 5572 
innovation A repositioning . 57605 
/. 7016 
17: 1.18 1.6 62.3 Access to distribution channels . 71599 378355 




Product differentiation (proprietary product differences) . 33706 
of the incumbents 
18: Relative 1.16 1.5 63.9 Our product was priced considerably higher than . 75897 1.0-16 
high price of competing products /3590 
product 
19: Late 1.12 1.5 65.4 We entered the market somewhere between its maturity . 73468 . 4715 
market entry' and decline /. 6979 
We entered the market in its late growth stage . 66118 
20: Domestic 1.07 1.4 66.8 The primary market for this product was domestic (over . 39041 1.0 
markets 50% in US) /. 3904 
55 If not for the exploratory nature of data integration and itt effecla on PLC and orderTnnovation constrained modele, factors 17 and factors 19 
through 22 would have been eliminated. 
56 This factor was found to be a "univariate dimension' both by Cooper (1984,1985b) and by Song and Parry (1994). 
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Factor Eigen % Cum Variable Description Variable Factor 
yar. % loadings Chronbach 
alpha/avg 
loading 
21: 1.05 1.4 68.1 Government Policy . 75140 . 
1948 
Government This product had a long life cycle in its original form . 41841 
/. 5849 
barriers (before modifications were necessary) 
22: 1.01 1.3 69.5 The contribution margin was important in the decision to . 77585 1.0 
Contribution enter this market /. 7759 
margin 
4.3.2 Adequacy of the factor analysis 
Consistent with Cooper and de Brentani (1984) and Zirger and Maidique (1990), 
principle components extraction with varimax rotation yielded the best overall 
solution. Both factor analyses gave a good intuitive description of the underlying 
dimensions. Consistent with Cooper (1979b, 1984a), an Eigenvalue >1 was used as 
the primary determinant of factor inclusion. However, there is no one correct method 
to determine the number of factors from a data set (Kim and Mueller 1978). 
Therefore, comparison with significant work is appropriate here. 
Table 4-5c compares the parameters of this work's factor analyses with field results 
over the last twenty years. Both factor analyses are quite normal and were accepted 
for the following reasons: (1) the factor loadings of the variables averaged . 
6444836 
at To and . 653177 at T,; 
(2) the amount of common factor variance explained by the 
22 factors was 68.8% and 69.5% for To and Tl respectively; (3) alternative extraction 
and rotation procedures yielded similar groupings for each factor in both To and Tl 
cases; (4) all the factors had an Eigenvalue greater than one; (5) the variable 
groupings were intuitively logical and meaningfully described the items captured in 
the conceptual model of the new product decision process and (6) the scree plot of the 
variance associated with each factor showed an appropriate levelling between the key 
factors and the rest of the scree (Cattell 1966). The only characteristics needing 
explanation are low variances per factor and low Chronbach alpha scores towards the 
end of the scree. 
Factors exhibiting low, variance and low Chronbach alpha scores were acceptable due 
to the exploratory nature of heterogeneous inter-disciplinary data integration and their 
potential usefulness in testing H2 and H3.. There is a need to publish results even if 
they are not significant, so that knowledge of the principal drivers of new product 
performance may, progress beyond an exploratory, descriptive nature (Montoya-Weiss 
and Calantone 1994). Furthermore, lower Chronbach alpha scores are normal for 
"extra factors" at the end of any scree. Here, these result from requested inter- 
disciplinary data integration (Cooper 1976; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Wind and 
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Mahajan 1988) as heterogeneous new data produce low inter correlation with more 
homogeneous marketing variables. This is not seen in less integrative work where 
lowly correlated variable constructs are removed for the sake of parsimony and 
higher 
Chronbach alpha scores. Unfortunately, established models produced from these 
highly correlated but narrow homogeneous dimensions have not been well accepted 
by practitioners. Therefore, this more comprehensive approach 
is warranted. 
Nevertheless, those factors not significant in this work's linear regression functions, 
their variable constructs and variable constructs loading on significant 
factors at <. 5 
should be eliminated from future aggregate model building. This would put the 
variable/factor ratios between 4 and 6%, well within field boundaries. 
Table 4-5c: Comparison of factor analysis characteristics in seminal work versus 
Thesis nr=not reported ears=variables loading on constructs. %e. 5=% of variables 
loading on construct at less than. 50. Neg 
= negative loadings. Shaded areas show extremes 
in literature compared to this work. 
Variance vacs factors vats/ %<. 5 Neg 
T3 vats 2 vacs 1 variable/factor 
{factor factor /factor /factor Univariate57 
dimensions 
Cooper 1976' 11.1% 17 6 2.8 47.1% 11.8% 50% 33.3% u 
Cooper 4% 82 18 4.6 31.7% 2.4% 22.2%, 33.3% 0 
1979b" 
Calantone and 11.1% 17 6 2.8 . 
41.1% 11.8% 50% ..: ., 33.3%, -, '- 
0 
Cooper 1979' 
Cooper 1981` 5.3% 52 13 4 28.9% 5.8% 38.5% 23.1% 0 
Calantone and 4% 82 18 4.6 31.7% 2.4% 22.2% 33.3% 0 
Cooper 1981b 
Cooper and de 4.5% 58 11 5.3 2.1% 3.4% 27.3%' 0% 0 
Brentani 
1984° 
Cooper 4% 64 19 '3.4 , 
20.3% 1.6% 16% 11% 32% e' 
1984a" 
Cooper nr 70 19 3.7 27,1%_ 1.4% 21.1% 11% 21.1% 
1985b° l" 
de Brentani 4.5% 58 11 5.3 2.1% 3.4% 27.3% ý 0% 0 
1986° 










Cooper and de nr 77 18 4.2 nr nr 27.8% 11.1% 0% 
Brentani 
19911, 
Cooper and nr 772, 10 7.2 46% , 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
Kleinschmidt , 
1994' 
Song and 4.9% 82 16 5.1 11% 12.2% 12.5% 18.8% 25% 
Parry 1994) 
Thesis A 3.1% 75 22 3.4 - , 17.3% 6.7% 27.3% 22.7% 13.6% -Thesis B 3.2% 76 22 3.5 19.7% 7.9% 22.7% 27.3% 13.6% :. - 
" oddly, tnougn these use me same aata ana generate me same number or constructs, they report arrerent ioaarngs. 
° 82 variable constructs load from 77 variables i. e. some load on more than 
one factor. 
° 52 variable constructs load from 48 variables i. e. some load on more than one factor. 
° In both of these works a Chronbach alpha <. 5 is reported. Scores ranged from. 46 to. 90. 
" In these works different factor analysis results are reported from the same data. "Univariate dimensions" are defined. 64 and 70 
variable constructs load from 86 variables respectively. 
some constructs overlapped each other in factors 7,8 and 9. Chronbach alpha scores ranged from .5 to . 
98.46 variable constructs 
load from 43 variables i. e. some load on more than one factor. 
57 Cooper (1984) published five factors and Cooper (1985b) published four factors comprising only one variable construct These were accepted in 
the factor analysis solution because they aided interpretation and had eigenvalues >1. Cooper defined them as'univariate dimensiafs*. 
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`The "product value" factor had one factor Eigenvalue of . 87 i. e. usually eigenvalues <1 are not acceptable. 
11 Chronbach alpha scores ranged from. 527 to. 841.77 variable constructs load from 65 variables 
i. e. some load on more than one 
factor. 
I Chronbach alpha scores ranged from. 605-. 889 
j 82 variable constructs load from 77 variables i. e. some load on more than one 
factor. 
4.3.3 Factor analysis findings at To versus T1 
The 22 factor solutions found at To and Tl explain 68.8% and 69.5% of the variance 
respectively. This rise may be a function of perceived information coalescing 
in 
explanation of stochastic processes. This compares to 71.3% explained 
for Cooper's 
original NewProd (1979b), 69% for Zirger and Maidique 
(1990) and 49.1% for 
Cooper and de Brentani (1984). If homogeneity and parsimony rather than 
heterogeneous factor integration was the goal, a 17 factor solution would have been 
chosen in both cases. This compares to Cooper's 18 factors, Zirger and Maidique's 
8 
factors and Cooper and de Brentani's 11 factors. Elimination of five factors would be 
argued on the basis of: (1) the two scree plots (see Figure 4-6) being virtually 
identical and tailing off after the 17`hfactor; (2) a good amount of variance being 
explained (61.5% and 62.3%) and (3) a pattern of internal inconsistency beginning at 
the 18`' factor. However, this research responded to calls for expanding the 
variable/factor base (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and greater 
interdisciplinary perspective (Wind and Mahajan 1988). Thus, lower ordered factors 
were not removed in order to test their relationship to time (Hlc), PiLC (H), 
order/innovation (H), the need to publish even insignificant data to progress beyond 
the exploratory stage and the need for more broad-based studies that include multiple 
factors from diverse categories (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
As seen in Figure 4-5, the loading distributions are almost identical, with the mean 
and standard deviation almost unchanged over time. A paired sample t-value of -. 05 
at p=. 961 indicates factor mean distributions are statistical equivalents. This suggests 
that in the aggregate, normalised environmental factors do not change over time. This 
supports acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
The characteristics of the factor analyses suggest absolute differences between the 
two environments. For example, the actual order of factors is quite different between 
To and T1. Of 22 factors only the first two, "dynamic change in fast growing market" 
and "strategic reaction capability" are ordered the same at both time periods i. e. only 
9.1% of the factors fall at the same location by time period. - Conversely, 90.9% show 
a change in factorial order. Even the two common'factors (F1 and F2) have slightly 
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different construction and loading order at each time period. However, reordering 
differences might be considered minor, since when matched logically by the 
Figure 4-5: Factor loading distributions at To v T1 
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dimensions they portend, 20 factors can be matched reasonably well. Absolute 
differences are observed in Eigenvalues, percent variance explained per factor, 
average variable loadings and Chronbach alpha scores. However, this gives only 
weak support to rejection of the null form. More likely, the normalised environment 
at To and the normalised environment at Tl tell essentially the same environmental 
story. An argument for intrinsic difference thus falls short. 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
Side by side, the technical parameters of the factor analysis are different absolutely. 
"Common factors" such as superior product do add/remove variables over time. 
However, variable loading distributions, whilst rising absolutely, are not different at 
p=. 05. This lack of variation combined with similar pairing and almost identical 
scree plots requires this research to reject hypothesis Hlb and accept the null form. 
Probably due to the normalisation process, the factors constructed from dynamic 
variables do not change over time and, by themselves, are not dynamic. 
4.4 Hypothesis Hlc 
Factors significant to a new product's successful introduction are dynamic, not 
static As more information becomes known to the firm over time, (both internal 
and external) these significant factors are perceived to evolve from a inadequate, 
incomplete, uncertain condition at the initial screen to a more adequate, more 
complete, more certain condition at the end of the first year of market entry with a 
change in their order and magnitude. 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Validation of hypothesis Hlc would demonstrate that unique linear predictive 
functions are possible at different data collection points in the new product 
development process. Consistent with seminal work (Calantone and Cooper 1979; 
Cooper 1979b, 1981; Cooper and de Brentani's 1984; de Brentani 1986; Zirger and 
Maidique 1990), factor scores produced to test H, b above were saved as SPSS 
variables. These were used to construct one linear regression function at To and 
another at T1. Pearson's R (R), R Squared (R2), Adjusted R Squared (Adj. R2), 
Standard error of the model (Std Err), F value (F) and its significance with degrees of 
freedom (df) were compared by time period to determine if the function evolved 
between the initial screen and one year post launch. 
4.4.2 Linear Regression model construction findings at To 
The results of the linear regression at the initial screen is seen in Table 4-6a. 
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Table 4-6a: Linear regression at T. - the deterministic model. 
R=. 56589, R2= . 32023, Adj. R =. 29857, 
F =14.78065 at. 0000 with 8df Standard error = 2.58869 accuracy = 81.15384% 
Key factors or Reg. Coef F value Variables loading on factor 
dimensions 
(factor name) 
NPD history of 1.114580 48.01 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had 
failure F 17 Failure % (negative) 
Strategic reaction . 700422 18.96 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the Final Product 
capability F2 Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the Nature of the 
Project 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with difficulties inherent in this market 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of Resource 
Requirements 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of Barriers to 
Entry 
We spent a long time on the market research for this product 
New to the firm, -. 644947 16.08 We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of customer need or use 
didn't fit in F4 before 
The competitors we face in the market were totally new to our company 
The potential customers for this product were totally new to our company 
The product class or type of product itself was totally new to our company 
The product "fit in" with a family of products we already had on the market 
NPD history of . 586054 13.27 In the 
last 3 years in this product market we have had 
kills and success Kills % (negative) 
F16 Success % 
Alertness to . 437518 7.40 Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an 
important consideration in this 
threat of market entry decision 
competitive Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an important consideration in this 
retaliation F7 market entry decision 
Expected retaliation 
Late market entry -. 410086 6.50 We entered the market somewhere between its maturity and decline 
F14 We entered the market in its late growth stage 
Overall . 326788 4.13 Our company's sales force &/or distribution resources & skills were more than 
project/company adequate for this project 
resource Our company's marketing research skills & people were more than adequate for this 
compatibility F3 project 
Our company's management skills were more than adequate for this project 
Our company's advertising & promotion resources & skills were more than adequate 
for this project 
Our company's production resources or skills were more than adequate for this 
project 
Our company's financial resources were more than adequate for this project 
Superior unique . 317466 3.90 Our product was clearly superior to competing products in terms of meeting 
product customer needs 
meeting needs in Compared to competitive products (or whatever the customer was using) our product 
large rapid offered a number of unique features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
growth market Potential customers had a great need for this class or type of product 
F6 Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her costs, when compared to what 
he/she was using 
Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do something that he/she could not 
do with what was available on the market - The dollar size of the market (either existing or potential market) for this product was 
large 
(Constant) 1.671875 
With R=. 56589, R2=. 32023, Adj. R2=. 29857, F=14.78065 at. 0000 with 8df and a 
standard error of 2.58869, the solution is inferior to NewProd generally". The 
Adjusted R2, the best estimate of the model's fit to new, similar populations, is lower 
than NewProd (Thesis=. 32023/Cooper=. 395 ). However, the solution's rigour is 
better with a lower standard error (Thesis=2.58869/Cooper-2.73), no outliers at 3 
standard deviations from the mean59 and a modest residual error (see Figure 4-6a)60. 
This lower error maybe the result of a correction of Cooper's measurement timing 
58 Cooper (1981) reports the following: R=. 648074, R2 
. 
420, Adj. R7-9.395, F =16.83 with Sdf and a standard error of 2.73. 59 outliers and residual error are not reported by cooper. 60 ibid. 
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error (Crawford 1979,1986; Cooper 1992) leading to improved 
dimensional construct 
validity. These measures suggest a relatively sound function given that, even when 
errors in the population are normal, errors in the sample residuals are only 
approximately normal (Norusis 1993). 
Figure 4-6a: Error of the regression at To 
Histogram: Normalcy of the residual error 
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The sample was split into two randomly ' generatedsplit-halves (n=130) with the 
model producing similar linear regression functions and validating statistics for each. 
Also, its outcome was compared to a discriminant analysis performed on the 
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categorical variable success/failure (S=1, F=O). This yielded a Wilks lambda statistic 
of . 745771, similar 
factor selection and similar factor order. These results indicate 
that the To model is reasonably robust. 
4.4.3 Dimensions of success at To 
The dimensions of success at To are similar, but more informationally apropos to an 
early initial screening decision, than either NewProd or Stanford. Five of the eight 
dimensions are new to NPD initial screen forecasting models. All dimensions except 
success, failure and kill history are based on early speculative perceptions. This gives 
the model a deterministic bias suggesting that what is past and certain is more 
powerful early on, than what is intended and only hopeful i. e. hindsight is 20: 20 but 
the good intentions are not. 
The To model yields the certain "product market history of failure" as the most 
important dimension preventing future success. With a coefficient of 1.11458, a 
negative factor loading at -. 87497 and an F value of 48.01, the dimension is new to 
NPD forecasting model construction and a very significant detractor. Its importance 
is consistent with Cooper and Calantone's (1979) conclusion that the same mistakes 
may be repeated over and over. With early information speculative at best, a cycle of 
failure colouring early NPD efforts makes sense. Past product market history is 
certain and is the experience (Abell and Hammond 1979; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 
1982; Boston Consulting Group 1972) benchmark from which all learning and 
strategic planning begins. 
"Strategic reaction capability", also new to NPD forecasting models, follows. This is 
logical also since learning from experience and planning a new way is critical to 
success. "New to the firm, didn't fit in" has been found significant before but only in 
ninth (Cooper 1979b) and fifth (Cooper 1981) position. Its greater importance here 
stresses that the negative ramifications of new customers, competitors and products 
must be considered and overcome by rapid learning in the time remaining before 
launch. Measurement timing error may be the cause of its lower position in NewProd 
and is treated in section 4.6. 
The, next three dimensions are new to NPD forecasting models. "Product market 
history of kills and success" compliments failure history and supports the importance 
of the experience effect (Abell and Hammond 1979; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; 
Boston Consulting Group 1972) to success. The dimension indicates that early on, 
one's next success is related to past success and inversely proportional to past kills. 
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"Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation" is new and not the same negative 
dimension found by others. It contradicts Cooper (1979,1984a) and Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt's (1987b) findings that marketplace variables and competitiveness 
dimensions are not related to success. Rather, in agreement with Song and Parry 
(1994), early success is very much related to perceived magnitude and speed of 
retaliation. And "late market entry", the last new dimension at To, warns that 
being 
too late hinders success. 
The last two factors in the To model, "overall project/company resource 
compatibility" and "superior unique product" are among the most often reported 
dimension of success (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). They have been found 
second and first most important by Cooper (1981), fourth and third by Zirger and 
Maidique (1990) and second and fourth by Cooper and de Brentani (1984). This 
work's comparatively low ranking for both at the To stage suggests possible 
measurement timing error in seminal work. 
Table 4-6c compares order results to both Cooper models (1979b, 1981), Zirger and 
Maidique's discriminant analysis model (1990) and Cooper and de Brentani's linear 
regression model (1984). The shaded areas match similar dimensional findings. 
4.4.4 Linear Regression model construction findings at T1 
Table 4-6b demonstrates a 10 factor model more valid than NewProd. R improves to 
. 68961 versus 
NewProd's . 648074, R' to . 47556 versus . 420, Adj. R' to . 45450 versus 
. 395, F to 22.57937 at . 
0000 versus 16.83 and standard error to 2.28289 versus 2.73. 
Again, split-half analysis and discriminant analysis produced very similar results. 
Table 4-6b: Linear regression at T, - the stochastic model. 
R=. 68961, R -. 47556, Adj. R2=. 45450, F =22.57937 at. 
0000 with 10df Standard error = 2.28289 accuracy = 83.84615% 
Key factors or Reg. Coef F Variables loading on factor 
dimensions value 
actor name) 
Strategic 1.096848 59.78 Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the Final Product 
reaction Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the Nature of the Project 
capability F2 Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with difficulties inherent in this market 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of Barriers to 
Entry 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficienciestproblems in the area of 
Newness/Innovation 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of Resource 
Requirements 
We spent a long time on the market research for this product 
NPD history 1.050744 54.86 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had 
of failure F15 ` Failure % (negative) 
The product which entered the market was significantly different than that approved at 
the initial screen 
Superior . 800692 31.87 Our product was clearly superior to competing products in terms of meeting customer 
product in -. __,.. needs large rapid Compared to competitive products (or whatever the customer was using) our product 
growth market offered a number of unique features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
F3 Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do something that he/she could not do 
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with what was available on the market 
Our product was of higher quality - however quality is defined in this market - than 
competing products 
Potential customers had a great need for this class or type of product 
Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her costs, when compared to what 
he/she was using 
The market for this product was growing very quickly 
The dollar size of the market (either existing or potential market) for this product was 
large 
New to the -. 717605 25.59 We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of customer need or use 
before 
firm. didn't fit The competitors we face in the market were totally new to our company 
in F5 The product class or type of product itself was totally new to our company 
The potential customers for this product were totally new to our company 
The product "fit in" with a family of products we already had on the market 
Relative high -. 557748 15.46 Our product was priced considerably higher than competing products 
price of 
product F18 
NPD history -. 542047 14.60 In the last 3 years in this product market we have had 
of kills and Kills % 
success F14 Success % 
Marketing & . 399238 7.92 Our company's sales 
force &/or distribution resources & skills were more than adequate 
management for this project 
resource Our company's advertising & promotion resources & skills were more than adequate for 
compatibility this project 
(synergy) F7 Our company's marketing research skills & people were more than adequate for this 
project 
Our company's management skills were more than adequate for this project 
Alertness to . 372806 6.91 Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an 
important consideration in this market 
threat of entry decision 
competitive Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an important consideration in this 
retaliation F8 market entry decision 
Expected retaliation 
Technological . 302579 4.55 Our company's R&D skills & people were more than adequate for this project 
resource Our company's engineering skills & people were more than adequate for this project 
compatibility Our company's production resources or skills were more than adequate for this project 
(synergy) F4 The technical aspects - exactly how the technical problems will be solved - were very 
clear 
Our company's financial resources were more than adequate for this project 
The product specifications - exactly what the product will be - were very clear 
1°` in new, . 292228 4.24 We were the first to market this product 
highly New-to-the-world (a true innovation in the product marketplace listed above) 
innovative Our product was highly innovative - totally new to the market 
market F6 We were not first to market this product; we followed close behind however (negative 
loading) 
(Constant) 1.671875 
The Adjusted R2 of . 45450 versus NewProd's . 42 implies better extrapolative ability 
to similar populations. The function's rigour is better than either NewProd or the To 
model with even smaller standard error (Thesis at To = 2.58869, Thesis at T1= 
2.28289, Cooper = 2.73); one outlier at 3 standard deviations from the mean and a 
narrowing of the residual error (see Figure 4-6b)61. Logically, the residual error being 
largest in the middle indicates that marginal success/failure was most difficult to 
predict. This much improved solution may be confirming a coalescence of perceived 
process and environmental states of nature, along with less measurement timing error 
than found in longer retrospectives (Crawford 1979,1986; Cooper 1992). 
4.4.5 Dimensions of success' at T1 
The model describes well, the evolved success environment at one year post launch. 
In general, dimension F values are higher than both NewProd and the To model. This 
61 illustrated by an improvement in residual error normalcy La the gap between the normal line and the actual standardised residual narrows between To and T1 at both the middle and the extremes of the dependent variable. 
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Figure 46b: Frmr of the regision at Tl 
Histogram: normalcy of the residual 
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may be the result of reduced measurement timing error permitting description of 
dimensions more appropriate at the one year post launch point than traditional 5 year 
retrospectives. "Product market history of failure" declines to second position at T1, 
with "strategic reaction capability" rising to first place. Both F values rise, not 
surprisingly, as information becomes more certain over time. "Superior product in 
large rapid growth market" leaps from last place at To to third place here. Its F value 
improves by a factor of 8. This, in combination with the increasing importance of 
delivering technical detail to early benefit protocol (see factor construction at both To 
and T) validates the importance of launching a superior product. The impact of the 
dimension's new combination of market growth and size constructs suggests that 
these issues are unclear at To. This suggests over attention by NewProd vis-ä-vis the 
dimension's true importance at the initial screen. 
"New to the firm" declines to fourth position compared to fifth position in NewProd, 
as the "newness" at To is tempered by learning. "Relative high price of product", in 
fifth position, is a new factor at Tl and consistent with its sixth place position in the 
original NewProd (1979b). However, its lack of significance at To questions its value 
at the initial screen in Cooper's discriminant analysis. Product market "history of 
kills and success" declines to sixth position in sympathy with failure history. This 
confirms its diminishing deterministic effect over time. Clearly, "what you do" 
becomes more important than "what you've done". In seventh position, "Marketing 
and management resource compatibility" splits from the "overall project/company 
resource compatibility" dimension of To. The appearance of "Technological resource 
compatibility", absent at To, confirms the dimension's split and indicates that close 
team communication, so important at To, becomes less important post launch. Again, 
temporal validity of established models comes into question. 
Finally, "alertness to threat of competitive retaliation" and "1" in new, highly 
innovative market" complete the model. "Alertness" falls in importance, reasonably, 
as more "intelligence information" is gathered from the "battle". And "1s` in new 
highly innovative market", new to initial screening forecasting models, becomes 
declarative vis-a-vis required level of innovativeness. 
r+ 
: "iý .. 
Importantly, it is obvious that the Tl model is much closer-in construction to the 
NewProd and Stanford models. This is probably the result of internal construct 
validity problems in their models, cause by measurement timing error and survivor 
bias. These are discussed in section 4.6.4.4. 
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4.4.6 Factor/Model difference 
Factor differences easiest to identify are those significant in one model and not in the 
other. The only absolute example of this is "relative high price of product", found 
only in the Tl model. However, some dimensions change from immature at To to 
"mature" at T,. For example "late market entry" warns of failure at To but "1" in new, 
highly innovative market" declares innovativeness requirements for success at T1. 
This is consistent with Nijssen, Arbouw and Commandeur (1995) that introduction of 
a late new product can have a negative effect and that timely introduction of a 
product, under specific conditions, is important. This evolution of character, 
however, has never been established empirically in an NPD forecasting context. 
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Table 4-6c: Comparison of Thesis v screening forecasting literature Black cells -news 
Another example of dimension evolution involves the general "overall synergy" 
factor at To maturing into two functionally distinct factors, "marketing and 
management synergy " and "technological synergy" at T,. New to the field, this 
could be extremely consequential. It suggests conditions and limitations are 
appropriate to communication and information exchange between departments 
(Calantone, Di Benedetto and Haggblom 1995; Hise, O'. Neal, Parasuraman and 
McNeal 1990; Moenart, Souder, De Meyer and Deschoolmeester 1994; Rochford and 
Rudelius 1992; Souder 1988; Souder and Chakrabarti 1978,1980). 
The simple comparisons above are quite clear. However, the determination of 
statistical differences between "common" factors appearing to measure the same 
dimension is methodologically complicated. For example, factors significant in both 
the To and Tl models include "history of failure", "strategic reaction capability", 
"history of kills and success", "alertness to threat of competitive retaliation" and 
"superior product". Aside from noting variable loading and order differences, 
aggregate paired-samples t-tests whilst useful, are impossible due to normalisation. 
However, when sorted by success/failure, factors do exhibit variance. 
The use of a paired-samples t-test in Table 4-7 illustrates common factor distribution 
mean differences as they evolve from To to T1. It indicates that for successes, "history 
of failure", "new to the firm", "history of kills and successes" and "competitive 
alertness" decline in importance absolutely (but not statistically) over time. This 
argues for acceptance of the null form. Conversely, strategy62 and superior product 
increase at statistically significant levels over time. This indicates "common" factors 
can be significantly different over time, argues for acceptance of H, c and supports the 
importance of the rise of these factors by model over time. 
Table 4-7 also indicates that for failed cases, "history of failure", "new to the firm" 
and "competitive alertness" rise absolutely over time as "history of kills and 
successes" rises significantly. Kill magnitudinal difference in the opposite direction 
from successes, is illustrative63. Moving in the opposite direction also, the positive 
advantages of "strategy" and "superior product" to success cases are lost to failures at 
statistically significant levels. Again, this evidence supports the argument for 
"common" factor difference, advocates acceptance of Hlc and supports temporal 
dimension conclusions. 
62 u p=, 08. 
63 the dimension at Tf has a negative regression coefficient. The kill variable has a positive loading factor of. 92170. Because successes have a 
smaller, negative loading factor of -. 78354, when multiplied by the negative regression coefficient, the success effect is positive and the kill effect is 
negative. Therefore, an increase the factors magnitude over time produces a negative effect overall. 
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Table 4-7: "Common" factor distribution means by success/failure. 
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. 2099 . 1738 -. 0361 . 405 -. 5689 -. 4719 . 
0979 . 189 
Strategy . 1073 . 1918 %0845 . 082 -2913 -5207 . 2294 . 
012 
New -. 1123 -. 1312 . 0189 . 563 . 3048 . 3560 -. 0512 . 235 
History - 
Kip/Succ 
. 1069 -. 1022 -. 2071 . 150 -. 2901 . 2720 . 5622 . 016 7T7.7.7 
Alertness . 0954 . 0605 . 0349 . 434 - -. 2588 -. 1641 -. 0947 . 168 
Superior 
Product 
. 0560 . 1914 . 1354 . 018 . 1520 -. 5196 -. 3676 . 008 
Differences in the model factors are confirmed again by observing dimension order 
and significance ratios. The two largest differences in regression coefficients and F 
values are "strategy" and "superior product" (see Table 4-8, bold italics). The leap in 
coefficient and F ratio for "superior product in large growing market" suggests the 
factor is considerably more valid and important at T1. Again, this intimates 
measurement timing error in NewProd. 
Though appearing to measure the same dimension, these changes in common factor 
relative standing and validity indicate the T, model is different in construction from 
the To model and much improved over time. This supports acceptance of Hlc. 
Table 4.8: Aggregate difference in coefficient order and significance- 
Factors.. TO Reg. Coef TO F value Tj Reg. Coef Tj F value Ratio Fl to FO Ratio Tj 
Coe, to 
TO .,. NPD history of failure 1.114580 48.01 1.050744 54.86 1.142679 0.942726 
Strategic reaction capability . 700422 18.96 1.096848 59.78 3.152954 1.565982, 
New to the firm, didn't fit in -. 644947 16.08 .. 717605 25.59 1.591418 1.112657 
NPD history of kills and . 586054 13.27 -. 542047 14.60 1.100226 0.92491,1, 
success 
Alertness to threat of . 437518 7.40 . 372806 6.91 0.933784 0.852093 
competitive retaliation 
Superior or unique product . 317466 3.90 , 800692 31.87 &171795 Z522135 
meeting needs in large rapid 
growth nwket 
4.4.7 Other differences 
Mahalanobis' distance measures how much a case's value on the independent 
variables differs from the average of all cases. With an average saved variable 
Mahalanobis distribution of 7.9692 at To and 9.9615 at T1, the t-value of -6.76 at 
. 0000 suggests that a significant difference does exists in the independent variable 
distributions underlying each model. Similar significance is attributed to leverage 
values (Mahalanobis' distance divided by n=1; Norusis 1993). This also confirms 
acceptance of Hla. 
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Finally, residual variation in a regression model expresses the portion of the total 
variability in the dependent variable that cannot be attributed to, or explained by, the 
regression. Having a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, they cannot be tested 
for difference in the aggregate, but they can be tested when sorted by success/failure. 
Table 4-9: Model residuals by success/failure 
Residual 
Success means Failure means 
TO TI Difference Sig. TO . -, Tl = Difference Sig. 
1.1320 . 8633 . 
2687 001 -3.0726 -2.3433 -. 7293 . 000 
Table 4-9 demonstrates the Tl model as more impressive than the To model. More 
variation is explained (less residual error) by the Tl function in both success and 
failure cases. Opposite NewProd (Cooper 1981), the model is more rigorous when 
predicting successes than failures at either To or T1. These also support acceptance of 
Hlc. 
4.4.8 Conclusion 
The functions at To and at T1, whilst not completely unique, are dissimilar. The 
striking difference in model validating statistics suggests the Tl model is more 
rigorous. Increases in coefficient F value, reduction in model error and higher R, R2 
and Adjusted R2 statistics support this difference. It is superior in all aspects to the To 
model and improves upon the NewProd linear regression. As compared to To, the Tl 
model reveals more significant factors (10 versus 8) which are also more valid overall 
(rising F values), unique to the time period ("high price; 18` in" versus "late entry") 
and more mature ("overall project compatibility" splitting into 
"marketing/management synergy" and "technological synergy"). Distribution 
differences exist in "common factors" also. 
The To dimensions reflect an early deterministic bias based on the certainty of history 
and the static "a priori" characteristic of early information. The T, dimensions exhibit 
more stochastic characteristics based on posterior probabilities and revised conditions 
as information becomes known over time. The Tl function emphasises aconditional, 
stochastic "what if" character, rather than the To function's determinism. Whilst more 
complex, it is a more valid predictor of the future if the'dimension constructs are 
achieved at Tl. Based on conditional probabilities, its dimensional priorities evolve 
from what was known certainly at To (the influence of history in first and fourth 
position) to what must be achieved vis-ä-vis strategy and superior product at T1. This 
seems, in large part, to be a conditional process of learning and implementing the past 
history lessons. ',. -'` 
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These intuitive, observable and empirical differences argue for the acceptance of H, c 
and the rejection of the null form. Many dimensions of success, as perceived by 
managers, are demonstrated to evolve. Over time, the functions become more 
adequate, certain and disturbingly, more like NewProd. Over time, more variation is 
explained as less residual error is produced by both success and failure case 
distributions. Therefore, this research accepts the alternate form of the hypothesis and 
rejects the null form that the models are equal. Factors important to a product's 
successful introduction do change over time. 
4.5 Hypothesis Hid 
As the factors contributing to a new product's success evolve, the resulting new 
product screening model's predictive proficiency evolves also. 
4.5.1 Introduction 
This hypothesis follows logically from H, c and suggests that as the To model evolves 
in form to T1, its predictive accuracy rises. As demonstrated above, the To model is 
observably different and inferior to the Tl model. Using each function to predict 
success/failure for 260 cases, the To model is 81.15384% accurate compared to the 
83.84615% accuracy at T,. This observation alone argues for acceptance of the 
alternate hypothesis that their accuracy rates do differ. However, the difference in 
absolute value of the increase is small. This begs the use of a paired-samples t-test to 
measure the statistical significance of the difference. 
4.5.2 Paired-samples t-test findings 
Table 4-10 illustrates a paired-samples t-test of the prediction and model residual 
saved as SPSS variables at each time period. The statistically significant difference in 
both prediction and residual by success/failure argues for rejection of the null form 
that the predictions are equal over time. 
Table 4-11 illustrates accuracy outcome by type of model outcome. All possibilities 
include: 
1. actual success predicted success =a model success 
2. actual failure predicted failure =a model success 
3. actual success predicted failure =a model failure (and) 
4. actual failure predicted success =a model failure. 
The results demonstrate a statistically different prediction mean distribution in 
category 1,2 and 4. For example, in category #1, ' (cases where success was predicted 
and there was an actual success at both To and T), the 69.6% rate at To was 
statistically different from the 68.5% rate at T1. The poor result in category #3 is 
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probably due to a comparison of only 4 cases fitting this profile. This clear statistical 
differences in prediction by category argues further for acceptance of Hld and 
rejection of the null form that the predictions by each model are equal. 
Table 4-10: Model prediction rate and residual means by success/failure 
Prediction 2.2190 2.4877 -. 2687 . 001 k . 1869 -. 5424 . 
7293 
Residual 1.1320 . 8633 . 2687 . 
001 -3.0726 -2.3433 -. 7293 
Table 4-11: Model prediction mean comparison by category. 
Roftor rondo/ by lime nerind is shaded 
Significant 












To mean = 24381 mean = -1.6200 mean = -1.3770 mean =1.5734 
, 69.6%n=1811,1,11, 11.5%n=30 t ` ' 
15.4%n=40 
t=-4.57 at. 000 with 172, at . 885 
with 3. t=- . 16 
df df 
T, mean 2.7811 mean= -2.3266 mean = -1.4469 mean =1.1669 
68.5%n=178 - 15.4%n=40 ;,, 
`, :. 4.6%n=12 11.5%n=30, e ,"; a 
t=- 2.85 at. 009 with 24', ' t='3.10 at. 005 with 24, 
df df, 
Success means -a. i°'== "' 
Failure means, 
TO Ti Difference Sig., qp Tl - Difference Sig. ` 
2.2190 2.4877 -. 2687 001 . 1869 -. 5424 . 7293 . 
000 '1'ý 
1.1320 . 8633 . 2687 
001 -3.0726 -2.3433 -. 7293 . 000 
8 



















T(0) equation: y=0.0222x - 1.2249 T(1) equation: y-0.0274x - 1.8995 
R3-0.9108 R: -0.9322 
------------------------------------------------- 
Tt factor+are biased towards viewing a T, success prediction using T, factors 
great success more successfully. 
7.0Jactors are biased towards viewing 
a1T, 
success prediction using To factors 







prediction using To factors Te 
srefiorsare 
biased towards vlieewwtaefa ng 
a 
Rare m ore successfully. 
T, failure prediction using Tt factors Tt factors are biased towards viewing a 
79- ---------- -------------- `reatfallare even 















Prediction time 0 Prediction time I 
ý- -Linear (Prediction time 0) --- Linear (Prediction time 1) 
113 
Two simple bivariate regression equations of the aggregate predictions were plotted 
(see Figure 4-7) and strengthen these arguments graphically. These functions indicate 
that at To, the equation for the bivariate regression forming the line (y = 0.0222x - 
1.2249) has a lesser slope than the equivalent equation at T, (y = 0.0274x - 1.8995). 
They intersect at approximately case 130, the mean of the common dependent 
variable (1.67). These lines have different and improving RZ values (. 9108 v . 9322 
respectively), an indication of improved prediction variation explanation over time. 
Also, the lines yield different prediction biases depending on which set of factors is 
used. The To prediction underestimates the potential gravity of great losses and 
underestimates the potential for great success. This is logical and supports the 
difficulty of using early, speculative data (Albala 1975; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1987b, 1990; Souder 1978). The Tl function, because of clearer data, fits the 
extremes better (see Figure 4-6a versus 4-6b) and predicts great successes and great 
failure more accurately. This visual gap argues for the acceptance of Hd. 
4.5.3 Conclusion 
Absolute accuracy improvement demonstrated in the T0= TI functional evolution 
argues for the acceptance of Hld. Also, statistically significant differences in mean 
predictions and residuals and mean predictions by model category of success supports 
this argument. Further, the different and improving simple regression lines resulting 
in an expected cost of error bias gap supports acceptance of the alternate hypothesis. 
Therefore, this research accepts the alternative form of hypothesis H1d. As the factors 
contributing to a new product's success evolve, model predictive accuracy evolves 
also. The null form maintaining that the models are equally accurate is thus rejected. 
4.6 Discussion of Hla through Hld 
4.6.1 General implications 
Accepting three of four hypotheses has important ramifications on the existing body 
of work, as well as the future of screening research activity. Observing that 26 
variables are significant to success at both To and Tl validates Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt's hypothesised finding (H) that new product success is positively 
related to the proficiency of the up-front orpre-development activities of the new F 
product process'(Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b). However, changes demonstrated 
beyond the initial screen agree with (Albala 1975) and suggest that process activities 
should be based ultimately, on the significance of information, difficulty of 
attainment and its relative value over time. Changes agree also with those suggesting 
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that, whilst the greatest difference between successful and unsuccessful projects may 
be up-front, these do not guarantee success (Cooper 1988) but only help to avoid 
pitfalls (Cooper 1980b, 1990; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994). Some of these pitfalls 
and proactive activities are temporal and shown here to come later, not sooner. 
Further, some characteristics of successful entry are uncovered only in their 
relationship to strategy. Innovation and barriers to entry are examples. 
Virtually all variables constructing factors significant in the NewProd linear 
regression model (1981) were validated as important here (see Table 4-12a). This 
resulted in synthesis of knowledge requested (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Also, many new variables (see Table 4-2 in bold italics) and factors (see Table 4-12b) 
were found important at To and/or T1, thus validating calls for multi-disciplinary 
integration (Wind and Mahajan 1988) and temporal justification (Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994). These discoveries strengthen requests for more dynamic models 
(Wind and Mahajan 1988) and support the drive towards third generation conditional 
processes (Cooper 1994b). 
Table 4.12a: Synthesis of this work versus NewProd. (A 4 means Thesis results confirmed 
Cooper's (1981) linear regression construct findings"') 
Cooper, Robert G. An empirically derived new product project selection model. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 
EM-28: 54-61 (1981) 
SP found in Thesis as "Superior Product dimension" Found significant in Thesis at: 
TR=found in Thesis as 'Technological Resource dimension' 
Ist =found in Thesis as 'iSl in new, highly innovative market dimension 
HP= found in Thesis as 'Relative high price dimension 
Keyfactors or Variables loading on factor TO Ti 
dimensions 
Product superiority, highly innovative, new to mkt 1' 
quality and product has unique features for user 
uniqueness product is superior to competing products J .f 
product reduces customers' costs 
product does unique task for user 
product is higher quality than competitors 
Overall project/co adequate financial resources TR 
resource compatible R&D resources '1 R 
compatibility compatible engineering skills JTR 
necessary marketing research skills .4 .J 
needed managerial skills q J 
compatible production resources 4 
compatible sales force/distribution resources 4 ý 
adequate advertising/promo skills 4 ,f 
Market need, growth high need level by customers for product type. SP SP 
and size large market ($ volume) '1 SP 4 SP 
high growth market 4 SP 
Economic advantage product reduces customers' costs SP SP 
of product to end user product is priced lower than competing products 'IHP 
Newness to the firm new customers to firm 
new product class to firm J 
new customer need to firm .J .1 
new production process to firm not tested not 
new product technology to firm tested 
new sales force/distribution to firm not tested 
new advertising/promotion to firm not tested 
64 not tested" indicates that they were eliminated by Cooper as he reduced the data set from 77 variables over time to the *Cooper 30'. 
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new competition to firm 
Technological compatible R&D resources & skills for project TR 
resource compatible engineering skills & resources \'fR 
compatibility 
Market highly competitive market not tested 
competitiveness intense price competition in market 
many competitors J 
many new product introduced into market 
changing user needs 
Product a market-derived new product idea not tested 
customness/specialisa a custom product not tested 
tion a mass market for product not tested 
Table 4-12b: 'Found significant in Thesis but not in Cooper, 1981 Lc. new variables 
'1h11 7", lfi'n"' 
NPD history of In the last 3 years in this product market we have had "el failureý, ýAp'': Failure %ý lh!. 







of the Project'{ :l i 
, Our firn developed clear strategies to deal with difficulties inherent in this ý"1, ' 
- d- -. 1'kß i : s,, n, 
V'ý e. i. ý' li. l.. ..: 
' 
.. market tN 
4! t. ýar'i'ýi, 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of 
Resource Requirements 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies in the area of ýý. ''t' s'_" j`e'ý, Barriers to Entry Iý: (: . 
We spent a long time on the market research for this product 
Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies/problems in 4 
the area of Newness/Innovation 
NPD history of kills In the last 3 years in this product market we have had I 
sss'_ and Kills% ý 
ý 
Success%, ', 
New to the firm, 
' 
The product "fit in" with a family of products we already had on the 
didn't fit in market 
Alertness to threat of 4 Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was animportant 
competitive consideration in this market entry decision', ' 
retaliation'' Expected speed of competitive retaliation was ßän important consideration 
in this market entry decision',,, 
Expected retaliation --"ý -1 ,.. ý, ,J 
Late market entry' We entered the market somewhere between its maturity and decline 
We entered the market in its late growth stage 
Technological, 
I 
The technical aspects - exactly how the technical problems will be solved - 
resource . were very clear , '6 . 
J, ý'; 
,' , r;, 




compatibility The roduct specifications - exactly what the product product will be - weere very , clear ý, n^, ýP'ý:: ýr ., '"I"iR, . 
1 in new highly New-to-the-world (a true innovation in the product marketplace listed 
innovative mkt.:, ' 
'above) ; #;!; ýý^ aIF ;ý "'t ''' ý.: 
°.. 
" -;;, 
We were not first to market this produc ; we followed close behind 
however (negative loading) 
The unfolding conditional nature of the NPD process, demonstrated in the acceptance 
of these hypotheses, suggests monomorphic deterministic models do lead to temporal 
contradictions (Albala 1975; Grossman and Gupta 1974; Ronkainen 1985) when 
applied to stochastic processes. As such, these models may be inadequate to 
practitioner needs. Whilst they are useful for bringing together eclectic groups in an 
evaluation session (Cooper 1992), practitioner under-utilisation in stochastic 
forecasting situations is understandable. Acceptance of Hla, Hlc and Hld stands as 
one empirical footing in the foundation necessary to build more relative, dynamic 
models, needed to justify recommended conditional third generation processes 
(Cooper 1994b). 
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4.6.2 Specific variable implications 
The acceptance of Hla, Hlc and H, d implies some alteration of understanding 
is 
needed. This is true concerning the role of product/project, marketplace, strategic 
reaction, newness/innovation, barriers to entry and resource variables. ' 
4.6.2.1 Productlproject variables 
The change demonstrated in significance and magnitude of product/project variables 
suggests re-examination is in order. 
I. Regularly cited as the most important factor of success, "superior product's" 
construct evolution is instructive. The To factor focusing on meeting customer 
needs better than competition (see Table 4-3) is supplemented at Tl by statements 
measuring customer defined quality in a fast growing market. Only by time Tl is 
customer feedback accounted for. The possibility that customers are unable to 
define quality at the initial screen is supported by the "market research" variable 
being significant only at Tl and its significant increase over time for success 
cases. Its upward evolution suggests that "market research" must continue 
through one year post launch. Its lack of significance at the initial screen, whilst 
unclear, suggests temporal limitations on research spending may be appropriate. 
Supporting this, "product specifications were very clear" is significant at Tl only. 
This is consistent with Crawford's (1984) idea of screening stage protocol being 
loosely defined in terms of benefits, not technical specifications, to be produced. 
II. Failed cases deteriorated in "our product was clearly superior to competing 
products in terms of meeting customer needs". This validates the emphases 
placed on these attributes by NewProd. And it warns that intra-process and post 
launch monitoring is necessary. Allowing relative superiority to decline during 
the process or after commercialisation is a straight path to entry failure. Due to 
competitive constructs in the Tl dimension, the importance of monitoring 
competitive activity is validated as important again. 
III. No success case product quality measurement increased significantly over time. 
"Strategy vis-ä-vis the final product" was the only related variable to increase. 
This hints at the importance of a dynamic strategy in dealing with an evolving 
superior product whose requisite ultimate quality is unknown at the initial screen. 
More critical than simply producing one's initial screening image of a "superior 
product" (Cooper and Kleinschmidt's 1990); this "later rather then sooner" bias 
awaiting strategic feedback may be a clue to practitioner lack of up-front activity. 
4.6.2.2 Marketplace variables 
Significant evolution in marketplace variables suggests they are more important than 
Cooper has indicated. 
1. Dynamic markets can'actually facilitate success. They shouldn't be avoided by 
those prepared. ' Contradicting Cooper (1979b. 7 1980b); success cases experienced 
statistically significant increases in "amount of change", "fast production method 
changes", "rapid R&D advancements", "fast competitive introductions", "fast rate 
of technological change" and "dynamic market situations" (see Figure 4-3). In 
the aggregate, "number of competitors" was significant at To but not T1, as success 
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cases saw a significant increase from To to Tl but failure cases didn't. This 
suggests that today successful firms move to attractive, dynamic markets and 
thereafter, thrive on the competition. Avoidance recommended by Cooper and 
Stanford is conditionally misguided. 
II. "High need level by customers for the product in a large market ($ volume)" is 
common to success cases over time (see table 4-3). This validates both NewProd 
and Stanford's conclusions. However, "growth potential" is significant only at T1. 
This implies forecasts at the initial screen may be premature, inaccurate or both. 
Contrarily, failed cases display statistically significant declines in "customer 
need", "size of market", "growth", "order of entry", "length of PLC" and "market 
strategic alternatives" (see Figure 4-4). 
III. Clearly, product market characteristics such as order of entry, PLC and 
contribution margin are more important than thought previously. 
o "Late to enter" is significant at both To and T1. This supports 
its 
importance to both managers (Maidique and Zirger 1984) and scholars 
(Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Hopkins and 
Bailey 1971; Lambkin 1988; Lilien and Yoon 1990; Robinson and Fornell 
1985; Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan 1992; Urban, Carter, Gaskin and 
Mucha 1986). The appearance of 1" to market at Tl casts additional 
suspicion on luke warm statements concerning order's influence in the 
NPD process (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993). 
Length of PLC, significant at T1, supports Cooper and de Brentani's 
(1984) finding of PLC length as an important initial screening dimension. 
Whilst thought important generally (Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Buzzell 
1966; Catry and Chevalier 1974; Day 1981; Dodge and Rink 1978; Doyle 
1976; Gordon, Calantone and di Benedetto 1991; Kotler 1994; Luck 1972; 
Levitt 1965,1966; Michael 1977; Rink and Swan 1979; Tellis and 
Crawford 1981; Thorelli and Burnett 1981; Utterback and Abernathy 
1975; and Wasson 1978), this is the first validation of the variable's 
importance in NPD success/failure modelling. Its appearance at Tl only 
may suggest that this is another characteristic of success which cannot be 
measured precisely at the initial screen. Finally, in harmony with entry 
order and PLC and supporting Maidique and Zirger (1984) and others 
(Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Cooper 1975; Hopkins 1980)65, financial 
contribution margin is an important consideration in new product 
development. Financial risk assessment as part of a new product project 
evaluation has been confirmed as important by practitioners (Calantone, 
Di Benedetto and Haggblom 1995; Cardozo and Smith 1983; Page 1993). 
It should be integrated into process model construction. 
It is quite apparent that temporal constraints placed on marketplace variables remove 
the averaging effects of aggregate analyses. '- Removing the handicaps of measurement 
timing error and survivor bias helps clarify their relationship to entry success. The 
exogenous variable "time" must be viewed as a process catalyst/moderator. 
65 professor lohn qw at the Engineering School of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA has found contribution margin one of many 
important improvements to the NevProd model. 
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4.6.2.3 Strategic reaction variables 
Demonstrating the ability to react to external and internal developments significant to 
success in an NPD context is quite significant. 
I. Five of the six strategy constructs were important at both To and T1. This 
indicates that planning and strategic reactive ability is critical initially and remains 
so through one year post launch. Statistically significant increases are seen in 
aggregate case project strategy (see Figure 4-2) and successful case product, 
project, barrier and newness strategies (see Figure 4-3). This supports those 
arguing the importance of overcoming unexpected problems, leveraging 
opportunities and maintaining a successful equilibrium (Abell and Hammond 
1979; Kotler 1994; Porter 1991). Further, it confirms success to be a result of 
initial strategy, strategic market interaction (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b; 
Crawford 1986) and the compounding of external and internal variable groups 
(Calantone and Di Benedetto 1990) over time. However, "holding enough 
resources back to react strategically" may help explain why only 7.1% of NPD 
process expenditures are spent on up front activities (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1988). 
II. The isolated significance of "clear strategies to deal with newness/innovation" at 
Tl (see Table 4-3) suggests that developing strategies to deal with newness is 
difficult and possibly premature, at the initial screen. The diminution of carte 
blanche support for omni-present strategic activity may smack of heresy. 
However, practitioners may understand that developing a useful and effective 
innovation strategy requires market feedback on one's innovativeness versus the 
competition. This may be unavailable until closer to launch. 
4.6.2.4 Innovation 
Innovativeness is another characteristic which seems more important to NPD success 
than forecasting model developers have indicated. Static methods may hide a richer 
understanding of the phenomena which surfaces when variables are not painted 
broadly over long periods of time. 
I. Finding new-to-the-world levels of innovativeness significant to success supports 
Cooper's belief that innovativeness is a moderating variable (Cooper 1979a, 
1979b, 1980a, 1980b; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993). It is also consistent with 
innovätiveness as an important characteristic describing success/failure scenario 
(Calantone and Cooper's 1981) such as "innovative mousetrap, not better" and 
"innovative high-tech". Though only one newness variable, "a repositioning", 
was significant at both time periods, two were significant at Tl only ("new-to-the- 
world" and "addition to an existing product line")... This temporal high end bias 
suggests that to be successful, higher order innovative projects must be positioned 
in light of more certain, market feedback closer to launch. This finding supports 
calls for reassessment of innovativeness, (Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991) as an 
ingredient of success and validates requests for examination of antecedent 
temporal stability (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). Clearly, what is 
"innovative" is a function of customer perception rather than what management 
thinks at the initial screen (Cooper and Kleinschmidt's 1990). 
., 
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II. Absolutely higher To innovativeness levels for success cases suggests innovators 
may be generally more successful. Logically, the characteristic decreases over 
time (see Figure 4-2,4-3 and 4-4) for both successes and failures. With negative 
decreases more severe for failure cases, its importance as a descriptor of 
successful projects (Davidson 1976; Marquis 1969; Rothwell 1976) 
is validated. 
Successful teams seem to introduce more innovative products and/or position 
their entries to "stay newer longer". 
The ability to develop innovative strategies to manage an evolving superior product is 
characteristic of successes only. This work confirms more recent suggestions 
(Cooper 1994b; Cooper and de Brentani 1991) that innovative products, in spite of 
their perceived risks and pitfalls, should be pursued. 
4.6.2.5 Barriers to entry 
Barriers to entry have never been tested in a NPD success/failure context. Results 
suggest their significance in new product development is important early and remains 
so over time. 
I. Implicit in the concept of barriers to entry is that they are barriers before entry. 
However, because success cases increased significantly in their ability to deal 
with barriers strategically over time, entry barriers deserve continued 
consideration at least through the Tl period. 
II. As T, approached, success cases (see Figure 4-3) had clear and significant 
increases in appreciation for competitive retaliatory efforts, importance of 
government policy, improved access to distribution channels and customer 
switching costs. This supports their importance as suggested by Bain (1956), 
Karakaya and Stahl (1989) and Porter (1980,1985). Contrarily, failed cases 
showed neither an increase nor a decrease in any barrier to entry. 
These external considerations, despite their under-representation in the NewProd and 
Stanford models, advise vigilance in monitoring and reacting to barriers through the 
post launch period. Rather than disagreeing with NewProd's emphases on 
controllable over uncontrollable variables, the importance of barriers shown here 
suggests that attention to their magnitude over time allows some strategic control over 
their impact. 
4.6.2.6 Resource variables 
Resource variables are validated here as very important to a favourable outcome. 
1. Adequate resource levels are confirmed as necessary to success (Abell and 
Hammond 1979; Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; 
Calantone and Cooper 1979; Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988,1990,1993; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a, 1987b, 1988,1993; Cooper 1975,1976,1979a, 
1980b, 1983,1994b; Lambkin 1988; Lambkin and Day 1989; Maidique and 
Zirger 1984; Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan 1992; Rothwell 1972; Rubenstein, 
Chakrabarti, O'Keefe, Soulder and Young 1976; Utterback, Allen, Hollomon and 
Sirbu 1976; Wensley 1982) with most remaining significant over time. 
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II. The temporal nature of resource allocation is new to the field and instructive. For 
failed cases R&D, engineering, marketing research, management, 
sales/distribution, advertising, production and financial resources decline 
significantly over time. This diminution supports those suggesting one must 
monitor environments (Abell and Hammond 1979; Kotler 1994; Porter 1991) and 
match them with resources accordingly. Interestingly, whilst success case 
resource levels declined over time (see Figure 4-3), this decrease was far less than 
for failed cases. Also, "advertising and promotion resources and skills" becomes 
significant at Tl only. This difference is important to prioritisation issues (Cooper 
1994b). Delaying advertising expenditure is consistent with Calantone, Di 
Benedetto and Haggblom's (1995) finding that 67.2% of managers believed 
advertising to be most beneficial at the early stages of introduction (Horsky and 
Simon 1983). 
These findings validate the importance of resources to success. But they also indicate 
that temporal resource management needs greater scholarly attention. 
4.6.3 Specific dimensional implications 
The evolution of dimensions from uncertain and prescriptive at the initial screen to 
more certain and descriptive following the screen is logical and consistent with those 
believing early information is volatile (Albala 1975; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 
1990; Souder 1978). Scholars delivering only prescriptive advice to managers 
practising in dynamic, downstream, conditional environments is somewhat naive and 
possibly dangerous. Answering Montoya-Weiss and Calantone's (1994) question, 
"best practices" do change over time! 
4.6.3.1 Product market history of failure 
Calantone and Cooper (1977), Cooper (1975) and Hopkins and Bailey (1971) were 
correct. A definite pattern of project failure does exist. Evidence is quite decisive in 
confirming that the same mistakes are regularly made over and over again (Calantone 
and Cooper 1979). 
Because early information on the future state of controllable variables affecting 
outcome is quite speculative, certain, deterministic dimensions such as "a failure 
history", seem to have a disproportionate early influence on success. But this 
influence declines over time. 
I. "Failure history" is new to the literature as a success/failure model dimension. 
The To failure history dimension is certain with all else except "kill and success 
history", speculative., Failure history declines to second position at T,, due 
probably to downstream learning and plan 'execution: The dimension mimics 
natural selection (Darwin 1859) with multigenerational influences affecting 
industrial "reproductive success". This is consistent with Meyer and Utterback's 
(1993) advice that individual products are the offspring of multigenerational 
product platforms with successor platforms the result of a firm's underlying core 
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capabilities. In the absence of a bold break with the past, such "hereditary traits" 
may be buried in corporate culture to promote stabilisation within the population's 
ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Lambkin 1988; Lambkin and Day 1989). 
This may lead to quite "natural" deterministic early tendencies. These may be 
hidden by time, changing organisational structures and key personnel transition 
(O'Connor 1994). Thus, this dimension may also tap other phenomena previously 
unmeasured such as corporate culture, incompetence, office politics, decision 
making bias (risk prone versus risk averse) and learning ability not measured in 
the synergy dimension. 
II. "Nurturing" activities can override "nature", depending on product market 
condition and appropriate dimensional selection, emphases and implementation. 
Though deterministic failure can lead to more failure (Calantone and Cooper 
1979), the dimension's decline over time is optimistic for practitioners. It 
confirms that a failed "nature" can be overcome by organisational learning 
(Kiechel 1990; Mumford 1992; Nonaka 1988,1991; Shrivastava 1988; 
Shrivastava and Souder 1987), experience (Abell and Hammond 1979; Booz, 
Allen and Hamilton 1982; Boston Consulting Group 1972; Buzzell and Gale 
1987; Cooper and de Brentani 1984; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b; Crawford 
1980,1994; Lambkin 1988; Lilien and Yoon 1990; Peters and Waterman 1982; 
Schmalensee 1982) and strategic plan implementation. 
Measuring only one product generation fails to account for phenomena not found in 
single-generation synergy measures. With simple historical bivariate regression and 
extrapolation one of the most common techniques used in business forecasting, 
omission of this dimension in seminal models is an oversight. Clearly, it represents 
an almost perfect "null scenario/do nothing" deterministic model'. As such, it may 
be preferable and more parsimonious to other seminal dimensions which are simply 
"convenient representations" of available experience and knowledge (Calantone and 
De Benedetto 1990). 
4.6.3.2 Strategic reaction capability 
This dimension, implied previously in statements of controllable variable importance 
(Cooper 1979a, 1981; Zirger and Maidique 1990), is demonstrated here for the first 
time in a project level forecasting model. 
1. Whilst strategy has been shown related to performance (Buzzell and Gale 1987), 
this phenomena has not been demonstrated in a screening model reactive context 
until now. At its simplest, the dimension confirms that strategic typologies' are 
relevant to NPD success (Cooper 1984a, 1984b, 1985b). However, until now, 
project level strategy dynamics have not been linked empirically to implementing 
the desired, forecasted situation (Abell and Hammond 1979). This research's 
observation of equilibrium alignment (Kotler 1994) at work does this, thus 
satisfying requests for model examinationI under dynamic conditions (Wind and 
Mahajan 1988) with dimensions qualified temporally, (Montoya-Weiss and 
66 A deterministic mathematicai nvxk-A can be expressed at Y=Bp + B1X I Le. no error component. Given any value for X the value of Y can be determined with precision A stochastic model contains one or more random components that lead to effort in prediction and is written an Y=Bp + B1X1 +e (epsilon/error. Webster 1992). Being a -null seenarioldo nothing' dimension, it suggests the probable outcome if one does nothing different than what is -usual". 
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Calantone 1994). Further, illustrating the dimension's reactant linking 
characteristics to all other remaining dimensional states of nature over time 
confirms that superior performance is a longitudinal attainment of superior market 
position over time (Porter 1991). 
II. Inferior early information at To handicaps strategy, positioning it as inferior to 
deterministic "failure history". However, unfolding and more certain downstream 
information enables the strategically adroit. This is demonstrated by the 
dimension's improving influence on the model. Linking experience with 
optimising all remaining dimensions is conceptually accordant with new product 
strategy linking the NPD process to company objectives (Booz Allen and 
Hamilton 1982). 
Observing strategic adjustment of innovativeness, barrier, resource, project, product 
and market related problems confirms that success is not determined from initial 
strategy alone but by dealing with the interaction of process and environment change 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b; Crawford 1986). This may be the most important 
contribution of this work. 
4.6.3.3 Superior product 
These findings do not diminish seminal efforts but validate and enhance 
understanding of how superior products become superior over time. 
I. Superior product's importance in both the To and T, models validates Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt's hypothesis (H) that new product success is positively related to 
product advantage and (H) that new product success is positively related to 
market potential for the new product (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b). Further, 
it supports three hypotheses accepted by Zirger and Maidique (1990): 
o H4: a product providing a significant value (performance to cost) to the 
customer is positively related to successful products and negatively related 
to failures, 
H5: a technically superior product is positively related to successful 
outcomes and negatively related to failures (and) 
o H8:, markets that are large and growing are positively related to 
successful outcomes and negatively related to failures. 
II. Superior product's last place ranking at To may be a clue to understanding why 
superior products still fail. Endorsing Calantone, di Benedetto and Divine's 
(1993) finding that simply having good product quality alone is not enough, the To 
deterministic "success, failure and kill history" dimensions stand as arbiters of all 
controllable dimensions - including superior product. Whilst supporting those 
suggesting the dimensions ultimate importance (Bennett and Cooper 1981,1984; 
Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Calantone and Cooper 1981; Cooper 1979b, 
1980b, '1981,1985a, 1990b; Cooper and de Brentani 1991; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1986, '1987a, 1987b, 1990,1993; de Brentani 1986; Maidique and 
Zirger 1984; Zirger and Maidique 1990), it'advises that failing to improve the next generation's product by first learning from past problems and emulating past 
success consigns even a superior product to failure., This disquieting limitation on 
the dimension's carte-blanche endorsement is consistent with practitioner 
experience. Products defined precisely, early and incorrectly, condemn teams to 
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labour under false assumptions of superiority, with the truth known too late and 
only after launch (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1990). 
III. Customer cost reduction, utility and competitive quality features are added to the 
factor at Tl (see factor in both Table 4-5a and Table 4-5b) as the superior product 
dimension evolves in importance. This validates the positive consequence of 
delivering stated protocol (Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Crawford 1980,1984,1986, 
1994; Cooper 1992; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994; Maidique and Zirger 1984; 
Rothwell 1972; Pinto and Pinto 1990; Utterback 1974) from desired benefits to 
precise, technical features (Crawford 1984). Its importance supports Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt's hypothesis (H6) that new product success is positively related to 
project definition or protocol-how well defined the project strategy is prior to 
product development (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b) as well as others 
(Calantone, Di Benedetto and Haggblom 1995; Cooper 1988; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1987a, 1987c; Crawford 1984,1994; Kleinschmidt and Cooper 
1991). Its evolution from speculative benefit to feature delivery may illustrate 
how rapid learning (Day and Wensley 1988; Slater and Narver 1995) is used by 
successful teams to develop a superior product in stages. With technical features 
uncertain initially and where accelerated market and technological learning is 
possible (Day 1994), teams should not kill products too early, simply because 
they lack concrete advantages at the screen (Crawford 1984). 
Beyond these explanations of the dimension's assent, speculation of measurement 
timing error in NewProd and Stanford is discussed in section 4.6.4.3. 
4.6.3.4 Newness to the firm 
Findings here confirm the negative impact of this dimension on success. 
I. Consistent with Abette and Stuart (1988), Calantone and Cooper (1979), Cooper 
(1979b, 1980b, 1981), Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) and Roberts and Berry 
(1983), the dimension suggests that the team should "stick to their knitting" 
(Peters and Waterman 1982). Warning not to go too far afield from proven 
abilities, it validates a "short pass" strategy (Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991). 
II. At Tl the dimension falls back one place. This temporal validation is new to the 
field and suggests fresh approaches to the short versus long pass problem are 
possible. The deterministic effects of never having made or distributed products 
to different customers and against new competitors, whilst dangerous initially, 
diminish over time. Probably the result of an average 855 days of learning, the 
decreasing impact of "newness" validates a "long pass" strategy, but only in 
conjunction with learning and the appropriate strategic mix of other important 
dimensions' over time. 
III . At Tl "superior 
product" moves ahead of "newness" in sympathy with 
"strategy's" increased importance. Taken together these suggest that though "new 
to the firm" products, customers and competition are foreboding initially, over 
time the introduction of a superior new product evolving in conjunction with a 
reasoned, ' new product strategy (Crawford 1986) is more important. Negative 
implications of a failed history and "newness" can be overcome with the right mix 
of rapid leärning (Day 1994; Day and Wensley 1988; Slater and Naiver 1995), 
superior product development and strategic positioning. 
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In addition to confirming much from seminal literature, these discoveries add the 
optimism of a learning organisational culture (Kiechel 1990; Mumford 1992; 
Shrivastava 1988; Shrivastava and Souder 1987; Slater and Narver 1995). This and 
the synergy issue should not be seen glibly as "short pass versus long pass". Rather, 
it should be viewed as optimising the value of superior products, even if they are new 
to the firm, by overcoming newness via accelerated learning. 
4.6.3.5 Resource requirements and synergy 
This dimension substantiates much from seminal literature. 
I. The dimension is represented at both To and Tl and validates Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt's hypothesis (H) that new product success is positively related to 
market synergy or fit - the ability of the project to build from the 
firm's existing 
marketing resources and (HS) that new product success is positively related to 
technological synergy orfit-the ability of the project to build from the firm's 
existing development and production resources (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1987b). It also validates Zirger and Maidique's hypothesis (H) that products that 
build upon the firms existing market, technology and product competencies are 
positively related to successes and negatively related to failures (Zirger and 
Maidique 1990). 
II. The dimension's lower ranking at both time periods supports synergy's more 
recent, lesser role on project outcomes (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987c). 
Importantly, this may be due to using a measurement period ending at one year 
post launch, before process related efficiencies (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; 
Utterback 1981,1982 Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Calantone, Di Benedetto 
and Meloche 1988; de Bresson and Townsend 1981) can be realised. 
Nonetheless, synergy is validated as important (Ansoff 1965; Calantone and 
Cooper 1981; Cooper 1979a, 1979b, 1981,1985a, 1990; Cooper and de Brentani 
1984; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986,1987a; de Brentani 1986; Kulvik 1977; 
Lambkin 1988; Link 1987; Nystrom and Edvardsson 1977; Rothwell 1972; Zirger 
and Maidique 1990). 
III. Its dissolution over time into separate synergistic dimensions by function is 
provocative. The dimension separates into management/marketing versus 
technical functions. , This synergistic temporal maturation is new to the field and 
may indicate that whilst functional co-ordination is important (Ansoff and Stewart 
1967; Crawford 1980,1984,1986,1994; Cooper 1992; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1994; Maidique and Zirger. 1984; Rothwell 1972; Pinto and Pinto 1990; Utterback 
1974), it may have timing limitations (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Seemingly troublesome when all performance indicators in NPD point to the need 
for function harmony, it is consistent with Hart and Baker's ideas on multiple 
convergent process models (Hart and Baker 1994)., Interestingly, the 
"technological resource adequacy" variable is not critical to success at To but only 
at T1. This again validates Crawford's thinking that projects should not be 
rejected if the technological specifications cannot be met at the screen; as long as 
they can be met by launch. New to the field and inconsistent with both Cooper 
works (1979b, 1981), Cooper and de Brentani (1984) and Zirger and Maidique 
(1990), temporal instability indicates that the functional walls broken down 
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successfully at the initial screening are actually reconstructed by successful teams 
over time. 
Beyond this explanation of the dimension's maturation, measurement timing error in 
seminal models may average two dimensions into one. 
4.6.3.6 Relative high price of the product 
This dimension suggests that a price too high in the first year will have negative 
ramifications on success. 
I. This is consistent with early cross-sectional findings related to failure typologies 
(Calantone and Cooper 1979). Significant at Tl only, its fifth place position is 
consistent with the original NewProd discriminant analysis (Cooper 1979b) and 
the constructs of the negative competitive dimension in the follow-up linear 
regression (Cooper 1981). At To, when product features and required pricing are 
part of a nebulous early environment, it is reasonable that pricing should not be 
rigid. Rationally, pricing strategy evolves with the downstream learning, 
competitive analysis and the Tl superior product construct developments over 
time. 
II. Though low price strategy has been found ineffective in the chemical industry 
(1994) and a poor discriminator of success (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a), the 
dimension detracts from success in the first year of launch. It indicates possibly, 
that low price strategy is more appropriate in today's dynamic environment than 
"skimming". This is supported by success case ability to succeed in dynamic 
environments (see Figure 4-3) and today's shorter life cycles (Griffin 1993; 
Qualls, Olshavsky and Michaels 1981). Faster diffusion rates (Liberman and 
Montgomery's 1988) may effectively reduce the time allowed for skimming to be 
effective. As such, price competitiveness may become an even more important 
discriminator in the future, as margins erode even earlier because of more 
dynamic environments. 
4.6.3.7 Product market history of success and kills 
This dimension is new and represents the remainder of the "history dimension". 
I. The only empirical work examining the kill issues is Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
(1990). This was done to rectify methodological problems67. Asking "what 
separates kills from successes? " and "what distinguishes kills from failures? " they 
found nothing compelling, thus preserving earlier conclusions concerning 
success/failure. This dimension only concludes that kills are inversely 
proportional to successes at both To and Tl and does not support or dispute their 
"failures = kills" hypothesis. 
II. The dimension is as paradoxical as Cooper and Kleinschmidt's finding that 
management kills synergistic projects (1990). It does not suggest companies 
should be overly active in new introductions (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982) 
simply to gain experience. Rather, it suggests that kills are an opportunity cost 
keeping the team from successful learning experiences. As they dissipate 
valuable time and resources, kills may dilute what's left to critically inadequate 
levels. 
67 previous works overlook kills entirely. 
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III. Successful experience (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Boston Consulting 
Group 1972) in marketing, production and technology should lead to more 
success (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b). Though intuitively obvious, this could 
be a "natural" function of individual products being the offspring of product 
platforms that are enhanced over time from designs of longer duration and 
broader 
scope (Meyer and Utterback 1993). This dimension is in harmony with organic 
natural selection theory (Darwin 1859). Success leading to success is important 
because it has never been demonstrated empirically in a forecasting context. As 
with history of failure, this deterministic dimension becomes less 
important over 
time. This suggests that even teams graced with the comparative advantage of a 
predisposition to success, yield ultimately, to its diminishing returns. 
It suggests 
further, that excessive killing of projects "on the bubble" based on early evidence 
only, may not only waste resource but prove unwise based on evolving 
conditional developments. 
4.6.3.8 Alertness to the threat of competition 
Contradicting Cooper (1979,1984a) and in agreement with Parry and Song (1994), 
early success is very much related to perceived magnitude and speed of retaliation. 
Characteristics of competition deserve a prominent, positive role in initial screening 
models. 
I. The alertness dimension does not disagree that competition can be a detriment to 
success. However, this favourable dimension measures the assessment of 
potential magnitude and speed of competitive retaliation. As measured here it is 
supportive of Cooper and Kleinschmidt's rejection of their hypothesis (H) that 
new product success is negatively related to the level of competitiveness in the 
new product's market (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b). And it disagrees with 
those recommending the unconditional avoidance of highly competitive markets 
(Cooper 1979b, 1980b, 1981; Zirger and Maidique 1990). The dimension also 
denies Zirger and Maidique's finding (H) that weak competitive environments are 
positively related to product successes and negatively related to failures (Zirger 
and Maidique 1990) but is consistent again with Cooper and Kleinschmidt's 
(1990) determination, that kills and failures are both introduced in markets where 
competitive concentration was lower. 
II. The dimension's positive regression coefficient connotes a substantial difference 
from NewProd and Stanford's negative competitive dimension. This factor 
supports competition being recognised as important by NPD managers (Maidique 
an Zirger 1984). It is in complete accord with the importance of competitive 
assessment (Bain 1956; Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Cooper 1975; Cochran 
and Thompson 1964; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a; 1987b; Hopkins and 
Bailey 1971; Lambkin and Day 1989; Lazo 1965; Link 1987; Porter 1980,1985, 
1991) and it does not imply avoidance. 
III. Alertness is not 'at odds with Calantone and Cooper's (1979) failure scenario of 
"competitive brick wall". It is in harmony-with the same work's "the 
environmentally ignorant" scenario.. The dimension is optimistic and fundamental 
to taking appropriate action. It suggests that competition, whilst material to entry, 
can be handled withrproper research, assessment, planning and strategic reaction. 
Recognising that successful firms learn from history, it suggests a realistic 
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assessment of the competitive environment and then dealing with 
it strategically. 
This is one explanation why Cooper and Kleinschmidt regularly find 
competitiveness fails to impact on NPD success (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
1993). 
Another is offered by the authors themselves to wit "One possible reason why 
market environment characteristics appear so low on the list of success 
ingredients, is that products facing highly negative markets were likely scrubbed 
much earlier in their development" (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a p222). 
It is 
possible that they failed to measure the importance of alertness to competition 
due 
to management's "alertness" and subsequent killing of projects judged poor 
competitively. Thus they may have given the "go" to those with strategic plans 
in 
place and/or the reactive ability to overcome the competitive disadvantage. 
By measuring before survivour bias can diminish this dimension's effect, this factor 
confirms the importance of competitive assessment on entry success. 
4.6.3.9 Order of entry/innovativeness 
In opposition to NewProd and Stanford, entry order and innovation level are 
important to success. 
I. These dimensions disagree strongly with the original NewProd finding that ".. . 
although product uniqueness (first to market) is an important dimension 
describing new product projects (factor analysis results), it is not a determinant 
of success or failure" (Cooper 1979b, p102). The To "late entry" dimension is in 
sixth place and its complement "ls` in" falls to tenth place at T1. Though neither 
has been found very significant in any other NPD forecasting work, they both 
support the feelings of practitioners (Maidique and Zirger 1984) if not NPD 
modelers. This additional reality check may be yet another reason for practitioner 
avoidance. 
II. The dimension's evolution from a moderate to low level determinant is new to the 
field. It is consistent with Cooper and Kleinschmidt's chemical industry 
conclusion (1993) that order of entry is only slightly important to success, as 
success rates decrease with later entry. It agrees also with Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton (1982), Hopkins and Bailey (1971), Lambkin (1988), Lilien and Yoon 
(1990), Robinson and Fornell (1985), Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan (1992) and 
Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha (1986). Its importance here should provoke 
discussion of why the NewProd and Stanford models do not find order/innovation 
important. The dimension's relative absence in both models is probably a result 
of measurement timing error and survivour bias (Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 
1992; Mitchell 1991) in five year retrospectives imprecisely benchmarked. 
III. At To the dimension emphasises "do not be late". At T1, by adding new-to-the- 
world constructs, it becomes more conditional by suggesting one attempt to "be 1a" 
into the product market with a new-to-the-world entry". The caution expressed in 
the To dimension is consistent with improper timing'being judged a hindrance to 
success (Cochran and Thompson 1964; Hopkins 1980)., As it evolves over time it 
supports innovativeness as an important characteristic for new products (Davidson 
1976; Gerstenfeld 1976; Kulvik'1977; Marquis 1969; Myers and Marquis 1969; 
Rothwell - 1972,1974,1976; Utterback, Allen, Hollomon and Sirbu 1976). The 
drop in the factor's importance may suggest that diffusion is occurring more 
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rapidly, lessening the effects of learning-based, entry order advantage 
(Liberman 
and Montgomery 1988). 
Though not powerful, this dimension is quite significant and free of "survivor bias" 
(Crawford 1979; Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Mitchell 1991) clouding 
other studies. It supports those believing that innovative products can do well, by not 
being "caught in the middle" (Aker and Day 1986; Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991; 
Porter 1980,1985). Being relatively free of measurement timing error than either 
NewProd or Stanford, it is more sound in its advice for the one year post launch 
period. 
4.6.4 Model usage 
The models at To and Tl are different absolutely and in potential application. Albala 
(1975) suggests that NPD process activities should be based, ultimately, on the 
significance of information, its difficulty of attainment and its relative value over 
time. "No use" by practitioners may represent seminal model up-front inadequacies 
represented visually in Figure 4-7. These are demonstrated here by differences in 
validity, accuracy and deterministic versus stochastic information requirements. 
These differences have important implications on model worth to the team. 
4.6.4.1 Validity and accuracy 
Significant difference in model validity over time is demonstrated by the 
improvement in R, R2, Adj. R2, F and Standard error (see Table 4-13). In all cases the 
statistics demonstrate a more valid, robust model as information concerning stochastic 
environmental dimensions becomes more certain over time. 
Table 4-13: Differences in model validity 
TO TI difference 
r . 56589, . 68961 +. 12372 
R . 32023 . 47556 +. 15533 
Adj. . 29857 . 45450 +. 15593 
F 14.78065 at. 0000 with 8df 22.57937 at . 0000 with l Odf +7.79872 
Std Error 2.58869 2.28289 -. 3058 
# dimensions 8 10 +2 
accuracy 81.15384% 83.84615% +2.69231% 
residual (success) 1.1320 . 8633 -. 2687 
residual (failure) -3.0726 -2.3433 -. 7293 
Mahalanobis 7.9692 9.9615 +1.9923 
The validity difference is augmented by a small but statistically significant increase in 
accuracy. The importance of the difference is sustained by the large reduction in 
residual error of the prediction and visual error gap in the bivariate regression (see 
Figure 4-7). This suggests the Tl model deserves greater confidence as information 
evolution reduces perceived ECE (expected cost of error) and increases EVII 
(expected value of imperfect information). This does not suggest however, that all 
teams should use the T, model. That is a measure of model worth -a calculation 
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unique to every team. This is fundamental to understanding probable reasons for 
practitioner avoidance of front-end activities. 
4.6.4.2 A pure deterministic versus pure stochastic example 
In some measure models are either deterministic or stochastic. Deterministic models 
presume decision making under certainty and suggest "what's best? " by maximising 
or minimising an objective function. These are exemplified by NewProd, Stanford 
and this work's To aggregate model. All prescribe what should be done to achieve 
success using early dimensional probability distributions. Contrarily, stochastic 
models are concerned with decision making under probabilistic risk. They ask 
instead, "what if" (Burns and Austin 1985) and are based on downstream conditional 
dimensional distributions. This work's Tl model, evolving based on underlying 
antecedent evolution, is a good example. 
Overemphasising expensive, speculative, up-front deterministic forecasting activities, 
knowing that evolutionary change is imminent, may be off-putting to practitioners. 
The reasonableness of this proposition is demonstrated by the comparisons in Table 
4-14a through Table 4-14d. In Table 4-14a and 4-14b two pure deterministic models 
are based on past product market history of success, failure and kills only. They 
contain little if any information error and exemplify a "null (no change)" scenario. 
Contrarily, the stochastic models in Table 4-14c and 4-14d are based on all other 
dimensions except history. These exemplify the "maximum possible change" 
scenario with commensurate forecasting error potential. ' 
As seen in Table 4-14a and Table 4-14b, the deterministic models become less certain 
over time, F values and accuracy fall and standard error rises. Clearly, both history 
factors experience diminishing returns. Absent probabilistic dimensions, validating 
statistics are unimpressive and the prediction rates fall over time. However, they are 
far better than chance alone and suggest historical intuition as a reason why seminal 
models are under-utilised. 
Table 4-14a: To pure deterministic model with only product market hictnrv R =. 40741, R2 =. 16598, Adj. R =. 15949, Std. Err. = 2.83374, F= 25.57319 at . 0000 % accuracy=7&9% Key factors or dimensions (factor name) Reg. Coef. 
History of failure 1.114580 
History of kills and success 
"586054 
constant - 1.671875 
i awe 4ý14D: t1 pure aeterministic model with only nrnibirt m rkPt hictnrv R= . 38251, R .. 14632, Adj. R= . 13967, Std. Err. = 2.86695 F= 22.02413 at. 0000 accuracy = 74.246 Key factors or dimensions (factor name) Reg. Coef. 
History of failure 1.050744 
History of kills and success -. 542047 
constant 1.671875 
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Practitioners may ask "why bother" and in effect subscribe to "insufficient reason 
criterion" ". This would be true, especially if they have limited forecasting ability to 
predict the future states of Tl dimensions. Here, a "history only" choice of acting 
intuitively based on what one does well, is sensible for those with a successful track 
record. They would not be inclined to change procedures. On the other hand, 
intelligent teams with a bad track record would try something else as failure 
diminishes in importance over time. 
Table 4.14c: T. Hure stochastic model with no product market history 
R=. 36404, R"=. 13253, Adj. R =. 11892, Std. Err. = 2.9013 2F=9.73934 at. 0000 accuracy= 75% 
Key factors or dimensions (factor name) Reg. Coef. 
Strategic reaction capability F2 . 700422 
New to the firm, didn't fit in F4 -. 644947 
Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation F7 A37518 
Late market entry F14 -. 410086 
(Constant) 1.67187 
Table 4-14d: T, pure stochastic model with no product market history 
R= . 55743. R= . 31072. Adj. R .. 29438. 
Std. Err. = 2.59642, F= 19.00863 at. 0000 accuracy = 80.4% 
Key factors or dimensions (factor name) Reg. Coef. 
Strategic reaction capability F2 1.096848 
Superior product in large rapid growth market F3 . 800692 
Relative high price of product F18 -. 557748 
New to the firm, didn't fit in F5 -. 717605 
Marketing & management resource compatibility (synergy) F7 . 399238 
Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation F8 . 372806 
(Constant) 1.671875 
For the pure stochastic models in Table 4-14c and Table 4-14d the reverse is true. 
The Tl version is more valid and accurate than the To version. Constructed entirely of 
conditional dimensions, but requiring accurate prediction and dimensional execution, 
the models are more complex, have higher accuracy rates and a lower standard error 
over time. These pure stochastic models are appealing for all teams with the ability to 
predict and deliver dynamic dimensions more certainly and those with a significant 
failed history needing extensive change (or no history in the product market at all). 
4.6.4.3 T0= T1 evolution and worth 
Like the example immediately above, this work's demonstration of model evolution 
has significant implications on model worth to and choice by the team. 
4.6.4.3.1 Evolution 
The To=T, metamorphosis demonstrates a deterministic to stochastic evolution in 
bias. At T1, controllable dimensions become more important to success, confirming 
the findings of Cooper (1980b) and Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987a, 1993). 
Absolutely certain "failure, kill and success" dimensions decline in importance as 
probabilistic dimensions rise ("strategic reaction capability", "superior product") or 
68 This is the most subjective decision making criteria and focuses on personal knowledge of the problem and its environment. Marquis Pierre 
Simon de Laplace, the father of 'insufficient reason", argued that admitting that you have no Idea of underlying probability governing the states of 
nature means they are all equally likely to occur (Bums and Austin 1985). 
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are selected for the first time (" 13` in new, highly innovative market", "technological 
resource synergy"). The probability for prediction error rises as illustrated by the 
large, statistically significant 1.9923 point Mahalanobis' distance (see APPENDIX B) 
change over time. 
4.6.4.3.2 Worth 
Clearly, model choice is proprietary and related to team resources, ability and 
tolerance for risk. Its worth is a function of the decision's expected monetary value, 
expected opportunity loss, value of perfect information, value of imperfect 
information and/or management's attitude towards risk69 (Bums and Austin 1985). 
These characteristics are unique to each team, de Brentani's defence of universal 
models notwithstanding (de Brentani 1986). 
Like the extreme examples in Table 4-14 above, each model's informational 
requirements affect its worth based on team ability and inclination towards risk. The 
deterministic To model is 81.2% accurate and uses only eight dimensions. Initial use 
is justified by its clarity, simplicity and unswerving prescription. It should be 
appealing to those with poor forecasting and/or limited reactive ability. Though more 
accurate and valid, the Tl model can lead to larger expected cost of error depending 
on team forecasting ability and probability of dimensional attainment. In either case, 
after the project is "off the ground", evolving data richness, parallel decreases in 
expected cost of error and team forecasting skill advises the Tl model for 
simulative/diagnostic purposes. Thus, choice optimises the expected value of 
imperfect information (a function of forecasting ability) by allowing action and 
redirection based on "cheaper" information from more certain conditions over time. 
4.6.4.4 Tp, TI and NewProd 
The aggregate models differ primarily because of the reduction of measurement 
timing error. This is manifest in "superior product", "order of entry/level of 
innovativeness" and "synergy" dimensional evolution changing the model's structure 
over time. As such, the T, model moves away from the To model as its dimensions, 
validity and accuracy reflect the NewProd model quite closely. This suggests 
probable measurement timing error in the field's most respected model when it claims 
to represent the environment known at the initial screen. 
The dimensions recommended for use at the initial screen by NewProd do not 
represent those properly known or most appropriate at that time. This is disquieting 
69 mudmiN maximax, minimax regret and de Laplace iruufficiau reason. 
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and sustains those warning of problems associated with field validity (Montoya- 
Weiss and Calantone 1994), long retrospectives (Crawford 1979) and survivor bias 
(Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Mitchell 1991). However, it is consistent 
with Cooper's own admission that NewProd may actually measure average 
dimensions as they "turn out" based on strategic reaction long after launch (Cooper 
1992). Being heavy with measurement timing error, NewProd is inappropriate for 






Chapter Five - Analyses and findings (H2, H3 and H) 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 tests hypotheses H2, H3 and H4utilising the methodologies delineated in 
Chapter three. To test H2, the metrically scaled variable "life expi7° was divided into 
three approximately equal categories of short, medium and long PiLC. A linear 
regression function was constructed for each category at each time period. To test H3, 
"1$` in new, highly innovative market" (factor 5 at To and factor 6 T), was used to 
categorise cases. A linear regression function was then constructed for each category, 
at each time period. Acceptance or rejection of H. and H3 was made based on 
differences in model validity, dimension selection and prediction accuracy among 
categories, across time periods and compared to the aggregate models. To test H4, a 
paired-samples t-test was used to examine strategic variable increases or decreases as 
they affected success/failure. 
5.2 Hypothesis H2 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction are 
perceived to vary as a function of the length of the product's introductory life 
cycle. 
5.2.1 Introduction 
H2 tests whether success factors are perceived to change if the product's PiLC is 
estimated to be short, medium or long. The "life_exp" variable was not normally 
distributed (see Figure 3-4). Categorisation was approximate with short defined as 0- 
3 years (n = 71), medium as 3.001-4.999 years (n = 76) and long as 5 years and longer 
(n = 57). Acceptance of H2 was based on observable differences among categories 
and between time periods. Duncan's multiple range test was used to determine 
"common" factor distribution differences. Prediction and residual error distribution 
differences were tested by category and supplemented by paired-samples t-tests of the 
factor and prediction distributions over time. 
The average cycle time (see speed to market, APPENDIX B) was 490 days. Thus the 
average retrospective period was 855 days (490 days to launch +a 365 day launch 
period = 2.34 years; see Figure 5-1). Over half the sample reported product 
development cycle times of one year orless with 2/31 under 1.25 years. The median 
anniversary performance measurement date was less than six months from the median 
70 the life exp variable was obtained from the question: The produc tos life expectancy in original form before modifications was: #_Yrs. # Mos . 
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response date. This means that the average project was screened, produced and 
evaluated in under three years. NewProd's average would be much longer based on a 
five year retrospective without a1 year maximum benchmark date. Thus, the much 
shorter retrospective encouraged less measurement timing error and better represented 
5.2.2 PiLC conditioned model at To 
Table 5-la offers the results of the three conditional linear regression procedures at 
To. 
Table 5-1a: Linear regression conditioned by PiLC at To. 
n= PiLC model prediction: a= aeereeate factors nredictina success after snrnno by crteonrv 
Aggregate at T0: R=. 56589, R-;;. 32023, Adj. R2=ý29857, F =14.78065 at. 0000 with 8df Standard error = 2.58869 prediction 
accuracy rate = 81.2 %-'" 
PILC Factor Description Regression Model Fit 
% correct Coefficient 
p= PiLC model 
a= Agg. model 
SHORT: F6 Superior unique product, meeting needs in large . 913093 R=. 29718, R -. 08832, Adj. 0-3p-& rapid growth market R=. 07510, 
p=71.8% correct Constant - 1.58491 StdErr-3.14585, 
a=71.8% correct F=6.68410, Sig=. 0118, ldf 
MEDIUM F17 NPD history of failure 1.382622 R=. 61923, R -. 38345, Adj. 
>3&<=5 yrs. F2 Strategic reaction capability . 954682 Rß. 35776, 
p=80.3% correct F16 NPD history of kills and success . 947944 StdErr=2.49795, a=86.8% correct Constant 1.986872 F=14.92635, Sig=. 0000, 
3df 
LONG F17 NPD history of failure 1.150245 R=. 69685, R . 48560, Adj. >5 yrs. F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.141745 RZ=. 44603, 
p=78.9% correct F16 NPD history of kills and success . 807148 StdErr-2.42112, a=80.7% correct F4 New to the firm, didn't fit in -. 767273 F=12.27196, Sig=. 0000, Constant 1.56471 4df 
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market failure phenomena overlooked in other work due to survivor bias. 
Figure 5-2a: P1LC Histogram of residual error-T(0) 
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Figure 5-2b: Normalcy of residual. error 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
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Differences are observed in model construction, validity and accuracy among 
categories and compared to the aggregate model at To. There are less dimensions 
overall but these are fairly consistent between medium and long categories. Though 
the short model is poor, the medium and long model are more valid than the 
aggregate at To. This suggests that conditional models are preferable to an aggregate 
when medium and long PiLC can be predicted with accuracy. These differences 
support the acceptance of HZ, as PiLC is sustained as a moderator (Cooper 1979b, 
1981,1984a; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) of success at the initial screen. 
Medium and long accuracy rates of 80.3% and 80.7% are only slightly inferior to the 
aggregate model's 81.2% at To and NewProd's 84.1%. The rising bivariate R2 values 
(see Figure 5-la) and increasing normalcy (see Figure 5-2a and Figure 5-2b) over 
time sustains PiLC's role as a forecast enabler (Day 1981). At To, "history of failure", 
"strategic reaction capability" and "history of kills and successes" dominate, with 
"new to the firm" a detractor in the long function. Obvious model differences argue 
for acceptance of H2. 
5.2.2.1 Factor difference at Tp 
Duncan's multiple range test was used to determine which "common" factors had 
statistically different distributions within each time period at p< . 05. Three 
environmental factors were significantly different from each other by category but 
none was significant in the linear regression at T. (see Table 5-2a). Suggesting 
differences in environments but not outcome argues for acceptance of the null from. 
Table 5-2a: Duncan Multiple Range Analysis by PiLC at To (no 
factors significant in the PiLC linear regression model ) 
FaclorAt TO .+-,, '- sign at <. 05 dn... ' short mean medium mean long mean 
F2: Dynamic change in fast growing market short # long . 2738 . 0420 -. 
0975 
F10: Exogenous timing variables short x long . 2453 . 0204 -. 2483 
F18: Government/capital barriers short * medium 
long ;e medium 
. 1428 -. 2876 . 0669 
5.2.2.2 Prediction differences at Tp 
Duncan's multiple range test was used to uncover significant differences in prediction 
for both the sorted aggregate models and the three PiLC models. For the sorted 
aggregate model, no group prediction or residual'error distributions were significantly 
different from each other at the p=. 05 level. Therefore, ' using the aggregate factors 
sorted by PiLC category to predict success/failure would not produce statistically 
different results. However, the three PiLC predictions demonstrate significant 
difference between medium and long model means ät p=. 05. This indicates that one 
should use different models at the initial screen subject to whether the product market 
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had a medium or long PiLC. These differences in accuracy are significant, interesting 
and support the acceptance of H2. 
5.2.3 PiLC conditioned model at T1 
Table 5-1b exhibits the results of the three conditional linear regression procedures at 
T1. 
Table 5-1b: Linear regression conditioned by PiLC at T, 
p= PiLC model prediction; a= aggregate factors predicting success after sorting by category. Bold italics= 
not in ajregate models 
Aggregate at Ti : R=. 68961, R 2=A7556, Adj. R2=. 45450, F =22.57937 at. 0000 with 10df Standard error = 2.28289 prediction 
accuracy rate = 83.8 % 
PiLC Factor Description Regression Model Fit 
p= PiLC model Coefficient 
a=Agg. Model 
SHORT. F15 NPD history of failure 1.639324 R=. 77053, R; =. 59371, 
0-3 yrs. F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.522217 Adj. R2=. 54857, StdErr- 
p=90.1% correct F3 Superior product in large rapid growth market 1.218584 2.19779, F= 13.15189, 
a=84.5% correct Sig=. 0000,7df 
F10 Intense market competitiveness -1.013218 
F7 Marketing & management resource compatibility . 953863 (synergy) 
F4 Technological resource compatibility (synergy) . 930960 F1 Dynamic change . 658222 Constant 1.368538 
MEDIUM F15 NPD history of failure 1.289708 R=. 64116, W--. 41108, 
>3&<=5 yrs. F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.032534 Adj. R2=. 37790, 
p=81.6% correct F14 NPD history of kills and success -. 770734 StdErr-2.45847, 
a=86.8% correct F11 Satisfied customer with dominant competitor -. 627633 F=12.38996, Sig=. 0000, 
4df 
Constant 1.906633 
LONG F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.275299 R=. 73641, R2--. 54229, 
>5 yrs. F5 New to the firm, didn't fit in -1.014396 Adj. R2=. 49742, 
p=86. O% correct F15 NPD history of failure . 976890 StdEn=2.30608, 
a=82.5% correct F14 NPD history of kills and success -. 788625 F=12.08508, Sig=. 0000, 
F3 Superior product in large rapid growth market . 777590 5df 
Constant 1.304038 
By observation, each Tl model varies from the aggregate and from each other to a 
greater degree than the To models. All appear sound, with one outlier found in the 
short model only. Compared to the PiLC models at To, there are more and new 
significant dimensions but still less than the aggregate model or NewProd. Whilst all 
models deserve confidence, the short and long are superior to the aggregate and more 
valid than NewProd". At 90.1% and 86% accuracy respectively, they are more 
accurate than the aggregate To model (81.15384%), Tl model (83.84615%) and 
NewProd (84.1%). Bivariate prediction lines (see Figure 5-1b) show RZ values 
improving by length of PiLC, as the residual errors become more normally 
distributed. The soundness of the seven factor short PiLC model is clear-cut, with R 
-. 77053, R2 = . 59371, Adjusted R2= . 54857 and a StdErr of 2.19779. This strongly 
supports the significance of factors conditionally "enabled" by PiLC (Day 1981) 
including the negative "intense market competitiveness" and the new to the field and 
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Figure 5-2c: PLC Histogram of residual error at Tl 
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positively signed "dynamic change". The acceptable medium model brings forth 
"satisfied customer with dominant competitor", a negative factor. With R= . 73641, 
R2 = . 54229, Adjusted R2 = . 49742 and a standard error of 2.30608, the long model is 
also superior to both aggregates. Its validating statistics, with the exception of lower 
F values, are better than NewProd. Like the short model, the exceedingly high 
Adjusted RZ statistic allows extrapolation to larger, similar product market 
populations. These striking differences also argue for acceptance of H2. 
5.2.3.1 Factor differences at T1 
Duncan's multiple range test yields statistically significant differences in six factors. 
F1, "dynamic change" and Flt, "satisfied customer with dominant competitor" are 
significant in the linear regression PiLC models at Tl. "181 in" and "alertness" were 
significant to the aggregate models and "exogenous timing variables" and 
"government barriers" only environmentally different (see Table 5-2b). Difference 
based on PiLC suggests that issues are more complex than suggested by others 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981, de Brentani 1984, Zirger and Maidique 1990) and argues for 
acceptance of H2. 
Table 5-2b: Duncan Multiple Range Analysis by PiLC at Tl ceo euwi..,, igrwam i. im"', regression by PiLC) 
FactorAt Tl -. . sig. at <. 0S . -, short mean medium mean long mean 
Fl: Dynamic change short xmedium 
short along 
. 3337 . 0047 -. 0983 
F6: 1" in new, highly innovative market short t medium . 1210 -. 2402 . 0161 F8: Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation short * long . 2329 . 0369 -. 1777 F9: Exogenous Timing Variables short * long . 1803 . 0426 -. 2764 Fll: Satisfied customer wills dominant competitor short along %2144 . 0454 . 2742 F21: Government Barriers long x medium . 0220 -. 2057 . 3143 
5.2.3.2 Prediction differences at Tl 
Mean prediction distributions for the sorted aggregate models do not differ at the . 05 
level. Further, unlike the To models, neither do the predictions differ by category. 
This argues for rejection of the hypothesis. However, important to practitioners, the 
short and long PiLC models at Tl are better predictors actually, than either the 
aggregate model or NewProd and require far less information. Achieving higher 
levels of accuracy by estimating PiLC and then using the more parsimonious, more 
potent PiLC dimensions, is supportive of Levitt (1965,1966). 
5.2.4 Paired-samples t-test 
Table 5-3 suggests that except for short failure cases, no PiLC categorical common 
factor distributions actually change over time. e. g. the "superior product" dimension 
for short PiLC successes at To is the statistical equivalent of superior product at T1, 
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but the failure superior product dimension for short PiLC is different. Demonstrable 
at the . 102 level, this provides weak evidence in support of H2. 
Table 5-3: Model of common factor comparison by success/failure 
over time Bold italics = significant at. 1 
Success means- ° Failure means r- 
Factor'I. Ct. i. , Itrr, " TO TI D: JJ Sig.. TO TI Duff Sig. 
SHORT n=51 SHORT n=20 j , "I 
Superior product- . 0644 . 1438 . 0794 . 463 ý4ý- Y,. -. 3S67 , 9866 , 6299 =. 102 
MED. n_-_57 , MED. n=19 
HistojT oia _ I'bý . 
2683 . 3187 . 0504 . 528 ," SFr ýrý'ý -. 
6807 -. 6116 . 0690 . 633 ,, , ý ýý , Failure', 'i,!. y; p, , ,, 
Strategic ,^ . 0782 . 1645 -. 0863 . 311, ,$. +' -`ý",. ý' .^ -. 6636 -. 8015 . 1380 . 353 
reaction 
° Historyof K&S -e . 1229 -. 1110 -. 2339 . 375 V_:. ti ' J"n fr", r nr'td"+ o,;, -. 3402 . 2055 . 5457 . 206 
1 LONG!! n=37 iLONG n-25777 a" 
History 0680 . 0082 -. 0598 490 -. 7467 -. 5416 . 2050 383 
Failure 
Strategic . 2655 . 4046 -. 1391 . 281 -. 4927 -. 5491 . 0565 , 790 reaction''tlt, llýýlk°' . ý'? i'ýh'; 
'"! ý4; ýý! :' 
History of K&S . 1199 -. 1065 -. 2264 . 393 ý' °-, .'- "ý -. 3269 . 3746 . 7015 . 151. 
New to Firm , -. 2015 -. 2270 . 0255 . 685 Nke' . 5146 . 5860 -. 0713 . 435 , 
Table 5-4a, 5-4b and 5-4c depict change in categorical prediction over time. No 
predictions differ significantly in the aggregate. However, when sorted by 
success/failure, short PiLC predictions and complementary residuals do differ at 
p=. 000 for both successes and failures. Similarly, long successes are different at 
p=. 084. But medium case predictions and residuals are statistical equivalents for 
either success or failure. 
Table 5.4a: Prediction means comparison by success/failure over time 
. All cases prediction -" _. 
All case residual 
Tp" 4M :s Tý. r. ".:.,... Difference Sig. . i_ TO. x ýTj! D erence " Sig. SHORT 1.8072 1.7854 
. 0218 . 895 -. 2718 -. 2500 -. 0218 . 
895 
MEDIUM 1.6578 1.6353 . 0225 . 861 . 2764 . 2989 -. 0225 . 861 LONG 1.3393 1.4917 -. 1523 . 406., -. 0937 -. 2461 . 1523 . 406 
Table 5-4b: Prediction means comparison by success/failure over time (bold italics   significant it . 05) 
Success means... Failure means _F Tp '.. - ý, Tl Difference . six. - , Tp , Tj Di erence - Sig. SHORT 2.1502 26740 . 5238 , . 000 , --" . 9326 . 4804 1.4130 . 000 MEDIUM 2.2929 2.3941 -. 1012 x. 457 -. 2475 -. 6412 . 3938 . 216 LONG 2.2327 2.6445 -. 4118 ; . 084 .. -. 3134 -. 6411 . 3277 . 234 ." 
Table 5-4c: Residual means comparison by success/failure over time (bold italics - significant at . 05) 
Success means `. "- -, Failure means , TO Ti ,. - Difference L Si _ TO.:,, ,° Tl. " 
' 
Sig., 
SHORT 1.2423 . 7184 . 5238 . 000 ,r,. " -4.1326 -2.7196 . 1.4130 ý . 000 MEDIUM 1.2685 1.1673 . 1012 . 457 ...., :' . 2.6999 -2.3061 -. 3938 . 216 LANG 1.1457 . 7338 . 4118 -2.3866 -2.0589 -. 3277 ,:. 234 
The differences, especially between short PiLC success and failure cases, are 
supportive acceptance of Hz. 
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5.2.5 Conclusion 
PiLC categorisation by time period results in the dramatic reduction in the dimensions 
compared to the aggregate solutions or NewProd. Though tests yield mixed results, 
change occurs obviously, in factor selection by category both at To and T1. This 
argues for acceptance of H2. 
Further, two new and significant factors, "dynamic change" and "satisfied customer" 
are different statistically at T1. Also, To predictions are statistically different between 
medium and long models. These observable and empirically verifiable differences 
between the To and Tl PiLC models, along with obvious differences with aggregate 
models, argues for acceptance. 
Categorisation by PiLC definitely differentiates the factors of success within and 
between time periods. Distinction, rather than similarity, is caused by this enabling 
dimension. Therefore, this Thesis accepts H2, that success factors do vary as a 
function of the length of the product's introductory life cycle. The null form is thus 
rejected. 
5.2.6 Discussion of H2 findings 
The operationalisation of PiLC avoided past problems whilst responding to calls for 
studying the moderating effect of selected variables on the NPD process (Cooper 
1979b; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). With PLC as the catalyst, it also 
supported Day's (1981) enabling concept whilst producing fewer but more potent 
forecasting factors. However, though H2 was accepted due to obvious gross model 
differences, small category sizes limits 'dimensional interpretation. Deep dimensional 
meaning in the discussion below is speculative and requires further study. 
1. Accepting H2 disputes those who disparage PiLC's usefulness in forming strategy 
(Dhalla and Yuspeh 1976; Lambkin and Day 1989; Thietart and Vivas 1984), thus 
validating its role as an enabling (Day 1981) and moderating (Cooper 1979b, 
1981,1984a) condition of success. Model and dimensions variance based on 
PiLC is consequential to both early and later strategy (Ansoff and Stewart 1967; 
Buzzell 1966; Catry and Chevalier 1974; Day 1981; Doyle 1976; Dodge and Rink 
1978; Kotler, 1980; Luck 1972; Michael 1977; Rink and Swan 1979; Tellis and 
Crawford 1981; Thorelli and Burnett 1981; Utterback and Abernathy 1975). 
Further, with short and long PiLC "exogenous timing variable" distributions 
statistically different at To, failure to account for product market cyclicality and 
seasonality characteristics vis-ä-vis PiLC is a mistake. 
II. Estimating product market PiLC (Levitt 1965,1966) is important to creating 
parsimonious, accurate results and validates its importance as a framework for 
forecasting (Balachandran and Jain 1972; Cooke and Edmondson 1973; Kovac 
and Dague 1972; Parsons 1975). As PiLC lengthens, forecasting confidence and 
model error improves. This sheds light on PLC's importance in process time 
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management (Cooper and de Brentani 1984). Validating its strategic role 
(Thorelli and Burnett 1981), PiLC models are more parsimonious than Cooper's 
eight (1981), nine (1992) or eleven dimensions (1979b) and Zirger and 
Maidique's (1990) eight dimensions. Combined with selected improvements in 
accuracy, less dimension investigation/activity should reduce cycle time as 
requested (Cooper 1994b, 1995; Millson, Raj and Wilemon 1992; Wind and 
Mahajan 1988). This should appeal to practitioners. Further, as time between 
innovations decreases (Bayus 1994), shorter PLC's may require even fewer 
screening dimensions, proclamations against taking shortcuts notwithstanding 
(Cooper 1988; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 1988). 
III. Multiple models that are easier to use (Albala 1975) may relate better to 
practitioners (Lilien 1975). Using more certain information germane to actual 
information availability states may be more appropriate in today's dynamic 
environments than static, deterministic methods. If PiLC is estimated, even less 
screening data may be required for "gate 1 or gate 2" gentle screens than 
previously thought (Cooper 1988,1990a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987b, 1991). 
This would allow more but gentler screens on a wider array of opportunities, thus 
optimising research resources. 
IV. Model choice depends on the team's ability to accurately predict expected PiLC 
To and Tl dimensions and the expected value of imperfect information (EVII) 
based on the expected cost of errors (ECE). Model choice is appropriate only for 
those prepared to forecast all dimensions accurately and perform all activities 
required effectively and efficiently. Conditional PiLC models signal lower initial 
investment with project continuance based on probability of dimensional 
attainment. Requiring "just the right" information (like just-in-time inventory 
management; Meredith 1992) at exactly the right time would lower the ECE and 
increase EVII. This may improve ease of use, utilisation and success rates. 
5.3 Hypothesis H3 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction vary 
as a function of its order of entry and related level of innovativeness. 
5.3.1 Introduction 
H3 deals with changes important to success as the combination of entry order and 
relative level of innovation is controlled. To validate hypothesis H3, Factor 5 at To 
and Factor 6 at Tl were divided into three almost equal categories and labelled 
ls`/high (n=86 at To; n=87 at T1), middle/medium (n=88 at To; n=87 at T) and 
late/low (n=86 at To; n=86 at T). This was rigorous because the factor distribution at 
each time period approached normalcy, and at both To and T1, exactly the same 
variables in exactly the same order with very similar loadings described the 
dimension "1st in new, highly innovative market". Linear regression was used again 
to construct models for these three categories at each time period. Factor 5 at To and 
factor 6 at Tl were excluded from the factor analysis. After noting obvious function 
differences, Duncan's multiple range test and a paired-samples t-test were used as in 
H2 above, to verify factor differences within and between the time periods. Prediction 
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Figure 5-3a: ORDER Histogram of residual error at T, 
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Table 5-5a: Linear regression conditioned by order/innovation at To 
..... a ........ »".. » ».. d: rNn»" nv oon. onte f. buc nredictinn success alleramtine by catenrw BOLD üaücs a not in ap¢rrtate models 
Aggregate at To: R= . 56589., R -. 
32023, Adj. R2=. 29857, F=14.78065 at. 0000 with 8df, Std error =2.58869 prediction .. ' 
accuracy rate= 81.2% 
p=order/innovation Factor Description Regression Model Fit 
model Coefficient 
a= Agg. Model 
Is high (Top 113 of F13 Innovative strategy in highly competitive market 1.522378 R=. 69861, R= 
factor) 48806, Adj. R2= 
p=88.4 % F17 NPD history of failure 1.461672 . 44211. StdErr= 
a-87.2 % F2 Strategic reaction capability . 794427 2.18485, F= 
F4 New to the funs, didn't fit in -. 690323 10.62295, Sig=. 0000, 
F20 Long life cycle high pricalhigh quality strategy ~527181 7df 
Fl l Moderate innovation . 489349 
F7 Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation . 474390 
Constant 1.836052 
Middlehnedium F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.021367 R=. 45458, 
(Middle 113 of factor) F17 NPD history of failure . 907352 R2=. 20664, Adj. 
p=727% F4 New to the firm, didn't fit in -. 646658 R2=. 17830, 
a=77.3 % Constant 1.489603 StdErr-2.74777, 
F=7.29289, 
Sig=. 0002,3df 
Lalelow (Bottom 1/3 F17 NPD history of failure 1.290947 R=. 60850, 
of factor) F16 NPD history of kills and success 1.238716 R2=. 37027, Adj. 
p=77.9 % F9 Satisfied, competitive market . 854376 R2=. 33917, 
a=79.1% F7 Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation . 765716 StdEn-2.65916, 
Constant 1.479023 F=11.90672, 
Sig=. 0000,4df 
and residual error distribution differences were determined by success/failure 
category and by paired-samples t-tests between time periods. 
5.3.2 Order/innovation conditioned model at To 
Table 5-5a exhibits the results of the three conditional linear regression models at To. 
By observation, the three models vary in construction and validity from both the 
aggregate and each other. Like the PiLC conditioned models there are fewer but more 
powerful dimensions compared to either aggregate. 
Figure 5-3a and figure 5-3b suggest the ? /high function is superior to the others. 
However, figure 5-4a illustrates rising R2 values of the bivariate predictions as 
order/innovation decreases. This is logical and suggests that the later one enters, the 
more predictive accuracy variation is explained by the model. However, caution is 
warranted since the predictive accuracy of the late/low model is significantly different 
from only the ? /high. Conversely, the 18`/high model's wider predictive variation, 
suggests pioneering dimensions are more difficult to assess'- and deliver. Logical 
again, being 1s` with a new-to-the-world product based on speculative early 
information is not easy. But if possible, the dimensions are powerful in both 
prediction and effect. ' 
The high Adjusted RZ value of . 4421 compared to the aggregate (. 29857) and 
NewProd (. 395) combine with the lowest Standard Error of any model in this work 
(2.18485). These indicate that extrapolation of ? /high constructs to similar, larger 
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populations is judicious. Featuring an 88.4% accuracy rate at the initial screen, 
planning to enter early with a new-to-the-world product whilst duplicating the seven 
dimensional states of nature should lead to exceptionally accurate forecasting results 
and produce high levels of success at one year post launch. 
Though both the middle/medium and late/low models are inferior to NewProd, 
prediction accuracy and validity was higher than the aggregate model at To overall. 
Abnormal residual error is noted for the poorly performing middle category (see 
Figure 5-3a), with the least amount of residual distortion exhibited by the ? /high 
model (see Figure 5-3b). This suggests that being "caught in the middle" at T. may 
not be an attractive position (Aaker and Day 1986; Hannan and Freeman 1977; 
Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991; Porter 1980,1985). No outliers were found in any of 
the models. 
The absence of "superior product" from any of the categories at To is a very 
provocative result. It sustains the aggregate To result that creating a truly superior 
product at the initial screen is difficult; especially when one must be first in and new- 
to-the-world. Its absence casts greater doubt concerning seminal measurement timing 
error in NewProd. Keeping in mind this work's "beginner bias" it suggests that: (1) 
when conditioned by entry and innovation, other factors take precedence; (2) entry 
success may differ from long lasting success and (3) to be successful initially, being 
early and innovative may be more important than being competitively superior and 
truly utilitarian. 
Compared to the inadequate one dimension short To PiLC model suggesting little 
besides superior product was important, this model's seven dimensions are a clear 
prescription as to what must be done to achieve the 88.4% accuracy rate even without 
having a "superior product".. New factors absent in the aggregate model include 
"innovative strategy in highly competitive market", "long life cycle high price/high 
quality strategy" and "moderate innovation". Taken together, the three new 
dimensions suggest that if one intends to be first with a new-to-the-world product, 
one should not spend time strategising about the problems of being innovative in a 
crowded field. Rather than wasting resources developing a high priced, high quality, 
long lived superior entry, one should put the innovation into play early. As discussed 
in section 5.3.6, these dimensions sustain beliefs concerning innovation charters, 
protocols (Crawford 1984,1986,1994) and robust designs (Urban and von Hippie 
1988) which evolve; over time in response to user input and in the context of planned 
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families of up-rated products designs. Failing to get in the game may condemn the 
"truly superior, long lived, high priced product" to being "caught in the middle. "72 
The middle model is a less certain predictor. It suggests those actually "caught" can 
benefit by strategic product positioning to avoid failure (Hopkins 1980). It validates 
strategic choices affecting profitability and growth for market followers (Buzzell and 
Gale 1987; Lambkin 1988; Levitt 1965,1966; Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 
1986). It confirms that market pioneers, early followers and late entrants have 
different skill and resource profiles (Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan 1992) yielding 
comparative advantage different from, but not inferior to, earlier entrants (Abell and 
Hammond 1978). This should be welcome news to those requesting follower 
strategies (Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; Liberman and Montgomery 1988). 
With only four dimensions, the late/low model is similar in validity to NewProd's 
eleven and eight factor solutions yet it is 77.9% accurate. The dimensions overlap the 
aggregate model suggesting that if one fails to learn history lessons, strategic reaction 
and alertness are required to compensate for being late with mundane offerings. It 
suggests also, that if one is late and low in innovativeness, one must not enter a 
market satisfied with competitive products. 
The new and different factor selection, combined with validity differences, argues for 
acceptance of H3. _'. 
5.3.2.1 Factor difference at Tp 
Duncan's multiple range test uncovered only one factor different by condition. Noted 
in Table 5-6a, "overall project/company resource compatibility" is not significant to 
the To function and argues for rejection of H3. 
Table 5-6a: Duncan Multiple Range Analysis by ORDER at To 
(italics means significant in linear regression by ORDER) 
Factor at TO sign cant of <. 05 
F3: Overall project/company resource compatibility early * middle (and) middle * late 
5.3.2.2 Prediction differences at Tp 
Duncan's multiple range test for sorted aggregate predictions suggests the 1`/high 
prediction mean distribution is statistically different from the middle/medium 
distribution: This cautions that using sorted aggregate factors changes predictive 
72 An example of launching (prematurely) a less than perfect product was given recently by Lew Pacley, P6 (chip intended to replace the infamous, error prone Pentium) product manager for Intel Corp. In response to questions concerning heat, size and price, Mr. Pacley stated " he most important thing we can do is get the chip working and get It out'. 'The heat and size will drop in succeeding generations. (the implication being that the chip is only the first of many improved chips to follow In the design family. The first P6 chips will be followed by smaller, cooler, less expensive iterations from a new process not yet in place. The small amounts of less than superior product was launched to head off the competition from PowerPC based machines (PC Week 1995). 
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Figure 5-3c: ORDER Histogram of residual error at Tl 
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Figure 5-3d: Normalcy of residual error T(1) 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Res 
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results, questions the wisdom of using aggregate "one size fits all" models such as 
NewProd or Stanford and argues for acceptance of H3. 
Represented graphically in Figure 5-4a, the early 1°`/high prediction mean is 
statistically different from both the middle/medium and late/low means at the . 05 
level. This suggests strongly that if one is the pioneer, the 1°Yhigh model and factors 
should be used to the exclusion of the middle/medium and late/low model. If one 
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follows, either the middle/medium or the late/low model will yield statistically 
equivalent predictive mean distributions. These differences indicate that 
order/innovation is an enabling condition (Day 1981) of forecasting and dimension 
selection. This argues for acceptance of H3. 
5.3.3 Order/innovation conditioned model at Ti 
Table 5-5b exhibits the results of the three conditional linear regression models at T1. 
Table 5-5b: Linear regression conditioned by order/innovation at Tl 
a. n... uclina.., . aoor rote facto.. eredictine success after soiling by category BOLD italics . not in aggregate models 
Aggregate at Ti:,, R= . 68961, R2= 47556. Adj. R2=. 45450, F=22.57937 at. 
0000 with df Std error= 2.28289 prediction-, 
accuracy rate = 83. % 
p=order/innovation Factor Description Regression Model Fit 
model Coefficient 
a= Agg. Model 
1"/high: (Top 1/3 of F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.221241 R=. 75437, R -. 56908, 
factor) F15 NPD history of failure . 832008 Adj. R2=. 52488, 
p=86.2 % F7 Marketing & management resource compatibility . 766623 StdErr=2.03578, 
a=87.4 % (synergy) F=12.87591, Sig=. 0000, 
F8 Alertness to threat of competitive retaliation . 667318 
8df 
F3 Superior product in large rapid growth market . 607842 
F5 New to the firm, didn't fit in -. 580374 
F14 NPD history of kills and success -. 527212 
F18 Relative high price of product -. 499475 
Constant 1.980090 
Middle/medium F2 Strategic reaction capability 1.253960 R=. 73505, R2=. 54030, 
(Middle 1/3 of F3 Superior product in large rapid growth market 1.128727 Adj. R2=. 50582, 
factor) F15 NPD history of failure . 871117 StdErr=2.21350, 
p=88.5 % F18 Relative high price of product -. 742537 F=15.67086, Sig=. 000, 
a=86.2 % F5 New to the firm, didn't fit in -. 697598 6df 
Fl I Satisfied customer with dominant competitor . 531555 
Constant 1.751458 
Latellow (Bottom F15 NPD history of failure 1.276861 R=. 61038, R2=. 37257, 
1/3 of factor) F14 NPD history of kills and success -. 935726 Adj. R; =. 33335, 
p=80.2 % F2 Strategic reaction capability . 858688 StdErr=2.55363, 
a=77.9 % F3 Superior product in large rapid growth market . 822757 F=950070, Sig=. 0000, F5 New to the firm, didn't fit in -. 735710 5df 
Constant 1.245331 
Again by observation, the solutions are quite different from the aggregate model and 
from each other. Two of the three Tl solutions are superior to the aggregate solution 
and more accurate and valid than NewProd. The la`/high model, with an Adjusted R2 
of . 52488 and accuracy of 86.2%, would be particularly applicable to similarly 
profiled populations. Rising dramatically from its To position, the middle/medium 
model has an Adjusted RZ of . 50582 and is 88.5% accurate. The reason for this large 
rise in validity and accuracy is speculative, important and addressed in section 5.3.6 
below. True of all conditional models, the number of success dimension is less than 
for the aggregates or NewProd., These differences argue for acceptance of H3. 
Overall, the residual error is distributed reasonably and commonly for all functions 
(see Figure 5-3c and 5-3d). This, in combination with the different but similar slopes 
of the bivariate prediction lines (see Figure 5-4b), argues for rejection of H3. The 
predictions deviate from each other less than at T. (see Figure 5-4a). Like the To 
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predictions, the late/low model has the highest R2. Caution is in order again since its 
accuracy is not statistically different from either of the others. With one outlier found 
for the ? /high, the models are sound. 
The ? /high model is superior in validity and similar in accuracy to the short PiLC 
model. It is remarkable in its potential for extrapolation to large populations and it 
demonstrates strategies for pioneers capable of forecasting and implementing 
correctly, the eight dimensional states of nature at T1. This again supports its use to 
alter the factors of success and if desired, change a deterministic history. Even more 
remarkable, the Tl middle/medium solution's evolution, highlighted by the leap in 
importance of superior product, suggests that waiting to develop a better product with 
better strategic options can be a very successful strategy for some (Buzzell and Gale 
1987; Lambkin 1988; Levitt 1965,1966; Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 1986). 
Clearly, those "caught in the middle" (Aker and Day 1986; Kleinschmidt and Cooper 
1991; Porter 1980,1985) are not without opportunity. The late/low solution is quite 
similar to the late/low solution at To, with deterministic history dominating both. 
Being late with little innovativeness clearly limits one's strategic options. These 
dimensional differences support acceptance of H3. 
5.3.3.1 Factor difference at T1 
Duncan's multiple range test demonstrates that in the middle model, Factor 11 
"Satisfied customer with dominant competitor", differed between 1"/high and 
late/low models (see Table 5-6b). This argues for acceptance of H3. 
Table 5-6b: Duncan Multiple Range Analysis by ORDER at Tl 
(italics means significant in linear regression by ORDER) 
Factor at Tl - rr ý. -": ý. ý ý. significant at <. 05 
Fll: Satisfied customer with dominant competitor early middle 
middle xlate 
5.3.3.2 Prediction differences at TI 
Duncan's multiple range test revealed a significant difference between 1"/high and 
middle/medium predictions at the . 05 level in the sorted aggregate order/innovation 
models. These findings agree with the results for this test at To and suggest that 
forecasts using the aggregate, NewProd or Stanford models may shroud prediction 
differences resulting from order/innovation conditional differences. The 1$`/high 
order/innovation model prediction differed from both the middle/medium and the 
late/low distribution mean. , 
The same as the To result, this suggests again that for best 
results, the is`/high model should be used by pioneers to the exclusion of the other 
two order/innovation models. 
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5.3.4 Paired-samples t-test 
"Common" factors were tested for change between To and T3. Ranking at To was 
used to categorise the cases. Table 5-7 indicates that no factors appearing to be 
similar over time are actually different in their distribution patterns at the p=. 05 level. 
"New to the firm" for the 1$`/high failed case distribution is statistically different over 
time at the . 095 level. "Strategic reaction" for middle/medium 
failure cases is 
different at the . 079 level. And 
"retaliation" for the Pt/high success cases is different 
at the . 103 level. New to the 
firm and strategy being significant to the models 
suggests that "common" factors differ over time. This argues for acceptance of H3. 
Table 5-7: Model of common factor comparison by success/failure 
over time 
Success means Failure means .. 
Factor'ý'I: ü. ý" Tp Tj Diff Sig. ý "- TO TI Diff Sig. 
'lsl/high -69"e ; Isl/high 777777 I. + 
History of ý 2867 . 2758 -. 0109' ;. 870-j °r'^ ý'"; r. a; ý'' -. 
5816 -. 3395 . 2421 
failure"`='`,, ýfli: °_., 
Strategic" 2356 . 2804 -. 0448 . 483. -. 
3726 -. 6881 . 3155 222 
reaction 
, New to the firmd'ý -. 0442 -. 0819 . 0377 '. 474 . 
6901 . 8662 -. 1762 . 095 
Retaliation ýo,! 4 . 2358 . 1120 . 1238 . 103. } -. 5673 -. 5534 -. 0140 . '. 943. 
, it Middlefinedium Middle/medium 
History Of , ý' C '; ^ . 1509 . 0730 -. 0778 , 330 -. 5090 -. 3787 . 1303 ' . 325 dI' ' failure'i! ý, 't 1 
Strategic F1 1 8 -, . 0496 . 1072 -. 0576 . 514 -. 4188 X6466 . 2278 P a; ,l 079 * reaction : 
'; ý-4,91- 
New to the firm -. 1835 -. 1855 . 0020 .. 963 r. 'n -. 0124 . 0334 -. 0458 . 559 a 
Laleliow n=58 , I1, '. LateRow n=28 
Histo of "'ß'. r4 ýi; i . 1827 . 1620 -. 0207 . 
800 
'h p -. 6169 -. 6354 -. 0185 . 859 j failure ''G'"',,,, P, {I' I _11; 1 "ý11, ti 
_ 
d History of K&S yl . 1704 -. 1738 -. 3442 . 183i, t '+. ýý -. 3294 . 3236 . 6530 . 119 '- the absolute difference in the history dimension results from the factor's slightly different construction at T1. 
Table 5-8a examines model categorical prediction mean distributions over time. The 
middle/medium failure mean does vary over time. This indicates that prediction 
accuracy for failed cases can vary by model selection i. e. using the To middle/medium 
model rather that its Tl counterpart will give failed cases statistically different 
accuracy results. o' } 
Table 5-8a: Model prediction means comparison by success/failure 
over time Eowüaia4 
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The residual error differences in Table 5-8b supports those in Table 5-8a and also 
demonstrates that residual error goes down over time. T, models are more valid and 
preferable all else being equal. Also, the middle/medium failure residual error, 
different at p=. 032, supports the difference in the middle/medium prediction above. 
These prediction and residual error differences over time supports acceptance of H3. 
Table 5-8b: Model residual means comparison by success/failure over time Bwi,;. - 
. kn, r *aD . Os 
-Success means Failure means " ;: ýr .: ý r' + ý' 
ý 
y s' 
Tp ýý Tj Difference °. Sig. _ . To TI -- Dierence ä Sig.. -- 
1"/high . 6513 . 5524 . 0989 . 
493 : ` 
1st/high -2.4494 -2.1574 -. 2920 . 528 ; ý ýý n=56 : , '! ý'ý n=13 ý. 
1ýý. 
middle/ 1.2674 . 9296 . 3378 , .. 
135 middle! -3.3873 -2.5124 -. 8749 . 032 ; 
medium rý, 
ýýýý 
medium q,. 'ý': ', ""; 
n=37 
late/low 1.1872 1.2515 -. 0644 7681. late/low -2.5751 -2.4021 -. 1729 617',.; 
n=47 "'ýýý'"'ýýý. n=21 
ýs'I: 'ýI, ýir 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
These results demonstrate that when aggregate models are conditioned by 
order/innovation, model validity, significant factors and model accuracy differ by 
category. Controlling for order/innovation tends to reveal dimensional changes and 
new factors/variables having interesting ramifications vis-ä-vis the aggregate model 
findings and seminal works. Some differences are also observed in "common" 
factors also. This argues for H3 acceptance. Clearly, significant factors appear, 
disappear and change inherent properties over time. Therefore, the preponderance of 
evidence related to condition allows this research to accept hypothesis H3. Factors 
significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction do vary as a 
function of its order of entry and level of innovativeness. The null form is thus 
rejected. 
5.3.6 Discussion of H3 findings 
Accepting H3 responded to requests for analysis by condition (Wind and Mahajan 
1988). However, like the discussion of PiLC above, whilst obvious gross model 
differences exist here also, small category sizes limits dimensional interpretation to 
speculation. 
I. Temporal qualification (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and 
entry/innovativeness conditions alter aggregate success dimensions. Consistent 
with many (Lambkin 1988; Lilien and Yoon 1990; Robinson and Fornell 1985; 
Robinson, Fornell and Sullivan 1992; Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 1986) 
entry position does matter. Changes observed within categories as projects 
mature may reflect product process innovation'evolution (Abernathy and 
Utterback 1978; Ansoff 1965; Ansoff and Stewart 1967; Calantone, Di Benedetto 
and Meloche 1988; de Bresson and Townsend 1981; Utterback 1981,1982; 
Utterback and Abernathy 1975): Suggesting entry and innovativeness have little 
impact (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1987a; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993; 
Fershtman Mahajan and Muller 1990) is incomplete. Whilst "first in" advantages 
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may be balanced by disadvantages (Cooper 1979b), the issue is more complex, 
with strategic choices affecting results for followers (Buzzell and Gale 1987; 
Lambkin 1988; Levitt 1965,1966; Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 1986) based 
on different skill/resource profiles (Abell and Hammond 1978; Robinson, Fornell 
and Sullivan 1992). 
II. Finding normative success strategies over time for followers (Liberman and 
Montgomery 1988) should be helpful to this vast majority of the market. Being 
high/first seems to compensate for having a less than "superior" pioneering 
introduction. Those yielding the pioneer role at To are "caught in the middle" 
(Porter 1980; see Table 5-5a). The alarming, unreliable middle/medium model 
evolves to its T, equivalent. But here the team is finally "in the game" and 
pursuing the leader, with dimensions mapped precisely and reliably. This 
confirms that entry performance is a function of the moderation in the strategies 
of entrant categories (Lambkin 1988) and that entry position alone is not enough 
i. e. success is based on many factors (Kerin, Varadaragan and Peterson (1992); 
Lilien and Yoon 1990; Miller, Gartner and Wilson 1989). Logically, the ls`/high 
model evolves less as pioneers defend the status quo whilst followers play "catch 
up/leap frog" through T1. "Superior product", missing for followers at To, "leap 
frogs" using strategic product positioning over time (Crawford 1984,1986,1994; 
Lambkin 1988; Levitt 1965,1966; Urban and von Hipple 1988). Compared to 
superior product's fifth position for the 18C/high model and its insignificance in the 
late/low model, the "used apple policy" is validated as long as the team gets the 
second big bite and not the skimpy remains left to late entrants (Levitt 1965, 
1966). The late/low entrant sees a more deterministic forecast with history 
dominating the dimension at both T. and T,. Its lack of alternatives is seen by 
comparing failure history's role in the 18t/high model as only one of seven or eight 
dimensions in the To and Tl respectively. However, in the late/low model, history 
has disproportionate deterministic effects at both To and T1. Being "late with less" 
seems unforgiving, empowers past behaviour, limits creative response and makes 
developing competitive advantage troublesome. 
III. Model choice is proprietary to team objectives, resources and forecasting/reactive 
abilities. Insignificant statistical differences in performance measurement 
distributions of 2.2133,1.4585 and 1.3488 at To and 2.2186,1.3181 and 1.4767 at 
T1, show 1S`/high entrants more successful absolutely. However, lack of 
significance at p=. 05 refutes Kleinschmidt and Cooper's (1991) poorly 
performing middle innovativeness category, at least through one year post launch. 
The issue of choice seems better stated as "which one of the six models relates 
better (Lilien 1975) to our strengths, weaknesses and objectives? " This is a 
function of: (1) ability to predict order accurately at To; (2) probability of 
successful dimension implementation by Tl and (3) model expected value vis-a- 
vis strategic firm/project objectives (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982), abilities 
(Abell and Hammond 1979; `Aaker and Day 1986; Ansoff and Stewart 1967; 
Calantone and Di'Benedetto 1988; 'Lambkin 1988; Utterback, Allen, Hollomon 
and Sirbu 1976) and time remaining (Albala 1975; Ansoff and Stewart 1967; 
Baker 1974; Charles and Stedry 1966; Glotskey 1960; Rubenstein 1964). 
Relative to these criteria, any and all are useful if based on the situation. Success 
is more a function, not of entry order, but of the "strategic window" (Abell 1978) 
skills and resources presented to the firm at different times (Abell and Hammond 
1979). 
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IV. "Innovative strategy in highly competitive market" is a new dimension to the field 
and a detractor from success for the To 131/high model. Competition at the higher 
end of the innovative spectra may be more critical to entry success than thought 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993) and supports firms killing mis-directed projects. 
The rise of "alertness to threat of competitive retaliation" to pioneers over time is 
logical given pioneers have no competition at T073. Over time they must increase 
their alertness decidedly. This confirms acknowledged undercounting of market 
competitive phenomena (Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987a). The dimension's 
Newness/Innovation strategy construct, a detractor at To, enhances the 1$`Ihigh T, 
"strategic reaction" dimension. Feedback is required from the market to 
determine levels of innovativeness. Innovative strategy's worth is dubious at To, 
but important at Tl following feedback. This suggests again, that strategic 
effectiveness has temporal qualities. 
V. "Long life cycle, high price/high quality strategy" is new to the field, detracts 
from success and suggests superior long lived products (Cooper and de Brentani 
1984) are not required for a one year "foundation" success. In conjunction with 
"moderate innovation", these new dimensions may confirm that successful initial 
entries are only the first in a line of many incremental innovations to follow 
(Crawford 1986). With 90% of new products only moderately innovative (Booz, 
Allen and Hamilton 1982), robust design families (Rothwell and Gardiner 1988) 
sporting moderate, synergistic improvement, seem the foundations of long term 
product family (Meyer and Utterback 1993) success. 
Testing H3 responded to the inconsistency in the literature between those deeming 
order of entry important (Booz, Allen and Hamilton 1982; Hopkins and Bailey 1971; 
Lambkin 1988; Lilien and Yoon 1990; Robinson and Fomell 1985; Robinson, Fornell 
and Sullivan 1992; Urban, Carter, Gaskin and Mucha 1986) and those sceptical of its 
worth (Fershtman, Mahajan and Muller 1990; Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson 1992; 
Miller, Gartner and Wilson 1989). It also provided new insight into the proper role of 
innovation in the success/failure dynamic (Davidson 1976; Gerstenfeld 1976; Kulvik 
1977; Marquis 1969; Myers and Marquis 1969; Rothwell 1972,1974,1976; 
Utterback, Allen, Hollomon and Sirbu 1976). Clearly, the "one size fits all" approach 
(Cooper 1979b, 1981,1992; Zirger and Maidique 1990) whilst prevalent and 
acceptable may not be best. de Brentani (1986) is imprecise in suggesting that 
general models are the equivalent of "custom" models because differences in 
outcomes are not supported. She is correct in that' aggregate models can be applied to 
diverse sets of businesses. But models based on order/innovation can be more valid, 
accurate and less "information hungry". And though outcome based on different 
dimensions may be similar, models varying over time and conditionally by 
order/innovation may be a very important to practitioners. Consistent with Albala 
(1975), failure to recognise these differences leads to higher than expected cost of 
73 the aggregate model by construction methodology contains 2/3rda. modiom/middle and low/late caxa Le. They we the competitive followers the pioneer is worrying about 
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error, represented by unnecessary and premature speculative information 
accumulation and evaluation. Practitioner scepticism is warranted until more 
discriminating refined models are supplied. 
5.4 Hypothesis H4 
Firms which develop precise initial strategies but react flexibly to deal with 
deficiencies in early assumptions of internal and external environments, are more 
successful than those that do not. 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Hypothesis H4 suggests that successful firms deal better with initial strategies and 
strategic deficiencies than failures by modifying their response to suit the internal and 
external environments. Because there were differences in the "dynamic strategy" 
dimension's construction between time periods, comparison of three equal 
distributions was impossible. Instead, a paired-samples t-test was used to examine 
success/failure differences in common strategic variables over time. Acceptance of 
H4 was based on the size and nature of variable change. 
5.4.2 Analysis of strategic components 
Table 5-9 and Figure 5-5 display the results, with significant differences noted at 
p=. 001,. 05 and. 1 levels. All seven variables showed significant change by success 
and/or failure at the . 10 level or better. This is not surprising given the factor's 
significance to the aggregate and conditioned models and its rise in rank over time for 
the aggregate model scenario. 
Table 5-9: Strategic Reaction variable construct paired-samples t-test 
by success/failure 
Developed clear strategies to deal with:. Mean Mean - Change , 'i 
l-score, Significance 
Tp Tj between 
Tpand ***--p <01 
r T =P 
- deficiencies in the final product Success 5.026 5.432 . 41 3.16 *** 
Failure 3.843 3.386 -. 46 -1.6 
- deficiencies in the nature of the project itself Success 4.253 4.747 . 49 2.83 *** 
Failure 3.371 3.314 -. 06 -. 18 
- difficulties inherent in the market Success 5.458 5.495 . 04 . 27 
Failure 3.586 2.943 -. 64 -2.48 ** 
- deficiencies in the area of barriers to entry Success 4.532 4.911 . 38 2.71 *** 
Failure 3.414 3.043 -. 37 -1.5 
- deficiencies in the area of resource requirements Success 4.600 4.653 . 05 . 38 
Failure 3.743 3.171 -. 57 -2.34 ** 
- deficiencies/problems in the area of product Success 5.311 5.668 . 36 2.18 ** 
newness/innovativeness +` 
Failure 4.857 2.671 -2.19 -1.65 
" spent a long time on the market research for the product Success 3.405 3.690 . 28 2.48 *** 
Failure 3.100 2.843 -. 26 -152 
+= variable loaded on factor based on Tl data set but not N. B. a minus sign implies a reduction in capability as judged by To data set - managers 
e ý. 
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Figure 5-9: Strategic reaction comparsion between success and failure cases 
Deficiencies In the area of product 
newness/innovatveness (Ti only) 
Deficiencies in the area of resource 
requirements 
Deficiencies In the area of barriers 
to entry 
Difficulties inherent in the market 
Deficiencies in the nature of the 
project itself 
Deficiencies In the final product 
Spent a long time on the market 
research for the product 
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The largest overall variable change was in "strategy to deal with 
deficiencies/problems in the area of newness/innovation". Whilst success cases 
increased their strategic readiness to deal with newness/innovation matters over time, 
failure cases decreased dramatically in this ability. In addition, success cases rose 
significantly in their ability to deal with deficiencies in the area of "barriers to entry", 
"nature of the project", "final product" and the amount of time spent on the product's 
"market research". Following the precipitous decline in "newness/innovation 
readiness", failures declined significantly, also in their ability to implement strategies 
to deal with problems in the area of "resource requirements" and "the market". These 
strong results'support acceptance'of H4. 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
Observing the importance and change in statistical significance of the "strategic 
reaction" factor over time in the aggregate, the PiLC and the order/innovation models, 
argues for acceptance of H4; even without tests conducted here. The evidence is 
abundant thata dynamic strategy (Porter 1991) plays 
,a 
critical part in success, 
through one year post launch. Isolating each construct and observing perceived 
adaptation to internal and external environments' only sustains an obvious conclusion. 
Every dimension construct changed statistically over time for either successes or 
failures. Therefore, consistent with Abell and Hammond (1979), Booz, Allen and 
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Hamilton (1982), Buzzell and Gale (1987) and Porter (1980,1985,1991), this work 
must conclude that firms which develop precise initial strategies but react to 
downstream information to deal with deficiencies in early assumptions of internal and 
external environments, are more successful than those that do not. This research 
accepts H4 and rejects the null form. 
5.4.4 Discussion of Hit findings 
This work's microscopic approach elucidates Cooper's rather broad admonitions 
concerning control over one's destiny. Adjusting the emphases, it suggests that it is 
possible for products to succeed in spite of the uncontrollable external environment 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1990), as long as initial planning and strategic reaction is 
appropriate to the situation. 
I. To strategic preparedness is higher absolutely for success cases. This readiness 
confirms that resources and skills must be anticipated and assembled ahead of 
time (Abell 1978; Abell and Hammond 1979) to ensure timely execution and a 
successful outcome. However, temporal evolution in strategy constructs suggests 
decisions cannot be made at the initial screen, implemented and left to age 
gracefully. Success cases increased their abilities to deal with newness, barriers, 
project, final product and market research requirements over time. Failure cases 
declined in this ability vis-ä-vis newness, resources and the market (see Figure 5- 
9). This supports those calling for a dynamic (Porter 1991) strategy. 
II. Though uncontrollable variables have had only limited support (Cooper 1979b, 
1980b, 1981; Cooper and de Brentani 1984) in the NPD modelling literature, their 
initial and continuous assessment is needed to achieve dynamic balance (Abell 
and Hammond 1979; Porter 1980,1985,1991). Suggesting that new products 
succeed in spite of their external or market environment (Cooper 1983; Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1990) is imprecise. Rather, initial accurate assessment of 
internal and external antecedents, effective strategy based on this assessment and 
intelligent strategic alignment over time (Kotler 1994) is the foundation of 
success. Despite arguments of external variable overemphasis (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1993) the evidence is clear. New products succeed or fail, not in 
spite of uncontrollable environments but in consideration of them. Internal and 
external antecedent uncertainty and evolution seem to be catalysts for successful 
planning (Abell and Hammond 1979). 
o Successful teams meet problematic barriers to entry (Bain 1956; Karakaya and 
Stahl 1989; Porter 1980,1985) "head on" and at increasingly statistically 
significant levels over time. "Barriers to entry" do not disappear after entry 
but remain a problem to be dealt with at least through the introduction period. 
With failure cases declining absolutely in this strategic ability over time, these 
elements demand constant attention, analysis and strategic action/re-action. 
oA strategy to deal with market problems is important to avoiding failure (see 
Figure 5-9). Strategy to take advantage of large growing markets has been 
suggested as important (Cooper 1979b, 1980b, 1985; Link 1987). It has been 
validated by Zirger and Maidique's hypothesis (H8,1984) that markets that are large and growing are positively related to successful outcomes and negatively 
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related to failures. However, the situation is more complex for many given 
that mistakes are made, inadequate markets entered and correction necessary. 
Success cases did not increase significantly in their ability to deal strategically 
with market problems. However, failures decreased in this ability at p=. 05 and 
failed to compensate strategically for poor markets once entered. Clearly, 
teams unable to adapt to market problems are inclined to fail. This may 
indicate that, whilst market strategy doesn't give overwhelming advantage, 
lack of market strategy can hasten failure. 
III. The necessity of adequate resources to develop and then to adjust strategy is 
confirmed (Ansoff 1965; Calantone and Cooper 1981; Cooper 1979b, 1980b, 
1985a, 1985b, 1990,1992; Cooper and de Brentani 1984,1991; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1986,1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1990; de Brentani 1986; Link 1987; 
Maidique and Zirger 1984; Peters and Waterman 1982; Zirger and Maidique 
1990) as important to strategic alignment. Though success case ability to modify 
product and project strategy through launch grew systematically, the decline 
experienced by failure cases was not significant. This may indicate that early 
problems with product/project issues does not predestine failure. But left 
uncorrected, failure can be expected. The need to earmark resources to react to 
the unknown may be another reason for practitioner lack of spending on the front 
end of the process (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1988). 
IV. Uncovering an evolving role for marketing research in NPD strategy formulation 
is quite significant. It confirms its importance (Calantone and Cooper 1979; 
Calantone and Di Benedetto 1988; Cooper 1976,1979a, 1980b, 1983; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1986,1988; Hopkins 1980; Lazo 1965) in NPD activities. And it 
confronts criticism of marketing research noted by others (Crawford 1977; 
Gomory 1989; Tauber 1974). Executives sceptical about its strategic value 
(Mahajan and Wind 1992) or viewing research as discrete and ending at launch 
are short-sighted. Matching discontinuous marketing research efforts to a 
continuous process of product and marketing strategy advancing together 
(Crawford 1986) is a mistake, especially during rapid change. Determining what 
characteristics are required of robust product design families (Rothwell and 
Gardiner 1988) in the eyes of an evolving, target market and strategy, requires 
consistency of effort after commercialisation. 
At one extreme, managers spend too much time putting out fires to the exclusion of 
strategic planning (Gorchels 1995). At the other, formalised strategic principles may 
be taken to excess (Lubatkin and Pitts 1985). The acceptance of H4 suggests that in 
between lies a position where new product managers halt "management only by 
crisis". Rather, they must clarify the strategic dimensions in support of early 
probabilities for success and provide the resources necessary to create and implement 
conditional plans based on posterior probabilities leading to T, dimensional targets. 
Eýýý _Q.. 
ý`; _ .ý. 
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Chapter Six - Summary and conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter six synthesises this work's findings, lists its limitations and suggests a 
framework for future scholarship. By using a discrete simulation design, evolution of 
perceived success/failure antecedents, dimensions and models was illustrated. 
Demonstrably: 
1. Many antecedents of success and measures of objective attainment are perceived 
by NPD managers to differ significantly over time. 
2. Complimentary linear functions define the perceived beginning and end of the 
NPD process. 
3. Reactive strategy, NPD multigenerational history and a superior product are the 
most important dimensions of success through one year post launch. 
4. Current linear screening models constructed using retrospective methods produce 
average prescriptive dimensions which exhibit measurement timing error when 
used at the initial screen. 
5. Success dimensions evolve from somewhat deterministic to more stochastic over 
time. 
6. Model forecasting accuracy rises as launch approaches based on better data 
availability. 
7. Product market PiLC and order of entry/level of innovation alter aggregate 
success model accuracy and dimension rank. 
8. Proper initial dimensional alignment and intra-process realignment based on 
changing environments is critical to a successful project through one year post 
launch. 
Whilst these findings temporally validate and synthesise much from the NPD 
literature, further temporal and conditional study should lead to improved model 
validity, accuracy and parsimony. However, practitioners should not wait for better 
models to be developed. They can benefit immediately from the results of this work 
if they: (1) benchmark reasons for their current product market success, failure and 
kill historical "batting average"; (2) enhance and/or replace contributing/offending 
processes and systems based on these history lessons; (3) choose or reject aggregate 
or conditional success/failure models based on team forecasting ability; (4) 
concentrate on the selected model's time specific dimensions of success and (5) 
provide/reserve adequate resources to adapt strategically over time to both internal 
and external antecedent changes in the NPD environment. 
The future research path is clear. Scholars should improve on this work's 
rudimentary understanding of evolution by learning more about the temporal, 
conditional and strategic trade-offs of internal and external dimensions of success. 
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Building on Calantone and Di Benedetto's beginning (1990), this can be 
accomplished best by combining linear and curvilinear methods to validate more 
elegant NPD intra-process simulations. 
6.2 Summary of conclusions 
Six of seven hypotheses were accepted. 
6.2.1 Hypothesis Hla conclusion 
Many variables perceived important to a new product's success are dynamic and 
evolve over the life of the NPD process in both significance and magnitude. Because 
many variables were significant at both data recollection points, much from seminal 
work has been validated at both the initial screen and one year post launch. However, 
because many display temporal instability, re-examination under simulated or 
longitudinal conditions is in order. 
A 43% change in the original To significant variable environment over time combined 
with a 37.5% change in antecedent magnitude illustrates at least two similar but 
critically different NPD environments (see Figure 4-2,4-3 and 4-4). Established 
variables showing stability between environments relate to: (1) R&D, engineering, 
marketing research, management, sales and distribution resource requirements; (2) the 
need for continuous problem solutions regarding product, customer and competitive 
newness and (3) uniqueness of a clearly superior product in a high need high growth 
market. Those exhibiting temporal instability relate to: (1) advertising and 
promotion resources; (2) product protocol vis-ä-vis its relationship to competitive 
offerings and (3) growth in the dollar size of the market. 
Some new to the field variables such as, expected speed and magnitude of competitive 
retaliation, general strategic alignment and speed to market were discovered to be 
temporally stable. Others such as high end innovativeness, innovation strategy and 
contribution margin exhibited temporal instability. This demonstration of temporal 
significance in both established and new antecedents is important given recent 
confirmation of temporal differences in performance measurement criteria (Hultink 
and Robben 1995; Ronkainen 1985). 
6.2.2 Hypothesis Hl b conclusion,,,, 
The factors constructed from screening variables whilst dynamic, do not evolve over 
time. This is probably due to the normalisation process. Individual antecedent 
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environments do change before they are normalised. Following normalisation they 
differ again based on their selection by unique linear regression functions. 
6.2.3 Hypothesis Hic conclusion 
Factors significant to a new product's successful introduction are dynamic. As more 
information becomes known to the firm over time, the dimensions of success evolve 
from inadequate to more adequate. They also change by selection and influence as 
they are used by unique linear regression functions. 
The To linear regression model demonstrates a deterministic/prescriptive character 
based in large part on both the early influence of a certain product market history and 
the speculative characteristics of early information. The To model evolves into a T, 
model exhibiting a decidedly stochastic/descriptive character. As information 
becomes known over time, the model improves in rigour. Dimensional priorities 
change based on learning and implementing "history lessons" and tighter strategic 
alignment with external and internal requirements. 
The dramatic change from To to T, combined with the Tl function's close reflection of 
NewProd implies Cooper's model is handicapped by measurement timing error when 
used to describe the dimensions of a successful project at the initial screening. This 
confirms Cooper's suspicion that NewProd describes the dimensions as they turn out 
much later in the process (Cooper 1992). Importantly, problems stemming from 
measurement timing error could cause teams to over concentrate on the development 
of the 8`h most important dimension at To, "superior product", at the risk of violating 
the 6' most important dimension, "late to enter". Thus, measurement timing error 
manifest in the "superior product" dimension could cause the project to become a 
"leapfrogging follower" subject to a follower positioning strategy (see 6.2.6 below). 
6.2.4 Hypothesis Hid conclusion 
As the factors contributing to a new product's success evolve, the resulting post 
screen model becomes more accurate. 81.2% To accuracy improves to 83.85% over 
time based on improved downstream information states of nature. Though 
statistically significant, the small improvement seems meaningless until the validity 
of the model producing the change is considered. Then, its improved fit, predictive 
certainty and reduction in ECE leading to'an increase in EVII help explain managers' 
avoidance of speculative front-end activities and their concentration on more certain 
downstream processes. 
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6.2.5 Hypothesis Hg conclusion 
Factors significant to a new product's successful introduction do vary by PiLC. 
Model validity, factor and accuracy changes suggest scholars should consider fuzzy 
criteria for validation in the stage gate paradigm. Categorisation results in a dramatic 
reduction in success dimensions and allows other new to the field factors to surface. 
"Dynamic change" becomes important to success for those who understand its value. 
This repudiates those who unconditionally recommended its avoidance (Cooper and 
Calantone 1977; Cooper 1980b). Contradiction between the NewProd prescription 
and selective successful dynamic experience may cause avoidance by the most active 
NPD populations. 
6.2.6 Hypothesis H3 conclusion 
Factors significant in contributing to a new product's successful introduction do vary 
as a function of its order of entry and relative level of innovativeness. Again, when 
aggregate models are constrained, model validity, factors and accuracy differ by 
categorical condition. Whilst controlling for order/innovation also reveals new 
dimensions, the most exciting conclusion here is the demonstrable normative 
positioning strategies available for followers wishing to "leap-frog" the pioneer. A 
superior product well positioned (Crawford 1984,1986,1994; Lambkin 1988; Levitt 
1965,1966; Urban and von Hippie 1988) over time seems the key to overcoming the 
pioneer's advantage. 
6.2.7 Hypothesis H4 conclusion 
Firms which develop precise initial strategy but react flexibly to deal with 
deficiencies in early assumptions of internal and external environments are more 
successful than those that do not. Observing strategic variable construct change by 
success/failure category is enlightening. But the aggregate strategic dimension's 
movement from second to first place over time is truly exciting. Strategy appears to 
be the "dynamic link" (Porter 1991) to dimensions requiring "exactlyX" amount of 
alignment by one year post launch. This implies that NPD intra-process health can be 
diagnosed and improved based on precise amounts of prescribed strategic effort. 
6.3 Scholarly implications 
Scholarly implications from this work's findings are numerous. All relate to the need 
for dynamic methodologies, conditional models and additional temporal success 
dimension validation. _ý. 
' 3.. ..,;. _, .... 
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6.3.1 Methods 
Third generation process empiricism requires a break from single generation 
deterministic designs. These are inappropriate where time is a critical factor (Bums 
and Austin 1985) and produce models laden with measurement timing error. This 
reduces the temporal validity of intra-process dimensional prescription. 
Dynamic methods are recommended to shed light on gates, activities and critical 
paths. These require the use of time series analysis, queuing theory, Bayesian 
statistical analysis, canonical correlation and/or discrete/continuous simulation in a 
PERT network74. All would help to explain the temporal trade-offs of intra-process 
NPD activities and resources and their result on success/failure outcome. The 
canonical correlation design used by Calantone and Di Benedetto (1990) to find 
compounding interaction within and between controllable and uncontrollable 
variables is an instructive beginning. Extension is recommended, but in a temporal 
context. 
6.3.2 Models 
Whilst the 1981 NewProd model was quite extraordinary, today it is neither the most 
parsimonious, accurate, dynamic or valid. This work demonstrates five models more 
valid and accurate than NewProd (see shaded cells in Table 6-1 below), twelve with 
lower standard error and fourteen more parsimonious than Cooper's most famous 
work. However, all models require re-examination by field scholars. Though 
findings are tentative, it would appear that inflexible, prescriptive, information hungry 
models adding little accuracy over simple success, failure and kill history, should give 
way to stochastic multiple model explanations. This is consistent with Crawford's 
(1986) admonishment that newer evaluation techniques should be incremental and 
concerned with doing only part of the job - but better! The process control and 
conditional models which follow are good examples. 
6.3.2.1 Statistical process control models 
Dimension level alignment may be inappropriate for small firms. They might be 
better off using incremental models doing only part of the job. Benchmarking 
significant process control variables over time (rather than success dimensions) might 
allow a more precise understanding and implementation of strategic alignment issues. 
A simple process control model using this work's "critical six" antecedents is 
demonstrated in Figure 6-1. These variables are quite similar to those found by 
74 Similar to Microsoft Project, SPSS has recently developed CLEAR Process. This component uses one's SPSS data to simulate process behaviours. It generates most probable outcomes based on changing allocations in resources and Monte Carlo probability distribution theory. 
171 
Calantone and Cooper (1979) which discriminated between success/failure. Research 
at the critical variable level would allow construction of normative strategic 
alignment success/failure parameters in the NPD TQM (total quality control) effort. 
Measuring and "fine tuning" key activities along the success path might be useful to 
Table 6-1: Comprehensive model comparison 
FLLC . constrained for PILL( orderlinnovation. - constrained for order innovation aggregate - aggregate model sorted by category. 
Shading - more valid and 
accurate than NewProd. 
il NewProd: Cooper, Robert G. (1981) 
not applicable 
R=. 648074, R2=. 420, Adj. Rß. 395, F =16.83 with 8df Standard error 
= 2.73 accuracy = 84.1% 
B Aggregate at To 
C Aggregate at Tt 
R=. 56589, R=. 32023, Adj. R2=. 29857, F=14.78065 at. 0000 with R=. 68961, R2=. 47556, Adj. R2=. 45450, F =22.57937 at 
8df Std err = 2.58869 accuracy = 81.2 % . 0000 with 10df Std err = 2.28289 accuracy = 
83.8% 
DPiLC 
short at To 
E PiLC short at T, 
R=. 29718, R'=. 08832, Adj. R2.07510, StdErr=3.14585, F=6.68410, R=. 77053, R2= 59371, `Adj. R2=. 54857, StdErr= 
Sig=. 0118, ldf - PiLC =71.8% aggregate =71.8% 2.19779, F=13.15189, Significant=. 0000,7df, 
order/innovation. =L0.1%, aggregate =84.5%' 
FPiLC 
medium at To 
ýJ PiLC medium at T, 
R=. 61923, R2=. 38345, Adj. R2=. 35776, StdErr-2.49795, R=. 64116, R2=. 41108, Adj. Rß. 37790, 
F=14.92635, Sig=. 0000,3df - PiLC =80.3%, aggregate =86.8% StdEn--2.45847, F=12.38996, Sig=. 0000,4df, 
order/innovation. =81.6%, aggregate =86.8% 
H PiLC long at To 
I PiLC long at Ti ". ' 
'`' 
R=. 69685, R2=. 48560, Adj. R2=. 44603, StdErr-2.42112, R=; 73641, R2= 54229, Adj. R2=. 49742, :-" 
F=12.27196, Sig=. 0000,4df, PiLC=78.9%, aggregate =80.7% StdErr_2.30608, F=12.08508, Sig=. 0000,5df., ", 
order/innovation. =86%, aggregate =82.5%,;, ', " 
.% Order/fnn 1"/high at To 
K Orderton 1"/high ät Tr ` 
R= : 69861, R2='48806; Adj. R2.44211, StdErr= 218485, F=' R=. 75437, R2=. 56908; Adj. R2=. 52488, 
° 10.62295, Sig=0000,7df, PiLC=88.4 %. aggregate =87.2 % . StdErr=2.03578, F=12.87591, Sig=. 0000,8df, , '': 
" 
'; "' 
"-- order/innovation. =86.2 %, aggregate =87.4% 
L ORDER/Inn middle/medium at To M Order/Inn middle/medium at Tt "°`- 
R=. 45458, R2=. 20664, Adj. R2.17830, StdErr=2.74777, F=7.29289, R=. 73505, R2=. 54030, Adj R2=. 50582; A', :`"°. 
Sig=. 0002,3df, PiLC=72.7%, aggregate =77.3 % ' StdErtý=2.21350, F=15.67086, Sig=, 000,6df, ,,.: 
order/innovation. =88.5 %, aggregate =86.2% 
NOrderMn late/low at To 0 Orderinn late/low at T, 
R=. 63341, R2=. 40121, Adj. R2=. 36378, StdErr-2.60917, R=. 61038, Rß. 37257, Adj. R2=. 33335, 
F=10.72048, Sig=. 0000,5df, PiLC =82.6 %, aggregate =79.1% StdErr=2.55363, F=9.50070, Sig=. 000,5df, 
order/innovation. = 80.2 %, aggregate =77.9 % 
practitioners not capable of using complex linear regression diagnostic techniques. 
Observation of a few key variable tolerances might be all small firms can cope with. 
Surely, greater use of simpler models is better than serious under-utilisation of 
complex models. 
6.3.2.2 Discrete stochastic simulation models 
This work's two stage simulation should evolve to more complex probabilistic forms 
explaining aggregate and conditional intra-process stages, dimensions and activities. 
Following this work's demonstration of To (M) and Ti milestones (see Figure 6-2), 
scholars need to demonstrate conditional adaptation (see Figure 6-3) and intra-process 
milestones represented by points M2; M3, M4`M5. T2 and T3' (see Figure 6-4). 
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Figure 6-4 is consistent with Cooper's request for "4F" fluidity, fuzzy gates, focused 
prioritisation and flexible process routing (Cooper 1994b). It illustrates intra-process 
activity which is fluid and adaptable based on overlapping stages. This yields greater 
speed and is enhanced by fuzzy gates where conditions can assume varying 
conditional and situational states of nature. All projects are properly focused and 
prioritised by optimal, dire and most probable expected value scenarios, with each 
project having the flexibility to choose a unique route through the network. Linear 
programming of expected gate conditions could optimise objective(s) realisation. 
With every project decision/resource allocation compared against all others, "pipeline 
chum" from frequently changing development priorities would be reduced. This 
would reduce confusion and frustration whilst speeding up development activity. 
Reducing churn would ultimately help achieve "pipeline balance", the ability to 
successfully develop new product platforms whilst extending existing product lines. 
6.3.3 Dimensions 
Whilst no established variables, dimensions or models of success are irrelevant, 
reactive strategy, NPD history and the development of a superior product are clearly 
the most important success factors at the one year post launch point. None-the-less, 
investigation of both new and established factors should continue in the context of 
multi-disciplinary factor evolution. New research should concentrate on: (1) the 
deterministic characteristics of multigenerational product market history; (2) strategic 
alignment criteria; (3) dimensions "enabled" by time, PiLC and order/innovation 
conditions and (4) factor/antecedent interaction over time. 
6.3.3.1, Product market history 
Reflection on the human condition of one member rising above a family's failed, 
resource poor past is important to understanding the history dimension's deterministic 
relationship to downstream stochastic dimensions.. Like Darwin's theory of natural 
selection (1859), the "nature" of the team's uncontrollable product market history 
colours strategic "nurturing" activities. How teams overcome a predilection to failure 
by nurturing precisely the right activities in a timely fashion, requires a better 
understanding of organisational learning systems (Kiechel 1990; Mumford 1992; 
Nonaka 1988; 1991; Shrivastava 1988; Shrivastava and Souder 1987). Lack of timely 
learning may explain why a history of failure can lead to more failure despite 
production of a superior product. Because understanding multigenerational product 
market history and appropriate supportive/remedial system development is probably 
the key to appropriate, timely NPD planning and strategic action, scholars should 
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address the power of a failed history on early success and ways of quickly 
overcoming bad habits. 
6.3.3.2 Strategic alignment criteria 
Failure to understand strategy's relationship to all other dimensions is tantamount to 
not understanding the To=TI model metamorphosis. Ultimately strategy is the most 
important determinant of success or failure. It is strategic antecedent/dimensional dis- 
equilibrium which propels the successful team into strategic action. Its implicit link 
to NPD dimensional emphases should encourage many from outside the field to 
diagnose precise types and levels of reaction required for specific dis-equilibrium 
problems. This would allow strategic physicians to prescribe the best medicine for 
the NPD illness. 
6.3.3.3 Enabled dimensions 
Dimensions "enabled" (Day 1981 ) by time, PiLC and order/innovation conditions 
herald external environments as appropriate for NPD study again. The To aggregate 
model includes two external dimensions, "alertness to threat of competitive 
retaliation" and "late market entry". The Tl model includes "1°` in new highly 
innovative market". These invite scholars interested in uncontrollable product market 
phenomena to investigate the influence of PLC, order of entry, levels of 
innovativeness, dynamic change and competitive assessment on short and long-term 
NPD success. Outlook is particularly bright for those using time sensitive, curvilinear 
methods which can calibrate rate of change relationships over time. 
6.3.3.4 Factor/antecedent interaction 
Temporal understanding of the interrelationship of internal and external dimensions 
may be more important than scholars rallying around dimensional "sacred cows". 
Slight difference in rank is secondary to the trade-offs in NPD intra-process activities 
and resources over time. The work of Calantone and Di Benedetto (1990) is quite 
important here and should be extended in a temporal, dynamic context. The result 
would be a better understanding of "must meet, should meet" activity which would 
expose simplest deterministic proclamations as naive and imprecise. 
6.4 Managerial implications 
This work's, discovery of multiple screening model options is good news for 
practitioners., Managers should re-examine their. negative pre-dispositions to "one- 
size-fits-all" models, especially if their dissatisfaction is based on NPD prescriptions 
incongruous with temporal or conditional information realities. 
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6.4.1 Multiple model systems approach 
The multiple model approach demonstrated here should result in faster, more flexible 
decision making based on temporally appropriate information. Unless To scores are 
appalling with little hope for improvement over time, practitioners need not be 
preoccupied early on with meeting long-term dimensional requirements. To get a 
GO! managers need to either pass the less demanding To screen or, failing it, 
favourably assess the probability of approaching the aggregate or conditional Tl 
model target by one year post launch. Such flexibility underscores Crawford's advice 
to managers that evaluating new products is a system not an act (Crawford 1986). 
Having a potentially superior product advantage at To is enough to get by the initial 
screen - as long as factor construct scores should rise systematically by launch and 
perceived impact is forecast to systematically become financial success by T1. This 
approach should speed up the process considerably as it reduces cycle time. 
6.4.2 Relative conditional models 
Practitioners with sufficient product market knowledge may achieve proposed third 
generation model advantages today. Sporting accuracy rates from 86% to 90.1%, 
versus NewProd's 84.1%, five are more valid and accurate than NewProd whilst 
requiring far less information (see Table 6-1). Using any of them can result in 
substantial time and budget savings whilst selectively improving accuracy. However, 
model choice is a function of team ability to forecast its product market condition as 
well as having the capacities to deliver the appropriate model's dimensions. Benefits 
of choice must be weighed against the risk of incorrect condition estimates leading to 
inappropriate model selection and possible incorrect dimensional emphases. None- 
the-less, in diagnostically uncertain product markets, the aggregate To and Tl models 
are the equal of NewProd and Stanford whilst still more parsimonious and relative to 
informational states of nature. 
6.4.3 Learning systems 
There is nothing more important for practitioners to take from this research than the 
importance of the benchmarking learning=strategic action/reaction process. 
Without benchmarked learning systems supporting this concept, strategic action could 
decay into random walk' theory. '' All evidence from this work confirms that "Those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it9975. No matter how 
difficult, practitioners must benchmark key'variables and'dimensions of history and 
75 George Santayaoa (1563-1952). US philosopher. Used by William L Shirer as an epigraph in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1959). 
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then learn from them. This involves building/maintaining successful organisational 
learning systems and disposing of schemes which do not enhance required levels of 
success. 
To benefit from the deterministic effects of history teams must eradicate cultures, 
systems and procedures which have led to past failures, as they enhance processes 
which have led to success. Griffin (1993) is correct. To capitalise on history 
repeating itself or to reverse a failed process, benchmarks must measure the quality 
and magnitude of NPD process change. Without benchmarking the results of 
organisational learning and implementation systems, continued attempts at Td 
generation improvement will be chaotic and fourth generation neural learning and 
expert NPD systems will be fantasy. 
6.4.4 Dimensional implications 
All dimensional findings contain practitioner lessons, but some are more important 
than others. 
6.4.4.1 Natural History versus Nurturing Strategy 
Understanding the influence of NPD past performance is a dual edged sword. Whilst 
deterministic in its character to continue the success/failure of the past, teams with 
poor product market performance records are not predestined to fail - if they put in 
place, historical learning systems which support initial and reactive strategic decision 
making. These are the keys to changing past failure patterns and emulating successful 
scenario. 
6.4.4.2 Order of entry 
All things being equal, entering early with highly innovative projects is best. Being 
late limits one's strategic' options. ' However, the good news is that the PiLC and 
order/innovation models yield alternatives to followers positioned by mistake or by 
default. 
6.4.4.3 Competition 
Competitive analysis is important to success. Those suggesting otherwise are wrong 
or tell only half truths. Whilst what one does for oneself is more useful than worrying 
what the competition is doing, strategic action/reaction is a function of competitive 
feedback: Unequivocally, vigilant competitive awareness through one year post 
launch is associated with success whilst failing to monitor' and, react appropriately to 
competition is associated with failure: ° This is a wake-up call to practitioners lulled 
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into a false sense of security by those suggesting external dimensions are secondary in 
importance (Cooper 1979b, 1980b, 1981, Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1993). 
6.4.5 Realistic informational requirements 
Multiple, realistic, parsimonious models lessen inappropriate information assessment, 
collection burdens and associated costs. This is good news to resource poor teams 
requiring expensive research into uncertain environments. The To model dimensions 
are far less demanding and almost as accurate as currently available models. The 
81.2% accurate but gentle To model allows teams to forecast a "null (no change)" 
strategic scenario. If the null scenario results in a predicted failure, this should 
stimulate re-examination of history, start the discussion of Tl dimensional 
requirements, force estimates of how much and what type of change effort is 
warranted and generate probability distributions for success scenario based on those 
changes. Thereafter, the evolution of internal and external environments reveals the 
more certain, less expensive Tl information requirements to be used to diagnose one's 
progress. Using this simple dual simulation allows better strategic diagnosis and 
adaptation based on time appropriate information. Such realism in the context of a 
familiar simulation technique should appeal to managers. 
6.5 Contributions 
This work has made five contributions to field knowledge. It has: 
1. demonstrated a successful, inexpensive discrete simulation technique. This 
extends seminal deterministic methods with a simple stochastic alternative. The 
procedure is cost effective for simulating longitudinal internal and external 
process dynamic change over time. This demonstration was fundamental to and 
invites empirical demonstration of probabilistic NPD research designs including 
proposed CPM/PERT network paradigms (Grossman and Gupta 1974; Hart and 
Baker 1994; Lilien and Kotler 1983; Urban and Hauser 1980; Wasson 1978). 
2. delivered on Montova- Weiss and Calantone's (1994b) request for a temporal 
assessment and synthesis of established antecedents and dimensions of success. 
Many dimensions found important to success in five, year retrospectives were 
found more or less significant by time period. This improved their temporal 
construct validity at the initial screen' and one'year post launch by reducing 
perceived measurement timing error and survivor bias. Dimensions out of favour 
but discriminating between early success and failure have become important 
again. These include order, of entry, level of innovativeness and the importance of 
competitive awareness to strategic planning. 
3. delivered on Wind and Mahajan's (1988) request for greater NPD 
interdisciplinary perl ective. This allowed field knowledge to be integrated with 
and related to other branches of the literature. New dimensions of success 
including NPD history, order of entry, level of innovation, competitive assessment 
and strategic action/reaction were found to be arbiters of established dimensions. 
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4. demonstrated five conditional models more valid and accurate than NewProd. 
twelve with lower standard error and fourteen less demanding in terms of 
information requirements. This supports Cooper's request for 
conditional/situational schemes (1994b) in support of accelerated product 
development (Cooper 1995). 
5. shed early light on a provocative debate between deterministic and stochastic 
model value. This debate features the struggle between the "nature" of one's NPD 
product market success, failure and kill "natural history" and the "nurturing" 
effects of change based on strategic alignment/realignment. Both arguments are 
powerful, undecided and important to understanding the requirements of a 
"learning/changing organisation" (Kiechel 1990; Mumford 1992; Shrivastava 
1988; Shrivastava and Souder 1987; Slater and Narver 1995). 
6.6 Limitations 
Six limitations of this research must be noted. Future efforts should address: (1) an 
overly ambitious questionnaire possibly leading to non-response bias; (2) selection, 
experimental and measurement timing error potential; (3) failure to capture 
curvilinear phenomena; (4) the information vacuum and limited usefulness of 
predictive output; (5) "beginner bias" and (6) conditional model sample size. 
6.6.1 Overly ambitious questionnaire 
Whilst the instrument used was creative, it was too ambitious, intellectually taxing 
and expensive. This limited the response rate and will limit new replication. 
However, potential non-response error was offset by the fact that such bias may be to 
the researcher's advantage, when the relationships being studied are more important 
than extrapolation to the general population (Suchman 1962). Building models 
primarily for active NPD populations is consistent with this exception and thus, non- 
response bias was judged not to be a significant problem. 
To increase response rate the questionnaire length should be reduced by using cluster, 
factor or chaid76 analysis. Internally inconsistent construct variables at the end of the 
scree loading on factors insignificant to robust linear regression functions, and 
variables loading at <. 5 on significant dimensions of success, should be eliminated in 
future aggregate validations. Also, modem delivery methods such as FAX and 
spreadsheet/database templates on diskette might be used to make responding more 
fun (MacElroy and Geissler 1994). Most creative, "WWW" e-surveys" would allow 
perpetual international data collection in over 140 countries. Population specification 
error, could be minimised by utilising an e-mail write-back call-back system to 
qualify respondents after the fact. 
76 Chi-squared Automatic Interaction Detector "a relatively new statistical application useful for dividing populations into segments which are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. It can be used to reduce useless data and combine categories which do not differ significantly. 77 World Wide Web of the Internet 
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6.6.2 Potential selection experimental and measurement timing error 
Postal surveys are particularly vulnerable to selection error - the variation between a 
representative sample and the sample obtained using non-probability methods (Tull 
and Hawkins 1993). Selection error is recognised by Cooper (1979a, 1979b, 1981). 
It exists here also along with post hoc bias typical of retrospective success/failure 
work. However, post hoc bias has been shown to be minimised by objectively 
worded scales such as those used here (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994). 
This work's use of dual recollection points fails to address perfectly, measurement 
timing error in "real time". Whilst an improvement, the technique remains 
susceptible to experimental or measurement timing error but not both. Either the 
technique leads to experimental error by implying different answers or the process 
leads to measurement timing error by averaging dimensions over time. 
If significant variable selection and change in variable magnitude was universal, 
charges of "leading", gross experimental error would be legitimate. If variables failed 
to change universally due to averaging effects, charges of gross measurement timing 
error would be legitimate. The results of the independent t-tests show that 93.3% of 
the variables significant at To remained significant at T1, whilst 17.33% did not 
become significant until time T1. This represents a 43% change in the original To 
significant variable environment. When combined with a paired-samples t-test 
demonstrating a 37.5% changed in magnitude over time, this indicates that neither 
type of error occurred in substantial proportion. Clearly, undue experimental or 
measurement timing error, whilst possible, is not probable here. However, a fixed 
panel in support of a longitudinal validation would be a welcome addition if panel 
measurement problems (Churchill 1991) could be overcome. 
6.6.3 Failure to capture curvilinear phenomena s 
Even though some phenomena may not be linear (Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991), 
linear methodologies were used for consistency in the validation and synthesis of 
seminal literature. Curvilinear results would have been irreconcilable with NewProd 
and Stanford. None-the-less, temporal phenomena similar to those uncovered in 
diffusion research (Bass 1969; Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990) may respond better to 
curvilinear methods. In future research, these may prove useful to measure the 
changing contribution to success of time related variables such as levels of 
innovation, order of entry and PLC. 
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Curve fitting exercises were attempted with some success. Logistic regression 
showed the greatest potential with accuracy rates of up to 98.55% for successes and 
82.35% for failures. Unfortunately, these additions would have been a huge 
undertaking though worthy of future application. 
6.6.4 Information vacuum and inadequate output 
This research has been useful in determining states of nature at To and T1. However, 
these are indicative only of beginning and ending dimensions. What is lacking is an 
explanation of discrete gates/activities between To and Tl and the long-term 
dimensions of success at T2 and T3. Viewed in the context of Cooper's stage gate 
paradigm (1990) and modified rhetorically to reflect a CPM/PERT nomenclature (see 
Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-4) the gap between Milestone/Gate Ml and Milestone Tl 
represents intra-process dimensional confusion. Knowing only normative beginning 
and ending states of nature limits model diagnostic usefulness. Empirical validation 
of intra-process activities is needed to build on this work's dual milestone foundation. 
These components are cardinal to the future of NPD decision support using expert 
systems which "learn" from neural networks. 
The output demonstrated here represents only one part of a much larger information 
requirement. The need to account for current versus projected dimensional difference 
and portfolio balancing (Wind and Mahajan 1988; Cooper 1994b) could be satisfied 
by intra-process sampling based on probable states of nature. This would yield output 
on dimension specific objective attainment, project(s) expected monetary value and 
ROI. 
6.6.5 Beginner bias 
This work represents a beginners' bias - the antithesis of survivor bias. Rather than 
over-representing late successes and under-representing early failures, it fails to 
measure what happens after the one year benchmark. As such, it says nothing about 
projects considered a failure one year post launch which become successful at T. or T3 
due to additional investment and strategic attention. Conversely, one may conclude 
quite erroneously that because the successful project follows the To prescription and 
evolves to the Tl state in a precise and timely manner, the project will continue to be 
successful at T. and T3. 
6.6.6 Conditional model sample size 
Sample sizes for each category of PiLC and order/innovation were small. This is 
manifest in low model F values. Life expectancy broke down into samples sizes from 
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n=57 to 76 yielding F values of 6.68410 to 14.92635. Order/innovation sample sizes 
were n=86 to 88 resulting in F values from 7.29289 to 15.67086. Whilst adequate to 
illustrate hypothetical gross model differences, their value to the discussion of 
normative strategic planing is limited. Future research into conditional models 
require larger sample sizes to confirm this work's findings. 
6.7 Future research 
Limitations found in testing this work's eight hypotheses combine with new findings 
to chart the course for future research. Future inquiries should concentrate in two 
areas: (1) temporal validation of established and new success factors and (2) 
conditional methods and models required by third generation processes. 
6.7.1 Temporal re-examination 
A number of variables, normalised environmental factors and dimensions thought 
significant to success previously were validated here by time periods. However, in 
support of field synthesis (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994) and since all 
previous work was static, these findings should be re-examined under real 
longitudinal or perceived simulated conditions to confirm evolutionary differences 
uncovered here. 
6.7.1.1 Variables 
Because this work's antecedent evaluation was exploratory its temporal findings need 
re-examination (see Table 4-3 and Figures 4-2,4-3 and 4-4). This is especially true 
for the "critical six" which exhibit both success and failure tolerance parameters (see 
Figure 6-1). Viewed as simple process control elements in the strategic alignment 
process they include: " 
- new-to-the-world innovation 
- new product line innovation 
- level of financial resource adequacy 
- level of R&D skills adequacy 
- sales force"&/or distribution resource adequacy- 
- newness to the company- 
Range ratios78 characterising success as less forgiving than failure needs explanation. 
The use of chaid analysis -is recommended to' isolate variable importance on intra- 
process success paths. 
78 % failure range divided by % success range. 
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6.7.1.2 Environmental factors 
New to the field normalised environmental factors need re-examination in both 
aggregate and conditional NPD contexts. These include: 
- dynamic change in fast growing market 
- strategic reaction capability 
- 1$` in new, highly innovative market 
- alertness to threat of competitive retaliation 
- exogenous timing variables 
- moderate innovation 
- incremental innovation 
- innovative strategy in highly competitive market 
- late market entry 
- differentiation barriers 
- NPD history of kills and success 
- NPD history of failure 
- government capital barriers 
- contribution margin 
- financial barriers 
- differentiation barriers 
Understanding their usefulness in a richer, industry and/or product market specific 
context might prove very valuable. 
6.7.1.3 Dimensions 
Whilst all dimensions of success found here need re-validation, those requiring 
particular attention include: 
- NPD history - The effects of success, failure and kills needs clarification. 
Important questions include "what underlies the relationship of kills to successes", 
"how much failure history is too much to overcome", "what is the critical level of 
success, such that success leads to more success despite failure in other 
dimensions", "what characterises and how does one determine and overcome a 
failed history", "why do high kill ratios lead to failure" and "why is a failed 
history more important to avoid than a successful history is to attain"? 
- strategic reaction capability 
- The quality of strategic reaction depends on 
benchmarked learning from product market experience. Discovery of normative 
NPD strategic reactions based on To history and in pursuit of ideal Tl dimensional 
targets would be valuable to practitioners. Probable effects of "must-react" 
"should react"- strategic activities would aid understanding of what requires a 
significant rather than an ephemeral response. 
- superior product - Re-examination of NewProd's most significant conclusion 
concerning the primacy of "superior product" at the initial screen is in order. Its 
rise in importance over time and the evolution of its variable constructs suggests 
the dimension exhibits measurement timing error at the initial screen. This needs 
clarification because. öf the dimension's implication on timing and deployment of 
production, management and research resources. -, °- T=' 
- resource/synergy - Simply declaring that synergy is important to success is 
inadequate. Normative "resource/synergy mixes" in response to dimensional dis- 
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equilibrium would be more helpful to practitioners than vague statements 
supporting short pass strategy. This, along with better understanding of normal 
resource diminution over time, could prevent over/under funding of intra-process 
activities. 
Finally, dimensions unique to PiLC and order/innovation conditional models require 
investigation. Those in neither this study's aggregate models, NewProd or Stanford 
include: 
- dynamic change (short PiLC model at T1) - Dynamic markets can become a 
quagmire of problems relating to competitive one-upmanship (Calantone and 
Cooper 1977). However, Cooper's advice to avoid dynamic markets where users' 
needs change often and new product introductions are frequent (Cooper 1979b, 
1981) is conditionally incorrect. How successful companies use this environment 
to their advantage needs exploration. 
- innovative strategy in highly competitive market (1st/high order/innovation model 
at T& - This is the least understood dimension in this work. It requires 
exploration of the "time lefty competitive leveler innovation level" relationship. 
- long life cycle, high price/high quality strategy (1st/high order/innovation model 
at TO) - The benefit of developing long lived innovative products is intuitive. 
However, the negative impact of this factor at To calls for re-examination of the 
conclusion that development of long PLC projects with potentially high margins 
is always congruent with success. Since every product cannot be long lived, the 
role of lower priced, moderately innovative products in robust family platforms 
(Meyer and Utterback 1993; Urban and von Hipple 1988) needs examination as 
life cycles get shorter. None-the-less, in aggregate model work this internally 
inconsistent dimension should be eliminated. 
6.7.2 Methods and models 
This work provides temporal validation and synthesis in the context of seminal 
methods. However, this does not mean that new designs useful for validating third 
generation processes should not be explored. Except for Gate #1, no empirical 
justification exists for Cooper's stage-gate "must meet - should meet" criteria. Figure 
6-4 proposes a complex discrete simulation as a better future design. 
6.7.2.1 Methods 
Attempting to develop and synthesise new knowledge based on only the NewProd or 
the Stanford design is a mistake. Both use deterministic, monomorphic linear 
methods to optimise only one objective function. Neither is an acceptable rallying 
point for synthesis because they exhibit measurement timing error. This is due to 
data, relationships'änd variables failing to`remain constant'over time (Burns and 
Austin 1985). They should not be the starting gate for third generation empiricism. 
Rather, this work's simulation framework in the context of a network analysis 
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provides the most promising analytical paradigm. It should be validated by others 
(Hart and Baker 1994). 
Discrete simulation, where the variables change at specified points in time or 
continuous simulation, where they change continuously, would best allow temporal 
synthesis, field advancement and practitioner acceptance. These methods would 
allow construction of pessimistic, most probable and optimistic probability 
distributions for calculation of Type I and Type II error79 and EVII. This might 
demonstrate why practitioners have avoided initial screen models. More importantly, 
simulation models would minimise measurement timing error whilst allowing 
synthesis of NewProd and Stanford results at the appropriate time period. This 
would allow seminal work to be judged in conjunction with dynamic, intra-process 
conditional influences such as PiLC, order/innovation and other time related 
dimensions. Following this work's method will prevent 3'' generation flexibility 
from unravelling. 
6.7.2.2 Models 
Many dimensions and constructs uncovered here are quite complex, governed by 
probabilistic events and change in priority over time. Timely intra-process advice to 
practitioners based on more precise incremental models is needed to build systematic, 
go/no-go/continue decisions. New more accurate models need validation in light of 
recent findings concerning changing go/no-go/continue (Ronkainen 1985) and 
performance measurement (Hart 1993; Hultink and Robben 1995) criteria. These 
models would be more temporally appropriate, their internal dimensional construct 
validity would be high and new dimensions might be uncovered based on intra- 
process criteria change by time period. '-, '., -. 
As cited by Crawford (1986) such multiple models would use less information per 
solution. They would not predict actual success/failure but only the outcomes of key 
events at points along the critical path to success. Estimated path duration would be 
determined as follows: -, 
te=6 (Meredith 1992)80. 
This would help to implement Cooper's "four Fs", fill the knowledge gaps at M2, M3, 
M4, M5, T1, T2 and T3 (see Figure 6-4)and provide a research path for field expansion. 




Important seminal findings have been temporally validated with new knowledge 
added to the initial screening literature (see Table 4-12). Moreover, some synthesis 
has resulted vis-ä-vis the strategic nature of the process (see Figure 6-5). 
Unfortunately, though encouraging, little impact will be seen on failure rates until 
organisations learn from their own multigenerational history. 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given 
and transmitted from the past. " (Karl Marx from The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Sct. 11852. repr. 
in Selected Works, Vol. 2,1942, Columbia University Press 
1993). 
a Figure 6-5: Sustegic synthesis in the context of Booz, Allen and Hamilton's (1982) Stmt&c Approach to New Product Plannin& 
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Regrettably, new product development as an historical learning vehicle has been 
largely ignored. This must change' (Moran 1996). - -Achieving `rising success rates 
requires all to learn what successful teams already, know - that better assessment, 
learning and implementation of history lessons, combined with adequate resources to 
adapt strategically to changing environments, leads to success. Failing to grasp this 
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hypothetically extends Darwin's theory of natural selection (1859) to an industrial 
setting. He theorised long ago that: 
"Variability is not actually caused by man; he only 
unintentionally exposes organic beings to new conditions of 
life and then nature acts on the organism and causes it to 
vary. But man can and does select the variations given to 
him by nature and thus accumulates them in any desired 
manner". 
"It is certain that he can largely influence the character of 
a breed by selecting, in each successive generation, 
individual differences so slight as to be inappreciable 
except by an educated eye". 
`In the survival of favoured individuals and races, during 
the constantly-recurrent struggle for existence, we see a 
powerful and ever-acting form of selection': 
"More individuals are born than can possibly survive. A 
grain in the balance may determine which individuals shall 
live and which shall die, - which variety or species shall 
increase in number and which shall decrease, to finally 
become extinct". 
"The slightest advantage in certain individuals, at any age 
or during any season, over those with which they come into 
competition, or better adaptation in however slight a 
degree to the surrounding physical conditions, will in the 
long run, turn the balance ". 
"As natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, 
successive, favourable variations, it can produce no great 
or sudden modifications; it can act only by short and slow 
steps. Hence, the canon of "Natura Non Facit Saltum ", 
which every fresh addition to our knowledge tends to 
confirm, is on this theory intelligible" (Charles Darwin 
1859 p 621-626). 
137 years later, Charles Darwin, Chief Executive Officer, might extend 
his grandfather's work by adding The theory of NPD "natural 
outcome": 
"The optimisation of strategic resources across competing 
product market species over time affords survival of the 
fittest to those which learn and adapt best to lessons 
learned from multigenerational product market history. 
Some are "naturally selected" for success by their natural 
understanding of "past product market outcomes % This 
knowledge is handed down, quite normally, through family 
member experiences. As such, new projects are better 
prepared to take repetitive competitive advantage of 
190 
conditional changes in the environment, product 
generation after product generation. Each succeeding 
successful generation gets stronger naturally, playing out 
the hand its product market family history deals whilst 
passing on even deeper understanding. Unless interrupted 
purposefully by overt action, by catastrophic dimensional 
omission or by a significant change in its environment, a 
most "natural outcome" can be expected at one year post 
launch. 
Multigenerational product market history entombs a 
product market family success/failure imprint. The 
successful use this imprint "naturally , almost 
unknowingly. From strong programmes and robust family 
designs they continue to evolve slowly to states of being, 
even higher than the preceding product generation. The 
opposite is true of weak product market families. Failing 
to learn from ancestor projects, they are unable to adapt as 
well to conditions recognised by the successful. Being 
disadvantaged, barring, overt strategic dimensional 
realignment towards Tl targets. a most "natural outcome" 
is inevitable. Though distressing to the family ancestors, 
failing and not fully understanding why precludes them 
from re-teaching successful survival lessons to the next 
generation. As a result, they beget only weaker product 
offsprings ". 
And so it goes. 
f 
,ý . a. ý,. F_. ý. ýý.. _, 
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APPENDIX A- Questionnaire 
Thank you for participating in The Product-Wars Project, a British and American University collaboration designed to improve 
new product success rates by improving the GO/NO GO decision. In return for answering this 15 minute questionnaire, you 
will receive a free copy of Product-Wars 1.1°, an interactive decision support tool designed to help you assess market entry 
decisions. Please choose either a SUCCESSFUL OR FAILED new product introduced within the last three years and complete 
the questionnaire below as it applies to only the project chosen. Read each of the statements determining the extent to which it 
describes the product both at the initial idea screening and at the end of year #1 of market entry (two different answers for the 
same question indicates that over time the situation changed between the initial product idea screening and the end of the first 
year of commercialisation). Please use the postage paid self-addressed envelope provided to mail the completed questionnaire 
to John B. Green, Jr., Assistant Professor of Business Administration and Director of Institutional Research, Brenau University, 
1 Centennial Circle, Gainesville, GA 30501. If you have any questions please call him at 404/534-6215. Please check 
Product-Wars° disk size 3.5" or 5.25" Format . Thank you! 
Evaluator Title Company 
Company's Country of Origin 
Telephone # (_) - Product Product 
market Primary market: Industrial-Consumer 





This Product was a: Success_Failure 
In the last 3 years in this product market we have had (how many? ) # Successes # Failures # Killed ideas (Boot 
Allen and Hamilton 1982; Boston Consulting Group 1972; Darwin 1859) 
If product was modified after entry (when? ) During yr. 1_Between yr. 1-2 Between yr. 2-3 After yr. 3 
If product was killed after entry (when? ) During yr. 1_Between yr. 1-2 Between yr. 2-3 After yr. 3 
The Mo. /Yr. of Initial Idea Screening:: ____3 
Mo. /Yr. 
The Mo. (Yr. of first Market entry: I 
Its life expectancy in original fornt be ore modifications was. # Yrs. # Mos. (Cooper and de Brentani (1984) 
Please circle answers for both the period of Initial Screening 
of the idea and at theýend of Year #1 (Indicating if your, ', " 
feelings (the ' rating)' changed between the time of the initial 
screen and the end of year #1 after launch) _m 
0= strongly disagree, "ryu . 
10 =`strongly agreeý`'t ,';, 
'yý,. 
0 =strongly disagree, ", w`,, " 
10 =strongly agree 
. ý. s At Initial Screen . At end of ear #l" NEWNESSIINNOVATIVENESS> ý, 
This product was (please rate ALL as they apply to the new 
product) 
1. " New-to-the-world (a true innovation in the product 
marketplace listed above) 
Booz Allen 1982 
. 
Booz Allen 1982 
2. "A new product line Booz Allen 1982 ' Booz Allen 1982 
3. " An addition to an existing product line Booz Allen 1982. ^. F c Booz Allen 1982 
4 
4. " Improvement in or revision to an existing product Booz Allen 1982 ,, Booz Allen 1982: ý :, ý' .° 5. "A repositioning Booz Allen 1982 Booz Allen 1982 , - 6. "A cost reduction Booz Allen 1982 = ".. . 's vý_- :... s. Booz Allen 1992', .: 
7. Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with 
deficiencies/problems in the area of Newness/Innovation 
Porter 1991 Porter 1991 
SUCCESS FACTORS/STRATEGY FAILURE48 ONLY , .ý SUCCESS-#8 ONLY 8. After the 1 year entry period, this product was considered a 
FailurelSuccess 
(-5=great failure +5=great success) 
-5 , -4 -3 -2 "1 ° +1 +2 +3 +4 ±5 ;:, 
r.; 
9. This product should have been killed 012345679910 ...,. 012 345678 910, --..... <., 10. We should have modified this product more radically than 
we did 
345678910;, 01,2 01 23456789,10 
This success/failure judgement was based on the attainment of 
objectives to (please rate ALL objectives below: ) 
11. " Increase market penetration Mahajan & Wind 1992 Mahajan & Wind 1992 
12. " Capitalise on existing markets Mahajan & Wind 1992. °, ': Mahajan & Wind 1992 
13. " Combat major competitive entry Mahajan & Wind 1992,,,,: ..,. .: - . Mahajan 
& Wind 1992 - 
14. " Capitalise on new technology Mahajan & Wind 1992 °ý "... Mahajan & Wind 1992. s 
15. " Establish a foothold in a new market Mahajan & Wind 1992, ~1. " Mahajan & Wind 1992, 16. " Pre-empt emerging market segment Mahajan & Wind 1992, " ., °.. Mahajan & Wind 1992 17. " Utilise excess capacity Mahajan & Wind 1992 Mahajan & Wind 1992 
18. " Offset seasonal cycle Mahajan & Wind 1992 Mahajan & Wind 1992', 
19. " Utilise by-products Mahajan & Wind 1992- . ý" Mahajan 
& Wind 1992-,,:, -, -; 20. " Produce products at a lower cost Mahajan & Wind 1992,, -,,, :. "°. ,. `; " Mahajan & Wind 1992 Please rate degree of success at each time period according to 
the following performance measurement criteria: 
21. " Financial measures (profit, ROI, payback period etc) Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1987a Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1987a 
22. " Window of Opportunity measures (to new markets, 
categorises etc. ) 
Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1987a Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1987a 
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Please circle answers for both the period of Initial Screening 0= strongly disagree 0= strongly disagree sz 
of the ideas ind at the'end of Year #1 (Indicating if your 10 = strongly' agree, 10 = strongly agree 
feelings (the rating)changed between the time of the initial 
screen and the end of year #1 after launch) 
At Initial Screen At end of year #1 
23. " Market Impact measures (effect on domestic/foreign Cooper $: Kleinschmidt 1987a . . ->. 
Cooper & Kleinschmidt 1987a 
market share) 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY. arra-"anoä--.; nwc 
The following were important in the GO/NO GO decision 
process (please rate ALL barriers to entry): 
24. " Cost advantages of incumbents (economies of scale) Porter 1980 Porter 1980, 
25. " Product differentiation (proprietary product Porter 1980 Porter 1980 
differences) of the incumbents 
26. " Brand identity Porter 1980 Porter 1980 b, :.... . >, 
27. " Customer switching costs Porter 1980. Porter 1980 
28. " Capital requirements Porter 1980 tiý Porter 1980 
29. " Access to distribution channels Porter 1980 Porter 1980 n"'. «. 'e -= 
30. " Absolute cost advantages (learning curve, access to Porter 1980 Porter 1980 `«- 
inputs, proprietary design etc. ) 
31. " Government Policy Porter 1980 Porter 1980,,, 
32. " Expected retaliation Porter 1980 . ~. Porter 1980 
33. Expected speed of competitive retaliation was an important Porter 1980 Porter 1980 
consideration in this market entry decision 
34. Expected magnitude of competitive retaliation was an Porter 1980 Porter 1980, 
important consideration in this market entry decision 
35. The product would have done better if marketed by almost Cooper 1975 Cooper 1975 
any of our major competitors ., 4. 
36. Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies Porter 1991 Porter 1991 
in the area of Barriers to Entry 
RESOURCES REQUIRED 
37. Our company's financial resources were more than adequate COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992,,, _,: for this project 
38. Our company's R&D skills & people were more than COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 ., ° _~ ,, , ", r, adequate for this project ," ... _ 
" 
39. Our company's engineering skills & people were more than COOPER 1992, £ COOPER 1992 
adequate for this project 
40. Our company's marketing research skills & people were COOPER 1992 - 
ý:. 
" COOPER 1992 
more than adequate for this project 
41. Our company's management skills were more than adequate COOPER 1992, COOPER 1992 `, d°s"., 
for this project 
42. Our company's production resources or skills were more COOPER 1992 ý' : ýý, ", COOPER 1992 >; _: ° ,, ; , 
ý; 
°° 
than adequate for this project " ° ., 
43. Our company's sales force &/or distribution resources & COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
skills were more than adequate for this project a 
44. Our company's advertising & promotion resources & skills COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 ,. 
^ 
were more than adequate for this project 
45. Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies Porter 1991. Porter 1991 2, in the area of Resource Requirements " 
NATURE OF PROJECT/NEWNESS TO FIRM. 
46. Our product was highly innovative - totally new to the COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
market 
47. The product specifications - exactly what the product will COOPER 1992 -r, -- COOPER 1992 be - were very clear 
ry 
k+i 
48. The technical aspects , exactly how the technical problems COOPER 1992.4  ." ."-.:,; ... , .{;, COOPER 1992 will be solved - were very clear A. 
49. The potential customers for this product were totally new to COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
our company 
50. The product class or type of product itself was totally new COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
to our company 
51. We had never made or sold products to satisfy this type of COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
customer need or use before 
52. The competitors we face in the market were totally new to COOPER 1992: COOPER 1992 
our company ; .; =.. a 53. The product "fit in" with a family of products we already COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
had on the market , 
54. The product which entered the market was significantly Crawford 1986 ~, r Crawford 1986 
different than that approved at the initial screen 
55. Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies Porter 1991 Porter 1991 "k in the Nature of the Project 
ý ý THE INAL PRODUCT ýy, , 
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Please circle answers for both the period of Initial Screening 0, = strongly disagree 0 =strongly disagree 
of the idea and at the end of Year #1 (Indicating if your 10 = strongly agree' 10 = strongly agree 
feelings (the rattng)'etiänged between the time of the initial 
screen and the end of year #1 after launch) 
At Initial Screen At end of year #1 
56. Compared to competitive products (or whatever the COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
customer was using) our product offered a number of unique 
features, attributes or benefits to the customer 
57. Our product was clearly superior to competing products in COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
terms of meeting customer needs 
58. Our product permitted the customer to reduce his/her costs, COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
when compared to what he/she was using 
59. Our product permitted the customer to do a job or do COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
something that he/she could not do with what was available on 
the market 
60. Our product was of higher quality - however quality is COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
defined in this market - than competing products 
61. Our product was priced considerably higher than competing COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
products 
62. Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with deficiencies Porter 1991 Porter 1991 
in the Final Product 
THE MARKET FOR THE PRODUCT, % 
63. Potential customers had a great need for this class or type of COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 °" ' 
product ... 
`,. 
64. The dollar size of the market (either existing or potential COOPER 1992: COOPER 1992' 
market) for this product was large 
65. The market for this product was growing very quickly COOPER 1992 -- -- COOPER 1992 . 
66. The market was characterised by intense price competition COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992, > 
67. There were many competitors in this market COOPER 1992 "-- COOPER 1992 
68. There was a strong dominant competitor- with a large COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
market share - in this market 
69. Potential customers were very satisfied with the products COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
(competitors' products) they were currently using "" '. 3 
70. Users' needs changed quickly in this market -a dynamic COOPER 1992 COOPER 1992 
market situation ,,.,, >_ 
71. We were the first to market this product Maidique and Zirger 1984 Robinson Maidique and Zirger 1984 
& Fornell 1985 Robinson & Formell 1985' 
72. We were not first to market this product; we followed close Robinson & Fornell 1985 Robinson & Formell 1985 
behind however 
73. We entered the market in its late growth stage Robinson & Fomell 1985 Robinson & Formell 1985 
74. We entered the market somewhere between its maturity and Robinson & Formell 1985, Robinson & Formell 1985 
decline 
75. The fast rate of technological change was important in this Ansoff & Stewart 1967 ,:., ý, 
ý" 
"- -ý Ansoff & Stewart 1967, = ti;. r 
product market 
76. Competitors introduced new products into this market very Ansoff & Stewart 1967,,,,, -, .. Ansoff & Stewart 1967 
quickly x ..,.. 
'i 
.. 77. Competitors withdrew products from this market very Ansoff & Stewart 1967 Ansoff & Stewart 1967 
quickly 
78. R&D in this market produced many advancements in the Ansoff & Stewart 1967, -, -,, r LL Ansoff & Stewart 1967 
production process and ensuing products 
79. Production methods in this market changed very quickly Abernathy & Utterback 1978 Abernathy & Utterback 1978 
80. The amount of change (technological leap/boundary Ansoff & Stewart 1967, Ansoff & Stewart 1967 
distance) was important in this product market 
81. New products introduced into this market were much more Ansoff & Stewart 1967 Ansoff & Stewart 1967 
technologically sophisticated than those replaced ` ". 
82. R&D in this market produced significant advancements in Abernathy &: Utterback 1978 Abernathy &, Utterback 1978 
the production process and ensuing products 
83. This product had a long life cycle in its original form Ansoff & Stewart 1967 Ansoff & Stewart 1967, ý 
(before modifications were necessary) 
84. We spent a long time on the market research for this Cooper 1976 k,. Cooper 1976 
product 
85. Market cyclicality was important in the decision to enter Hopkins 1980 Hopkins 1980 
this market 
86. Market seasonality was important in the decision to enter Mahajan and Wind 1992: 
,; "ý- .,;, 
F Mahajan and Wind 1992 
this market 
87. The contribution margin was important in the decision to Cooper and de Brentani 1984 Cooper and de Brentani 1984 : enter this market 
88. The primary market for this product was domestic (over COOPER AND DE BRENTANI COOPER AND DE 
50% in US) 9 BRENTý1NI1984 
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Please circle answers for both the period of Initial Screening < 0, = strongly disagree 0 =strongly disagree of the idea. and at the end of Year #1 (Indicating if your : ý° ,' 10 = strongly agree 10 = "strongly agree 
feelings (the'rating) changed between the time of the initial 
screen and the end of year #1 after launch) 
At Initial Screen At end of year #1 
89. Our firm developed clear strategies to deal with difficulties Porter 1991 Porter 1991 
inherent in this market 
ý, 
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APPENDIX B- Definitions 
A priori probability - The probability measures before any additional information is 
obtained. It may be revised if further relevant information is revealed (Webster 
1992). 
Adjusted R Square - An estimate of how well the model will fit the population. A 
model estimated from a sample fits the sample better than it will fit the population. 
The sample R squared thus tends to overestimate the goodness of fit of the model in 
the population. Adjusted R squared corrects the optimistic bias of the sample R 
squared by taking sample size and the number of predictors into account. Unlike R. 
squared, adjusted R squared does not necessarily increase as additional variables are 
added to an equation (Norusis 1993). 
ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) - In regression, used to test the hypothesis that there is 
no linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable(s). 
The total variation in the dependent variable is divided into two components--one 
which can be attributed to a particular regression model (labelled REGRESSION) and 
one which cannot (labelled RESIDUAL). If the observed significance level for the F- 
test is small, the hypothesis that there is no linear relationship can be rejected 
(Norusis 1993). 
Canonical Correlation - The canonical correlation for a discriminant function is the 
square root of the ratio of the between-groups sum of squares to the total sum of 
squares. Squared, it is the proportion of the total variability explained by differences 
between groups (Norusis 1993). 
Chi-square (in Crosstabs) - Statistic used to test the hypothesis that the row and 
column 'variables are independent (Norusis 1993). 
Cluster analysis -A statistical procedure that identifies homogeneous groups or 
clusters of cases based on their values for a set of variables (Norusis 1993). 
Conceptual definition (sometimes called a constitutive definition) - Defines aýconcept 
in terms of other concepts. It states the central idea or essence of the concept (Tull 
and Hawkins 1993). 
Construct validity - Understanding the meaning of the obtained measurements (Tull 
and Hawkins 1993) 
Critical path method (CPM) -A technique of project control, now usually 
incorporated in various software programmes. The technique puts all important steps 
of a given new product project into a sequential network (Crawford 1994). " 
Cronbach alpha -A method for measuring factor extraction that considers the 
variables in the analysis to be a sample from the universe of potential variables 
(Norusis'1993). 
Cycle time - Se 
;e- 
speed to market. 
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Degrees of freedom - Number associated with a test statistic which is used in 
determining the observed significance level (Norusis 1993). 
Deterministic (versus) stochastic (random) models -A deterministic mathematical 
model is expressed as Y=Bo + B, XI. Given any value for X, the value of Y can be 
determined with precision. A stochastic model contains one or more random 
components that lead to errors in efforts to predict and is written as Y=Bo + B1X1 +e 
(epsilon/error) (Webster 1992). 
Discrete stochastic process -A dynamic, probabilistic process that involves elements 
of a system moving in an orderly manner among finite sets of states, the movement 
occurring at discrete points in time (Bums and Austin 1985). 
Discriminant function -A linear combination of the discriminating variables that 
maximises the distance (separation) between groups. The maximum number of 
discriminant functions that can be derived is either one less than the number of 
groups, or the number of discriminating variables, whichever is smaller. When the 
independent variables are not in standardised form, their coefficients are called un- 
standardised discriminant function coefficients. Also called canonical variates and 
un-standardised canonical discriminant functions (Norusis 1993). 
Duncan procedure -A multiple comparison procedure that ranks the group means 
from smallest to largest and uses the distance or number of steps that two means are 
apart in this ranking in computing the range value for each comparison. The test is 
based on the assumption that the larger the number of means being compared, the 
more likely, that significantly different comparisons will occur. In this procedure, the 
probability of finding a significant difference, given that the two groups are in fact 
equal, is sometimes less than and never greater than, the specified significance level 
(Norusis 1993). 
Eigenvalue - The ratio of the between groups to within groups sum of squares for 
each discriminant function. Large Eigenvalue are associated with functions that, 
contribute to group separation. In factor analysis, the Eigenvalue for a factor is the 
variance associated with it (Norusis 1993). 
Expected value of imperfect information (EVIL) - What the researcher wishes to 
optimise, the expected value of imperfect information is the expected value of perfect 
information (EVPI) minus the expected cost of errors (ECE) caused by inaccuracy 
and research error (EVII = EVPI - ECE) (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
Expected value of perfect information (EVPI) - The difference between the expected 
value of a decision outcome with certain knowledge (EVDPI) and the expected value 
of the decision with current knowledge (EVD) i. e. EVPI = EVDPI - EVD (Tull and Hawkins 1993).. -:: -, -.., 
Expected value of the decision with perfect information (EVDPI) - The sum of the highest payoff for each market state multiplied by the probability of that market state 
occurring (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
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F- The ratio of two mean squares. The larger mean square is conventionally placed 
in the numerator and the smaller in the denominator. The degrees of freedom 
associated with the numerator and denominator are used in the evaluation of F 
statistics (Norusis 1993). 
Factor Analysis - Used to identify underlying factors that explain the correlations 
among a set of variables. Its purpose is often to summarise a large number of 
variables with a smaller number of factors (Norusis 1993). 
Factor loading - The coefficients used to express a standardised variable as a linear 
combination of the factors. If the factors are un-correlated with each other, it is also 
the correlation between the variable and the factor. Also called the factor pattern 
matrix (Norusis 1993). 
Imputation Estimates - Involve assigning attributes to the non-respondents (of a 
survey) based on the characteristics of the respondents in order to adjust for non- 
response (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
Innovativeness - (1) When applied to the seller, it is the degree to which the firm has 
the capability of and follows the practice of, being innovative. (2) When applied to a 
buyer, it is the extent to which that person or firm is willing to accept the risks of 
early purchase on an innovation (Crawford 1994). 
Interval Scale - Numbers used to rank items such that numerically equal distances on 
the scale represent equal distances in the property being measured. The location of 
the zero point and the unit of measurement are determined by the researcher; 
consequently, ratios calculated on data from interval scales are not meaningful (Tull 
and Hawkins 1993) 
Kurtosis -A measure of the extent to which observations are clustered in the tails. 
For a normal distribution, the value of the kurtosis statistic is 0. For samples from a 
normal distribution, the values of kurtosis will fluctuate around 0. If a variable has a 
negative kurtosis, its distribution has lighter tails than a normal distribution. If a 
variable has a positive kurtosis, a larger proportion of cases fall into the tails of the 
distribution than into those of a normal distribution. Kurtosis can be used, along with 
the skewness statistic, to assess whether a variable is normally distributed (Norusis 
1993). ýý .... . 
Likelihood ratio -A goodness-of-fit statistic similar to Pearson's chi-square. For 
large sample sizes, the two statistics are equivalent (Norusis 1993). 
Linear regression - Estimation of the linear relationship between a dependent variable 
and one or more independent variables or covariates using the regression method. 
The regression method is a method for estimating factor score coefficients. The 
scores produced have mean of 0 and a variance equal to the squared multiple 
correlation between the estimated factor scores and the true factor values. The sum of 
squared discrepancies between true and estimated factors over individuals is :. 
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minimised. The scores may be correlated even when factors are orthogonal (Norusis 
1993). 
Mahalanobis' distance -A measure of how much a case's values on the independent 
variables differ from the average of all cases. For a single independent variable, it is 
simply the square of the standardised value of the independent variable. A large 
Mahalanobis' distance identifies a case as having extreme values on one or more of 
the independent variables (Norusis 1993). 
Measurement timing error - Occurs when the pre or post-measurement 
is made at an 
inappropriate time to indicate the effect of the experimental treatment (Tull and 
Hawkins 1993). 
Meta-analysis - The application of statistical procedures to collections of empirical 
findings from individual studies, for the purpose of integrating, synthesising and 
making sense of them (Wolf 1986). 
Monomorphic - Not changing form during development (The concise Oxford 
Dictionary 1990). 
Multimorphic - The opposite of monomorphic. Changing form during development. 
Multiple stage evaluation models - Different models used during the new product 
development process to account for varying R&D levels, cost, information 
uncertainty and go/no-go criteria (Albala 1975). 
NPD product market history ("batting average") - The last 3 years of actual product 
market successes, failures and kills. It is comprised of the success ratio (S%), the 
S failure ratio (F%) and the kill ratio (K%). The success ratio (S%) is = S+F+K 
where 'S = the number of successes, F= the number of failures and K= the number of 
kills in the last 3 years in the same product market. 
New product failure -A new product that does not meet the objectives of its 
developers. Depending on what those objectives are, 'a profitable'new product can be 
a failure and an unprofitable new product can be a success (Crawford 1994). 
New product strategy - Strategy that guides the product innovation programme. Is 
unique to new products and is a spin-off from overall corporate or division strategy 
(Crawford 1994). 
Non probability sample - One in which chance selection procedures are not used to 
draw the sample (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
NPD process (new product development process) - (1) The overall process of 
strategy, organisation, concept generation, product and marketing plan creation and 
evaluation' and commercialisation, of a new product. _ (2) Sometimes restricted in 
meaning to that part of the process done by technical (R&D) departments. (3) 
Sometimes used to denote the person or persons engaged in the new product creation 
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task. New product development concerns activity within an organisation, in contrast 
to the acquisition of finished new products from outside- (Crawford 1994). 
Observed significance level - The basis for deciding whether or not to reject the null 
hypothesis. It is the probability that a statistical result as extreme as the one observed 
would occur if the null hypothesis were true. If the observed significance level is 
small enough, usually less than 0.05 or 0.01, the null hypothesis is rejected (Norusis 
1993). 
Operational Definition -A description of the activities the researcher must complete 
in order to assign a value to the concept to be measured. It translates the concept 
(e. g., brand loyalty) into one or more measurable events (e. g., purchase frequency) 
(Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
Orthogonal (FACTOR) - Factors resulting from a factor analysis that are not 
correlated (Norusis 1993). 
Pearson sR-A measure of linear association between two variables. The value of R 
ranges between -1 (a perfect negative relationship in which all points fall on a line 
with negative slope) and +1 (a perfect positive relationship in which all points fall on 
a line with positive slope). A value of 0 indicates no linear relationship (Norusis 
1993). 
PIC (product innovation charter) - The summary statement of strategy that will guide 
a department or project team in their efforts to generate new product volume. 
Specifies the arena within which the people will operate, their goals and objectives 
and the general approaches they will use (Crawford 1994). 
PiLC - The product's life expectancy in original form (# of years and # of months) 
before modifications are necessary. From the variable statement "The products life 
expectancy in original form before modifications was: # Yrs. # Mos. " 
PIMS Database -A computerised database maintained by the Strategic Planning 
Institution, containing data on over 200 marketing, financial and operating 
performance variables collected from almost 2,0000 business units (Buzzell and Gale 
1987). 
Pipeline balance - The inability to successfully develop new product platforms whilst 
extending their existing product lines (Product Development & Management 
Association). 
Pipeline churn = The problem of too often changing development priorities. This 
creates confusion and frustration and slows down development activity (Product Development & Management Association). 
PLC (product life cycle) - The four stages that a new product is thought to go through 
from birth to death:, introduction, growth, maturity and decline. ; Controversy 
surrounds whether products do indeed go through such cycles in any systematic, 
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predictable way. The product life-cycle concept is primarily applicable to product 
forms, less to product classes and very poorly to individual brands (Crawford 1994). 
Posterior probability - The probability measure which has been revised on the 
condition that some known event has occurred (Webster 1992). 
Product introduction - The first stage of the product life cycle, during which the new 
item is announced to the market and offered for sale (Crawford 1994). 
Project - The unit of activity in the product development process that usually 
deals 
with creating and marketing one new product. A project involves a multidisciplinary 
group of people and may often be part of a larger unit of work, a programme, which 
delivers a stream of new products, one from each project (Crawford 1994). 
Protocol -A statement of the benefits 
(not features) a new product should have. A 
protocol is prepared after the full screen and business analysis, prior to the project 
being assigned to technical departments. The benefits statement is agreed to by all 
parties, thus the term protocol (Crawford 1994). 
R Squared -A measure of the goodness of fit of a linear model. It is sometimes 
called the coefficient of determination. It is the proportion of the variation in the 
dependent variable explained by the regression model. It is also the square of the 
multiple R, the correlation of the observed and predicted values of the dependent 
variable. It can range in value from 0 to 1. Small values indicate that the model does 
not fit the data well (Norusis 1993). 
Reliability - the extent to which a measurement is free of variable errors. This is 
reflected when repeated measures of the same stable characteristic in the same objects 
show limited variation (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
Scree -a plot of the variance associated with each factor. It is used to determine how 
many factors should be kept. Typically the plot shows a distinct break between the 
steep slope of the large factors and the gradual trailing of the rest (the scree) (Norusis 
1993)., 
Screening (of ideas at the initial screen; To) - Evaluation steps prior to R&D and 
systems design in the product development process. They involve use of scoring 
models, checklists, or personal judgements and are base don information from , ý. experience and various market research studies (including concept testing) (Crawford 
1994). 
Significance of F. - The observed significance level of F. If this probability is small 
enough, usually less than 0.05 or 0.01, the null hypothesis, that there is no linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables, is rejected (Norusis 
1993). 
-Simulation 
-a widely used tool differing from others in that the interest is in 
replication of system behaviour over time. The emphases is one of "what if" rather 
than "what's best". - Policies and strategies for improving system behaviour are 
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usually manually generated rather than automatically generated by an optimisation 
algorithm (Bums and Austin 1985). 
Single stage accuracy rate - The rate of prediction accuracy using a static model to 
maximise a linear regression or discriminant analysis objective function. Used to 
measure antecedent variables at one point in the new product development process. 
Skewness - An index of the degree to which a distribution is not symmetric, or to 
which the tail of the distribution is skewed or extends to the left or right. The normal 
distribution is symmetric and has a skewness value of zero. A distribution with a 
significant positive skewness has a long right tail. A distribution with a significant 
negative skewness has a long left tail. Skewness is used, along with the kurtosis 
statistic, to assess if a variable is normally distributed (Norusis 1993). 
Slack time - The delay allowed in activities off the critical path. All activities on the 
critical path have zero slack (Meredith 1992). 
Speed to market - The speed of the development process or launch effort. Included 
are measures which refer to launch timing, development cycle time and first or second 
to market effects (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994). 
Standard error of the predicted values - The standard deviation of an average 
predicted value. The standard error of a predicted value depends on how close a 
case's value for the independent variable is to the average values of the independent 
variables for all cases. Prediction is least variable when independent variables have 
values near their means (Norusis 1993). 
Strategic planning activities - Defining the mission, analysing the external 
environments, analysing the internal culture and environments, choosing objectives 
and goals, developing various strategies, preparing programmes, implementing the 
programmes and gathering feedback (Kotler 1994). 
Strategy - The policies and key decisions adopted by management that have major 
impacts on financial performance. These policies and decisions usually involve 
significant resource commitments and are not easily reversible (Buzzell and Gale 
1987). 
Tracking - The act of checking on the progress of important aspects or issues in the 
marketing of a new product. May be comprehensive or causal. (Crawford 1994). 
Tracking variable -A specific variable used to track a specific phenomenon (Crawford 1994). 
Type I error - The error of Tl (the designation of the market test) given S. (the true 
state of the market). It is conditional error since the indication of Tl is an error only 
under the condition that S. is the true state of the market. Type I error is the result of falsely rejecting the null hypotheses. The conditional probability of the error 
occurring is show symbolically as P(T11S) Type I error (its cost) = P(T1IS2) * P(S) IV2 
. 
Type II error is the opposite (Tull and Hawkins 1993). 
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Validity - the measure of consistent or systematic error rather than variable error 
(Tull 
and Hawkins 1993). 
Wilks'Lambda (DISCRIMINANT) -A statistic for evaluating the hypothesis that 2 or 
more groups come from populations with the same means for a set of variables. 
Lambda ranges between 0 and 1. Large values of Lambda indicate that group means 
do not appear to be different (it equals 1 if they're all the same). Small values indicate 
differences in group means. Sometimes called the U statistic (Norusis 1993). 
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